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ABSTRACT
Western culture. In large part, is a product of
scientific inquiry, technological development and the
ability to harness some of nature's resources.

Much of

society looks to science for technology-related solutions
to many of its ills.

As it develops new technology,

science necessarily seeks to understand and control the
forces of nature.
Although science assumes a prominent role in
contemporary society, that prominence does not
necessarily translate into cultural consensus on the
progress achieved by technological developments.

Another

perspective is represented by those who contend that
continued technological advancement is the source of
existing problems, not the solution.
As these issues surface, so do questions about how
to adjudicate them.

Who decides which of these issues

are to be debated by the public? And, who defines the
terms on which they are argued?
One significant issue to come before the public in
recent years is recombinant DNA research or genetic
engineering and its applications.
on this issue is Jeremy Rifkin.

An important spokesman
Rifkin is of rhetorical

interest because of his strategies to sustain the
dialogue and define the parameters in which it occurs.
This dissertation analyzes a broad range of Rifkin*s
rhetorical artifacts and those of scientists engaged in
v

recombinant DNA research.

They are examined against

criteria developed to identify and understand heresy.
The five areas of analysis are: the
nearness/remoteness phenomenon, the social construction
of heresy, the social consequences of heresy, the
doctrinal consequences of heresy, and the heresy-hunt
ritual.

The first two criteria focus on the rhetorical

strategies of the heretic.

The last three concentrate on

the rhetorical strategies of the defenders of the
institutional orthodoxy.
This dissertation examines the rhetorical strategies
of a heretical challenge to the scientific establishment
and the consequences of that challenge.

This

dissertation also analyzes the rhetorical strategies
employed by the defenders of the scientific orthodoxy.
Although an understanding of the rhetorical strategies
employed on both sides of this conflict is important, the
implications for the role of rhetoric in highly
controversial issues such as recombinant DNA are even
more critical.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Overview
Western culture, in large part, is a product of
scientific inquiry, technological development, and the
ability to harness some of nature's resources.
Contemporary society appears to require of scientists
continued emphasis on the discovery of knowledge, the
development of technology, and the control of nature in an
effort to achieve continued and more rapid progress.
Richard Weaver suggests that progress has become deified
in America because it is "probably the only term which
gives to the average American or West European of today a
concept of something bigger than himself, which he is
socially impelled to accept and even sacrifice for."1
Although science assumes a prominent role in
contemporary society, that prominence does not necessarily
translate into cultural consensus on the progress achieved
by technological developments.

While each new technology

may introduce a new technique, process or product, it is
often accompanied by a side effect or by-product that is
perceived as less than beneficial by some segment of the
population. In fact, it is not uncommon for some new
technologies to be condemned because people fear that they
introduce more disadvantages than benefits.

1
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A heterogeneous culture is expected to produce
divergent views on issues of public importance.

So, as

these issues surface and different opinions evolve, the
questions become: How are these issues adjudicated?

Who

decides what gets brought before the public for debate?
Who defines the terms on which the issues are argued?
An important societal issue brought to the public
forum in recent years is the recombinant DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid) discoveries of the 1970s.
Recombinant DNA is the term used in scientific circles for
what has generally been labeled "genetic engineering" and
"biotechnology" in discussions involving the public and
popular press.

In 1973, two scientists, Herbert Boyer and

Stanley Cohen, developed procedures to produce
"recombinant DNA molecules" from two different parental
DNA molecules.

With the development came the practical

application of combining DNA molecules, or genes, across
previously inviolable species boundaries.

James D. Watson

and John Tooze succinctly stated the significance of the
discovery when they declared that, "Without doubt
molecular geneticists now had the power to alter life on a
scale never before thought possible by serious
scientists."2
Since the early discoveries it has been this "power
to alter life on a scale never before thought possible"
that has haunted both proponents and opponents of
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recombinant DNA.

Scientists view recombinant DNA as the

gateway to unprecedented medical applications, greatly
increased plant and animal food and fiber production
efficiency, and other biological achievements never before
thought possible.

Opponents of recombinant DNA argue that

while there are potential benefits from the technology,
the potential for unprecedented problems far outweighs the
positive effects.

Opponents contend that recombinant DNA

experiments raise issues that transcend scientific
inquiry.

They argue that the experiments affect the

population beyond the laboratory and that the decisions
about these investigations should extend to the public at
large.
An important spokesman on the issue of genetic
engineering is Jeremy Rifkin.

Although there are other

people involved in this issue, none is as rhetorically
interesting as Rifkin.

Although he is not a scientist,

Rifkin challenges the entire scientific community and with
it influential scientists, multi-national corporations,
universities, and government agencies.

Rifkin's appeal to

those interested in rhetorical studies lies in his
strategies and his ability to achieve a measure of success
in a confrontation questioning the legitimacy and
necessity of a highly popular technology.

Although Rifkin

did not initiate the debate, I contend that he does more
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than any other individual to sustain the dialogue and
define the parameters in which it occurs.
Much of Rifkin's success is a result of his defining
the genetic engineering issue in terms of "us vs. them."
His definition of "us" is a value-oriented culture with a
perspective of the world that focuses on what he terms
empathetic relationships between human beings and nature.
Rifkin's definition of "them" is a scientific
establishment that places its guest for empirical data
above the scrutiny of public opinion and virtually ignores
questions of values and ethics that arise from the
research.

Rifkin argues, "We can choose to engineer the

life of the planet, creating a second nature in our image,
or we can choose to participate with the rest of the
living kingdom.

Two futures, two choices.”3

Rifkin

strategically places these two perspectives at opposite
ends of a continuum that provides little, if any, middle
ground on which compromise might be attempted or consensus
achieved.
On one end of Rifkin's continuum is what he calls
"...an ecological approach, a stewardship approach."4
Rifkin advocates the development of a philosophy of
science that "...works with the environment, that is
empathetic to the natural resource base rather than a
philosophy of science based on exploitation and short-term
gains only."5

Rifkin argues for an economic philosophy
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based on "...justice for the homo sapiens species and
equity and justice for all the other creatures that we
have on this planet."6

Rifkin claims renouncing the

scientific world view and the technological achievement it
fosters is requisite to achieving the empathetic world
view that he envisions.

Rifkin argues that society must

renounce "...the use of power as a means of obtaining
security" if it is to survive.7

Moreover, he appeals for

a commitment "...that can erase the need for a nuclear
bomb and genetic engineering from the collective
consciousness of the human race."6
On the other end of Rifkin's continuum is the
scientific establishment.

Rifkin contends that the

controlling influence in society is science:

"If there is

a universal faith today, a faith that supersedes political
ideologies, economic philosophies and religious doctrines,
it is most assuredly the faith we place in the scientific
world view."8

Rifkin argues that nuclear fission and

recombinant DMA are products of this world view and
represent a "unique way of thinking, a special approach to
understanding the world..."10
Rifkin contends that what he terms the scientific
world view reflects society's obsession with
predictability and order, a need to control.

Rifkin's

chronology of the scientific world view identifies Francis
Bacon, Rene' Descartes, Isaac Newton, John Locke, Adam
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Smith, and Charles Darwin as its founders.

Rifkin credits

Bacon with changing the Western approach to knowledge from
asking the "why" of phenomena to the asking of Mhow.H
With this change, Rifkin argues that Bacon defined ",..an
objective world out there whose secrets can be discovered
and exploited to advance human ends."11

Rifkin suggests

that Descartes embraced Bacon's notion of the world and
developed the tools to pursue that approach to
investigations.

Descartes, Rifkin says, defined the world

in mathematical terms and, in the process, "...drained it
of colours, feelings and every other non-quantifiable
consideration.

What was left was pure matter, devoid of

any meaning."12

Rifkin observes that though the world

may be without meaning, it is not without activity.
Rifkin claims Newton's laws formed the foundation of
Europeans' construction of the world as a giant machine.
Rifkin adds, "It became fashionable among scholars to use
mechanical terminology to explain and rationalize every
aspect of life.."13

Rifkin claims that Locke, then,

defined individuals as small bits of matter with no other
purpose than perpetuating themselves.

This notion,

according to Rifkin, leads to an intensely materialistic
view of the world.

From that perspective, Rifkin suggests

it was a small leap for Adam Smith to develop the
rationale that "...only by each individual attempting to
maximize his own material advantage that the common good
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of society is advanced."14

Finally, Rifkin claims that

Darwin's theory of evolution and natural selection
provided human beings superior minds and, therefore,
"... superior means of exercising power and control over
our surroundings."15
Rifkin's depiction of the evolution of the scientific
world is an assumption on which he builds most of his
arguments against the scientific establishment.

As he

sets about to define the issues in the recombinant DNA
debate, Rifkin proposes that these ideas "...continue to
animate the public life of our nation today" in the form
of a scientific world view.16
Rifkin has approached the subject of genetic
engineering and several environmental issues through
multiple media.

His challenges to genetic engineering

have come through lawsuits, demonstrations, interviews,
lectures, books and other public forums.17 Rifkin has
authored or coauthored at least six books, including
Entropy: Into the Greenhouse World. Algenv. Declaration of
a_Heretic, Time, Wat-S, Who Should Plav God. The Emerging
0£d££, The North Will Rise Again, and Biosphere Politics.
Though all of these publications reflect Rifkin's
environmental activist approach, Alaeny addresses the
issue of genetic engineering most directly.

Other topics

are discussed in Algenv. but this treatise is Rifkin's
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most ambitious attempt to develop arguments against
scientific defenders of genetic manipulation.
The National Journal declared Rifkin to be one of the
nation's most influential spokesmen against genetic
engineering—someone who can greatly influence federal
policy.18
Rifkin asserts that he is not anti-agriculture, but
much of his involvement in the biotechnology debate
clearly runs counter to what agricultural leaders consider
to be in their best interests.

Rifkin has slowed,

delayed, and even stopped some testing of genetically
engineered organisms intended for agricultural use.

In

April 1986, The New York Times reported that the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) suspended the
license and halted the sale of the first live genetically
altered virus released into the environment.

The two-week

suspension came in response to a petition from Rifkin's
Foundation for Economic Trends.19
In April 1987, The New York Times published an
article by Rifkin that raised ethical and economic
concerns about a Patent and Trademark Office decision to
patent as a "human invention" any animal engineered with
characteristics not attainable through classical breeding
techniques.

Rifkin enlisted the help of farm

organizations, animal activist groups, and several members

of Congress to cut off Patent and Trademark Office animal
patenting activities.

20

Although Rifkin employs a multimedia strategy in his
challenge of genetic engineering, he does not define the
audience to which he directs his persuasive efforts.
While science and scientists appear to be the subject of
many of his rhetorical efforts, the materials examined in
this study do not suggest that these individuals
constitute his sole audience.

Much of Rifkin's work seems

to rely on the judicial system and regulatory agencies as
means to stopping or delaying genetic engineering
research.

So, it appears that the decision makers in

these institutions make up at least part of Rifkin's
constituency.

Otherwise, Rifkin's speeches, lectures,

books, articles, etc., are tailored for mass media and
mass consumption.

Certainly, when one considers Rifkin's

arguments one might reasonably assume that Rifkin hopes to
appeal to the broadest audience possible.
Statement of Purpose
Rifkin's high profile rhetorical approach to
confronting social issues makes him an important
individual to investigate, and although many of his works
will be included in this study as examples of rhetorical
responses to social situations, the scope of this study
extends beyond this one man.

Rifkin's ability to delay

and stop biotechnology experimental projects indicates
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that he has developed rhetorical strategies that have had
a significant measure of influence.

Rifkin's involvement

in the legislative process for the purpose of establishing
guidelines for biotechnology experimentation and the
resulting governmental regulations is also reflective of
his considerable rhetorical expertise.
Notably, Rifkin achieves his successes arguing
against the powerful and pervasive scientific community,
and his successes have been won battling an
extraordinarily popular technology that holds the promise
of "miracle" medical cures, dramatic agricultural
advances, and spectacular societal changes.
From its inception, biotechnology research generated
such inertia that it virtually defied challenges.

Yet,

challenges were precisely what Jeremy Rifkin initiated,
and with a measure of success.

The purpose of this study,

then, is to examine rhetorical methods and their
implications when they become the instruments used to
challenge powerful, highly persuasive issues, ideas, or
institutions.

In the hands of Jeremy Rifkin, rhetoric

becomes a tool that at once draws impassioned rebuttals
from the scientific community and moves people outside
science to question the freedom with which scientific
inquiries are conducted.

Rifkin approaches the issue of

genetic engineering with a self-proclaimed heretical
perspective.

It is this notion of heresy and the rhetorical stance
it implies that will be the focus of this dissertation.
The word heresy has its roots in the Greek term hairesis
meaning "action of taking, choice, sect" akin to the Greek
horme meaning assault or attack.21 One definition of
sect, according Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, is "a dissenting religious body; especially:
one that is heretical in the eyes of other members within
the same communion."22

The idea of heresy springs from

conflicts within the Roman Catholic Church and refers to
"a sin of one who, having been baptized and retaining the
name of Christian, pertinaciously denies or doubts any of
the truths that one is under obligation of divine and
Catholic faith to believe."23

For the purposes of this

study, heresy is defined more broadly to include the
beliefs of individuals that deviate from the orthodoxy of
social institutions other than the Church and threaten the
stability of the controlling values and assumptions of
those institutions.

From this perspective, heresy is

viewed as a rhetorical endeavor in which its proponents
engage in dialectical efforts to persuade others to
forsake existing orthodoxy for their "new orthodoxy."
Although heresy, by definition, is a deviance from the
status quo and carries several pejorative connotations, it
remains an effective means of persuasion under certain
circumstances.

This paradox raises some important
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questions about the role of the rhetor who chooses heresy
as a rhetorical strategy.

First, if the heretic is to

be effective, one of his challenges is to develop a cadre
of followers, a sect or dissenting body that is, as the
Merriam-Webster dictionary termed it, "heretical in the
eyes of other members within the same communion."

Having

forfeited whatever ethos he may have earned by simply
being a member of the group, how does the rhetor acquire
the credibility necessary to be effective? How does the
heretic justify his position of being both inside the
group and outside?

How does the rhetor create and

maintain the ethos of the heretical notion he advocates?
How does the rhetor incorporate orthodoxy into his
rhetorical strategies to further heretical notions?
Finally, is there a form to heresy as a rhetorical
strategy?
This dissertation suggests that Jeremy Rifkin employs
a rhetoric of heresy in his opposition to genetic
engineering and examines Rifkin's rhetorical strategies in
an attempt to answer these and other questions.
Jeremv Rifkin; A Voice for Extreme Viewpoints
Pinpointing the origin of what Rifkin's detractors
call his extremist views is difficult, but they began
surfacing during his undergraduate days in the Wharton
School of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania.

His

involvement in campus politics became more visible when he
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was elected president of his class, during which time he
earned a reputation as an accomplished speaker.

In 1966,

some of Rifkin's fraternity friends attacked other
students who were picketing the university's
administration building.

This incident provoked Rifkin to

organize a "freedom of speech" rally, paving the way for
future activities in the peace movement.

Following his

graduation from the University of Pennsylvania, Rifkin
continued his education at the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy of Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts,
where he earned a master's degree in international
affairs.2*
Beginning with his college days, Rifkin sought
controversial, even confrontational, issues in which to
involve himself.

Rifkin set the pattern for his career

when, according to his curriculum vitae, he was "a sponsor
of the first national rally against the Vietnam War."

In

1969, he helped create a citizens' commission to help
publicize Vietnam veterans who had personal reports of how
the United States was violating international
agreements.25
Rifkin came to national prominence in 1976 when he
organized the People's Bicentennial Commission as a
counter-celebration to the national Bicentennial
Celebration.

Its activities included mocking the
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pageantry of the national activities and publicizing the
"sins" of corporate America.
Following the Bicentennial festivities, Rifkin
founded and became co-director of The People's Business
Commission in Washington, D.C.

The commission was

described as "an educational organization dedicated to
challenging the abuses of corporate power and to
mobilizing public support for democratic alternatives to
the present economic system."

In 1977, Rifkin established

the Foundation for Economic Trends, the successor to the
People's Business Commission.

These organizations

provided Rifkin the opportunity to debate the interrelated
issues of organized labor, the decline of the industrial
Northeast, and the manipulation of capital.

Part of the

product of these efforts was the collaboration and
coauthorship of several books.27
About the time his first books were being published,
Rifkin's attention turned to the implications of
scientific research into recombinant DNA and the prospects
of genetic manipulation.

His entry into the fray began in

1977, when he and some followers made an uninvited
appearance at a meeting of scientists organized by the
National Academy of Sciences.

As one of the meeting

organizers rose to speak, Rifkin's colleagues stood and
sang "We shall not be cloned” to the tune of "We Shall
Overcome."

Z€L

Since that time, Rifkin has taken a more
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conventional, but no less confrontational, approach. He
has challenged regulatory agencies, corporations,
universities, and others engaged in biotechnology research
with court orders and law suits.
Rifkin is in considerable demand on the speaking and
lecture circuit, having participated in more than 100
conferences and meetings in eight countries during one 16
month period.

During the past decade he has spoken on 300

college campuses, usually in what he calls "A One-Day
Interdisciplinary Residency with Jeremy Rifkin," for which
he received $4,500.

29

There is no evidence to suggest Rifkin's background
includes the formal study of science, but according to
Liebe Cavalieri, a molecular biologist at Sloan-Kettering
Hospital in New York, "Jeremy is extremely intelligent and
grasps scientific issues immediately, if you take the
trouble to explain them."30
Though not a scientist, Rifkin has no reservations
about commenting on science, both verbally and in writing.
His three most popular books, The Emerging Order; God in
the. Aqg g.f Scarcity, Entropy: Into the Greenhouse World,
and Algenv challenge the basis of scientific inquiry.
The Emerging Order is a scathing attack on political
liberalism, crediting it with "Vietnam, Watergate and
related scandals, failed social experiments, inflation and
unemployment..." and labeling it as a system of
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exploitation.

Rifkin argues that the whole liberal

approach is based on the "possibility of unlimited
economic growth.1,31 This growth, of course, is made
possible by growing industrialization that generated
scientific inquiry.

Rifkin says that nature was once seen

as divine and mysterious, but the coming of the scientific
age reduced it to quantitative physical phenomena.

Rifkin

says, "Desacralized and reduced to mathematics, the world
became nothing more than material for manipulation."32
Emerging Order carries another of the themes present in
most of Rifkin's works—an attack on "progress.”

He says

the "age of materialism has been characterized by the
notion of progress.... the process by which the 'less
ordered' natural world is harnessed by people to create a
33

more ordered material environment."

Entropy: Into the Greenhouse World is Rifkin's view
of a deteriorating environment in which he argues that the
burning of fossil fuels is at once creating a shortage of
energy and producing detrimental, perhaps fatal,
environmental conditions.34 Rifkin discusses in detail
what he describes as the "entropy effect" or the Second
Law of Thermodynamics.

The First Law of Thermodynamics,

Rifkin explains, is that all energy and matter in the
universe are constant and can be neither created nor
destroyed.

The second law and the entropy effect states

that matter and energy can be changed in only one
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direction, "that is, from useable to unusable, or from
available to unavailable."35

with a detailed chronology

of the development of the "machine age" or the scientific
world view, Rifkin revives his argument against "unlimited
growth" and "progress."
In Alqenv. Rifkin depicts Darwin's theory of
evolution as a contribution to the scientific world view
that has resulted in the development of biotechnology.
Rifkin says, "The recombinant DNA process is the most
dramatic technological tool to date in the growing
biotechnological arsenal."

36

With that statement Rifkin

launches into a full scale attack on biotechnology,
predicting detrimental effects on the environment,
society, the economy, and humanity in general.

Rifkin

suggests that humanity is faced with two choices for its
future.

It can choose to "engineer the life of the

planet, creating a second nature in our image, or we can
choose to participate with the rest of the living
kingdom."37

Rifkin argues that the next generation is

being reared on information that will make it more
accepting of the "engineered" approach to modifying living
beings than is the current generation.
Many of the ideas and arguments in Alqeny appear to
be distilled and refined from an earlier book on
biotechnology written by Rifkin and Ted Howard.

In Who

Should Play God?. Rifkin and Howard describe the genesis
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of recombinant: DNA and assume an unapologetic stance
against the technology.

They declare that, "...this book

is not intended to be value-free...on this question we
side with the opponents of genetic engineering, and this
book is intended to reflect that point of view.1,38
Beginning with chapter two and continuing through the
remaining chapters, Rifkin and Howard pursue the issue of
eugenics.

Citing example upon example of mankind's

fascination with creating the perfect human being, Rifkin
and Howard paint a chilling portrait of the dark side of
biotechnology and how they predict it may ultimately
affect the human race.

They state their case

metaphorically: "It is these bits of genetic data [DNA]
that molecular biologists are now learning to read.

Once

having learned the letters of the alphabet, they will
ultimately be able to write."39
Time Wars is another of Rifkin's arguments against
advancing technology.

He contends that the increasing

emphasis on efficiency places a greater premium on saving
time and time-saving technologies.

This push for greater

efficiency outstrips what he calls "nature's own
production and recycling rhythms" to such an extent that
the planet's "ecosystems are no longer capable of renewing
resources as fast as they are being depleted, or recycling
waste as fast as we discard it."40
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Rifkin discusses in detail what he sees as the
detrimental effect of computers and their ability to
compress time.

Rifkin says, "The new 'computime'

represents the final abstraction of time and its complete
separation from human experience and the rhythms of
nature."41

Rifkin asserts, "The computer represents the

ultimate technological expression of our culture's
obsession with efficiency."42
Rifkin argues that the manipulation of time is a
means of acquiring and maintaining power. Citing examples
such as the shrinking official allotment of time
corporations allow for mourning the loss of a family
member and the economic reasons for the seven-day work
week, Rifkin argues that time has become a powerful
political instrument.43

He says, "In the computer age,

information is power and that power is becoming
increasingly centralized in the hands of a small coterie
of public bureaucracies and giant corporations."44
Rifkin appeals to people in Time W a r s , as in most of
his writings, to live more harmoniously with nature in
what he calls "a partnership based on a deep and abiding
respect for the rhythms of the planet."

But, he says, to

accomplish this, "we would have to be willing to give up
the long-standing alliance of perspective and power and
seek a new temporal orientation based on an empathetic
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union with the biological and physical clocks of
nature."45
Declaration of a Heretic is Rifkin's frontal assault
on the scientific world view.

In his introduction to this

book, Rifkin explains that "If there is a universal faith
today, a faith that supersedes political ideologies,
economic philosophies and religious doctrines, it is most
assuredly the faith we place in the scientific world
view."46

Rifkin suggests, though, that this faith is

unfounded.

He believes it is "possible that the

scientific world view of the Enlightenment has run its
course, and that by continuing to adhere unqualifiedly to
its assumptions, we make the world a less secure and more
dangerous place to live in."47
Rifkin takes direct aim at what he suggests are the
two most dramatic technological developments of the modern
era—the splitting of the atom and genetic engineering.

In

his discussions on the development of nuclear power,
Rifkin argues that even after we know the benefits and
dangers of splitting the atom and we know that the dangers
may outweigh the benefits, we must continue the
technology.

He contends we no longer have the ability to

say no to technology.

Rifkin says, "To reject the

experiment is to threaten our world view, to question our
approach to knowledge and to undermine our traditional
relationship to technology.1,48

In his criticism of genetic engineering, Rifkin
suggests that the primary objectives of technology are
efficiency and speed.

He claims that genetic engineering

is "so contrary to the underlying principles of the
ecological vision as to constitute a totally different
conception of the future."48

Rifkin contends that the

notion of species as a separate entity with a unique
nature loses its significance with the recombining of
genetic traits across species barriers.

He suggests that

there is nothing to stop scientists from making whatever
crosses they choose.

Rifkin implies that researchers in

molecular biology believe "that there is nothing
particularly sacred about the concept of a species."

He

extends that notion to include human genes.30
In the final chapter, Rifkin says, "It is time to
entertain the ultimate heresy: to consider the idea of
renouncing the use of power as a means of obtaining
security.1,51
In essence, we can see that all of Rifkin's writings
are heretical.

In his introduction to Declaration of a

Heretic. Rifkin asks several questions that surface, in
one form or another, in each of his books:
Is it heresy to suggest that the particular approach
to knowledge we have given our allegiance to, for
these past several hundred years, is alienating us
even further from the natural world we so desperately
seek to understand? Is it heresy to suggest that the
fruits of the scientific world view have been a mixed
blessing, often causing more harm than good? Is it
heresy to suggest that the two great scientific
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discoveries of this century provide us with
inordinate power over the forces of nature and ought
not to be used?
Is it heresy to suggest that
alternative approaches to science and technology are
indeed possible to contemplate and act upon?
There is a sense of irony in these rhetorical
questions because Rifkin suggests that the status quo
considers such questions heretical, yet he believes the
views implied by the questions should, if fact, represent
the status quo.

As Rifkin raises these issues again and

again in his books, the reader sees more clearly that his
approach to these issues certainly cannot be considered
mainstream.

He admits at one point that his point of view

is often considered irrational by those in the scientific
community.
The parentage of Rifkin*s challenges appears to
reside in the Frankfurt School, reflecting the ideas of
Jurgen Habermas and others.

Rifkin*s criticism of the

scientific community frequently centers on what he
describes as the scientists' will to dominate and control
nature.

Habermas contends that mastering nature is seen

by the scientific-technological community as a
"precondition of freedom."

However, he predicts this

"boundless will to control" may result in the destruction
of nature by threatening the very ground of survival.54
Habermas concerns himself not only with modern man's
preoccupation with controlling nature, but also the
effects of a population that exceeds the limitations of
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the world's finite resources, and in the process deprives
itself of what he calls the "basic sensual-aesthetic"
needs.53

He argues that continued industrialization,

contamination, and destruction of the environment bring
people to the realization that there are limits to
aesthetic deprivation.

So, according to Habermas, it is

not just the environmental equilibrium that rapidly
advancing technology puts in jeopardy, but the coping
capacity of the world's citizenry.

Habermas suggests that

this inability to cope manifests itself in fears and
anxieties, "In the fear generated by atomic power plants,
nuclear waste, or gene manipulation, there is certainly a
good bit of justified anxiety."56
Habermas has cited developing crises that have become
some of Rifkin's points of contention.

For example,

Habermas believes that ecological balance is threatened by
continued growth in population and production worldwide.
He observes that "The economic needs of a growing
population and the productive exploitation of nature are
faced with material restrictions: on the one hand, finite
resources...; on the other hand, irreplaceable ecological
systems...."57

Rifkin echoes Habermas' concern about

imbalance in international power evolving from the
development of nuclear weapons.

Habermas suggests that

although nuclear technology is neutral, "The accumulated
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potential for annihilating is a result of the advance
stage of productive forces."58
Dieter Wellershoff warns, as does Rifkin, of a dark
future in which fossil fuels are depleted, increasing air
pollution and water contamination, destruction of the
ozone layer, and the disintegration of the ecosystem in
the "deadly final lap of the technological-industrial
civilization that now begins to span the entire
globe... "59
Among Rifkin*s demands of the scientific community,
and a goal toward which much of his rhetoric is directed,
is public participation in the decision-making process for
implementing and expanding technological discoveries.
Habermas, before Rifkin, cited the need for a more
dialectical approach when he declared that it is a
"...question of setting into motion a politically
effective discussion that rationally brings the social
potential constituted by technical knowledge and ability
into a defined and controlled relation to our practical
60

knowledge and will.”

Habermas argues that the mass

populations have become depoliticized and the public realm
has declined as a political institution.

The result, he

says, is "...a system of domination that tends to exclude
practical questions from public discussion."61

The

question that Habermas believes should be opened to public
debate is not whether society uses all of the potential
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available to it through science and technology, but
” ...whether we choose what we want for the purpose of the
pacification and gratification of existence.1,62 Habermas
contends that the solution is in unrestricted
communication.
Clearly, the ideas of an environment with finite
resources, the adverse effects of increasing efforts to
control nature, the self-perpetuating world-view of
technological advancement, and the necessity of public
discussion of the conduct of science found their genesis
in philosophical circles long before Rifkin brought them
before the American public.

Although Rifkin's position on

these issues is not original, his ability to adapt these
arguments for the general populace and persuasively argue
his position as a heretic in the shadow of what many would
consider an intimidating scientific presence, makes the
man and his rhetoric the focus of this dissertation.
Review of Literature
The relationship between rhetoric and science, even
in its best moments, can be described as no better than an
uneasy coexistence.

Science has endured the criticism of

rhetoric proponents who contend first that there must be
more to scientific inquiry than simply empirical data;
human values must be considered.

Rhetoric extends its

argument to the notion that even the most basic of
scientific data are based on assumptions that cannot be
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empirically verified.

Meanwhile, proponents of science

counter that rhetoric is argument based on beliefs,
intuition, and other equally empirically unverifiable
notions.

Proponents of science argue that at least the

ability to quantify their findings provides tangible proof
for their positions.
Contemporary scholars of rhetoric, seeking a more
comfortable grasp on this extremely thorny issue, have set
out to prove that science itself is rhetorical.

Herbert

Simons, for instance, suggests that the doing of science
is a consensual undertaking, i.e., a scientist proposing a
new procedure seeks consensus on his approach to the task
by following prescribed procedures and submitting his
findings to a technical journal in his field of endeavor
for peer review and approval or consensus.63 other
rhetorical scholars support the notion that the seeking of
consensus among scientists is a rhetorical act.64

This

perspective of the rhetoric of science examines the
rhetorical acts scientists employ to persuade other
scientists.65
Particularly relevant to this study are the works of
Thomas B. Farrell and 6. Thomas Goodnight; Alan Gross;
Michael Calvin McGee and Martha Anne Martin; and Walter
Fisher who address the issue of the failure of technical
reasoning to resolve social issues.
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Farrell and Goodnight argue that because of the "root
metaphors" of industrial expansion "...the invention of
advanced technology has had the unintended effect of
technologizing rhetorical invention."66 They propose that
this "technologizing” often excludes external audiences
from participation.

In fact, Farrell and Goodnight offer

a rather direct indictment of technical communication: "So
long as the assumptions, procedures, expectations, and
formats of technical communication and surrogate discourse
operate within undisturbed patterns, they are virtually
self-conf irming.1,67

They contend that it is not until a

crisis such as the Three-Mile Island mishap occurs that
the communication patterns are broken and their
inadequacies revealed.
From his investigation of the recombinant DNA debate,
Alan Gross concludes that the more the opposing sides
argued the issues the more divided they became.

He

observes that "Throughout, official bodies of redress, by
their divided action, or inaction, facilitated stalemate
rather than synthesis.1166

Gross contends that his study

affirms the conclusions of the Farrell and Goodnight work
and that "Both analyses conclude that conflicting societal
assumptions were responsible for the failed attempt to
deal with threatened disaster."60
Michael Calvin McGee and Martha Anne Martin attack
technical reasoning from a slightly different approach.
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They suggest technical reasoning and discourse is a power
play by misguided elitists who choose to make experts of
themselves.

In their view, a new way of thinking about

expertise is required, one which is properly skeptical of
claims to practical knowledge.1,70

They believe a move in

that direction has already begun as "thinkers" are coming
to believe "that expert advice is but an opinion argued
more and less persuasively."71
Gross concludes that the question raised by the
discussions of Farrell, Goodnight, McGee, Martin, and
himself is not whether society should protect science and
technology; rather can society abandon the idea that
science and technology hold the solutions to social
problems and can society find a consensual answer to the
questions that science and technology raise?72
Walter Fisher, recognizing technical reasoning's
failure to resolve social issues, concludes that all human
communication contains "...mythos— ideas that cannot be
verified or proved in any absolute way..."73

Arguing

that "Humans as rhetorical beings are as much valuing as
they are reasoning animals," Fisher suggests that value
judgements are unavoidable, that they are not irrational,
and that people are not likely to arrive at a consensus
about them.74

Fisher contends that part of the failure

of technical reasoning is that it ignores what makes a
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value valuable—that: a value "makes a pragmatic difference
in one's life and in one's community."73
In his essay proposing narration as a paradigm of
communication, Fisher suggests that technical reasoning is
effective within its specialized communities, however,
when a scientific issue migrates from its scientific
cloister into the public arena, the rules of advocacy
change.76

Fisher contends that the rational world

paradigm simply does not account for issues raised by the
"good reasons" expressed in public moral arguments.

He

suggests that "when arguers appealing to justice and
equality contend with adversaries who base their case on
success, survival, and liberty, they talk past each
other."77
Another area of investigation examines how scientists
persuade nonscientific audiences.

The public television

series Cosmos. hosted by Carl Sagan, is an example of one
scientist's effort to popularize science.

Thomas Lessl,

in his analysis of the Cosmos series, suggests that the
statement of theories as fact and the diminished adherence
to scientific protocol are two of Sagan's tools for
elevating the ethos of science.

Additionally, Lessl

suggests that Sagan depicts science as the culmination of
an evolutionary cycle that legitimizes its assertions as
the salvation for mankind.78
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E.O. Wilson, a Harvard entomologist, is another
example of a scientist popularizing science, but in a
different context from that of Sagan.

John Lyne and Henry

Howe analyzed Wilson's rhetorical methods as he parlayed
his expertise in entomology into a popularized approach to
social biology.

The question at the heart of the article

is "What makes an expert an expert?"

The authors'

observations and conclusions suggest that "instead of
being hemmed in by disciplinary standards, the expert can
blur the lines of demarcation between scientific paradigms
and, thereby, elude accountability to any of them."78
Lyne and Howe point out that Wilson's movement among
audiences of varying expertise provided him with an
environment of ever-changing criteria.

These criteria set

by audiences beyond his discipline allowed him more
freedom for generalizations in his interpretation of
scientific data.

The authors argue that Wilson's

standards "float within the context of argument."
Lyne and Howe conclude with another problematic
question, "How do we hold to account the expert who
constructs expertise rhetorically, moving from one
discourse frame to another, and eluding the controls of
80
any or all of them?"
In other words, when the
scientist moves from the structured confines of his
discipline where his peers determine the validity of his
science and takes his perspective to the non-scientist
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public, where is the control on the validity of his
arguments?
still another frequently used approach to
popularizing science comes as the nonscientist takes
science to the naive public.

During his presidency,

Ronald Reagan chose his "Star Wars" address to persuade
his audience of the necessity of science and call for an
increase in defense spending.

Janice Rushing argues

that Reagan rhetorically situated scientists in a "no-win"
situation by crediting them with the development of the
ultimate weapon—the nuclear bomb-and with it the
capability to destroy humanity, but then charging them
with the responsibility for using their science to protect
humanity from annihilation.82 Rushing argues that
Reagan's "star Wars" speech "encapsulates technical
reasoning within a myth which creates the illusion of both
preserving science and transcending its
83

transgressions."

Rushing says Reagan's rhetorical triumph in the "Star
Wars" speech is the linking of technology and the mythic
frontier so that "technology unleashed will 'open up the
high frontier of space,' 'tap its unlimited
resources,'....so that 'free enterprise investment' might
continue to be enjoyed by the 'Free World allies."'8*
Rushing posits that one of the primary failings of
the "Star Wars" address is that the Frontier metaphor is
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inadequate to deal with the complexities of space and the
new technology—the hero no longer rides a horse, but a
machine that travels infinitely faster than its
predecessor.85
This review of literature suggests a lack of critical
investigations of rhetoricians who employ a wide range of
rhetorical strategies, methods, and tools to confront a
prominent scientific establishment and who attempt to
expose scientific inquiry to increased public scrutiny.
This dissertation will help fill that void.

I suggest

that an articulate, well-informed, nonscientist, such as
Jeremy Rifkin, is able to analyze the vulnerabilities of
genetic engineering and tailor rhetorical strategies to
attack those weaknesses.

In the process, Rifkin brings to

public view the inadequacies of technological reasoning to
address social concerns about scientific endeavors.
Methodology
Defining rhetoric by its function, Kenneth Burke says
rhetoric is "the use of words by human agents to form
attitudes or to induce actions in other human
agents..."

86

Elaborating on that definition, Burke adds

that rhetoric is "the use of language as a symbolic means
of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond
to symbols."87 Although Rifkin employs nonverbal, overt
activities occasionally to influence his audiences, his
primary tool, and the focus of this dissertation, is
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language.

Both in books and in discourse, Rifkin uses

words to move or persuade his audiences to his point of
view.
This dissertation will follow a critical approach
outlined by Karlyn Kohrs Campbell.

She suggests that

rhetorical criticism is the result of a three-stage
process: locating "the unique characteristics of a
discourse...," analysis of "the internal workings of the
discourse and its relation to its milieu...,” and
selection or creation of a "system of criticism to make
evaluative judgments of its quality and effects."
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Campbell explains that the first stage of the
process, descriptive analysis, is "entirely intrinsic;
that is, the critic makes the descriptive statements
solely on the basis of the content of the discourse
og

itself."

Similarly, this author will closely examine

the materials selected for this study, paying particular
attention to the tone, purpose, structure, and strategy of
language usage.
The second step of Campbell's critical process is
historical-contextual analysis.

This stage of the

investigation requires the critic to examine extrinsic
elements of discourse.

Campbell suggests that the critic

study "the audience, the historical-cultural context,
other persuasive forces, and the rhetorician himself."90
In concert with this approach, this dissertation details
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the audiences to whom Jeremy Rifkin directs his rhetoric,
the historical-cultural context of genetic engineering,
and a sketch of Rifkin*s rhetorical credentials and his
evolving into a political activist.

I will analyze how

Rifkin adapts his discourse to confront a highly popular
scientific technology in an effort to minimize its
implementation.

This investigation will examine how

Rifkin, political activist and rhetorician, responds to
the advancing technology of genetic engineering.
The third and final stage of Campbell's critical
process is interpretive analysis.

Here the critic selects

or creates a system of criticism and "bases his decisions
on his intrinsic descriptive analysis and extrinsic
analysis of the historical-cultural context."

Campbell

explains that the third stage "focuses on the critic,
reflecting his interests and biases."81

The system of

criticism for this dissertation will draw heavily from an
analysis of heresy in the early Roman Catholic Church.
The author will analyze examples of the confrontations
imbedded in the recombinant DNA controversy, the
historical-cultural context of the conflict, and an
analysis of heresy by Lester R. Kurtz.
Kurtz outlines five distinguishing characteristics of
heresy: nearness and remoteness, social construction,
social consequences, doctrinal consequences, and the
heresy-hunt ritual.82

Kurtz asserts that heresy represents a union of both
nearness and remoteness.

The heretic is a member of a

group or institution, but one who holds beliefs that
deviate from the norm of the group, a ’'deviant insider."
Kurtz suggests that heresy is strangely powerful because
it so closely resembles orthodoxy, "It is developed within
the framework of orthodoxy and is claimed by its
03
proponents to be truly orthodox."
Lessl adds that
heretics have a greater potential for disruption because
of their legitimate claim to group membership and the fact
that they "possess a measure of social legitimacy by
virtue of their technical membership in the group."94
The second of Kurtz* characteristics of heresy is
social construction.

He concludes that heresy is a power

struggle— a problem of authority.

It is not what one

believes that makes him a heretic but adherence to error
in defiance of authority.

Often, the result of this

struggle is the polarization of viewpoints.

At one end of

the continuum are the authorities who defend the
institution against what they believe to be a genuine
threat and at the other end are the heretics who challenge
the elements of orthodoxy they believe to be
destructive.95
Kurtz* third characteristic of heresy views the
phenomenon from a different perspective.

He suggests that

heresy is most often viewed as "divisive and disruptive,
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an affront to authority and the social order."

Kurtz

argues that another effect of heresy is intergroup
solidarity.

Labelling heretics as a common enemy, the

institutional hierarchy can marshall support for its
position.

86

Lessl suggests that although scientists may

not be willing to admit it, an attack on science may
actually be beneficial because "it brings together
scientists who are ordinarily isolated within their
specializations and produces among them a renewed social
consciousness."97
According to Kurtz, the doctrinal consequences of
heresy include issues of definition.

It is the

polarization of positions and in "the heat of escalating
AD

conflicts that orthodoxy is formulated...."

Lessl

posits that "in the process of trying to keep deviance at
bay, the advocates of orthodoxy are pressed to draw
doctrinal lines which, by showing what is not correct,
serve to clarify what is correct."

89

Finally, the fifth characteristic of heresy is the
ritual of identifying and denouncing heretics.

Kurtz

explains that this ritual serves to both suppress heresy
and relieve anxiety.

Rituals focus anxiety onto what is

controllable, whether or not it is the source of the
anxiety.

Heretics often become convenient targets on

which an institution may focus its anxieties.100

Lessl suggests that heresy as a dialectical term
always stands in opposition to "orthodoxy" and designates
every affront to an institution's authority.101
Evaluating Jeremy Rifkin's rhetorical activities by those
standards, one must classify much of Rifkin's work as
heretical.

The "orthodoxy" against which Rifkin rails is

scientific opinion.

Rifkin asserts, "Today's faith system

is the scientific world view.

Today's Church is the

scientific establishment.11102

Surely, Rifkin stands in

opposition to scientific orthodoxy and is the
personification of an affront to the scientific
community's authority.
Mindful of Kurtz' definition of heresy and the
necessity of the heretic to be a legitimate member of the
institution against whose orthodoxy he rebels, I suggest
that Jeremy Rifkin is a heretic and his rhetoric is
heresy.

Clearly, Rifkin is not a scientist, but he is a

member of contemporary society which subscribes to what
Rifkin calls a "scientific world view."

Rifkin asserts

that people in today's society "are so enmeshed in the set
of assumptions that make up the modern scientific world
view...", that another way of thinking is almost
impossible to fathom.103
Philip Wander contends that the validation of ideas
by scientific empiricism is so powerful and so generally
accepted that "it is hardly surprising that on every great
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issue in modern society, science, scientists, and the
vocabulary of science shape the debate.104

Yet, Rifkin

sees a different world order; in fact, his perspective of
how society should function is divergent enough and his
adherence to those beliefs firm enough to be termed
heretical.
The author suggests that a close examination of
Rifkin's rhetorical artifacts will confirm the notion that
Rifkin's approach to confronting the issue of
biotechnology is heresy.

This dissertation will

investigate the following important research questions:
Is Rifkin's opposition to biotechnology based in a
rhetoric of heresy?

And, do the constraints imposed by a

rhetoric of heresy seriously limit the success (or at
least the perception of success) of the strategy?
Although rhetors who choose heresy as their approach to
confronting issues may achieve occasional, even
significant successes, I suggest that the likelihood of a
rhetoric of heresy overcoming orthodoxy is highly remote
because heresy ultimately becomes a victim of its own
success.

Heresy is most effective in attacking the

weaknesses of the orthodoxy.

Not only do these attacks

suggest to the defenders of orthodoxy areas that need
improvement, they draw attention to a common enemy against
which the orthodoxy can become unified.

The more success

heresy achieves, the more unified the orthodoxy becomes
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for the purpose of expunging the heresy.

This is the

paradox faced by Rifkin and, perhaps, by all those who
choose to confront status quo policies through the
rhetorical means of heresy.
Lessl, in his discussion of the role of heresy in the
scientific creationism debate, describes how orthodoxy
modifies its position to respond to heresy.103

He argues

that although the parasitic nature of heresy prompts
orthodoxy to marshall its resources to eradicate the
deviance, orthodoxy "finds its position strengthened
through argumentative rejections of the deviant
position."
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Lessl concludes that "heresy and orthodoxy

are two sides of the same social process,"107 and focuses
much of his discussion on the benefits that accrue to
orthodoxy through responses to heretical challenges.
If, indeed, heresy ultimately helps reform and,
perhaps, strengthen the orthodoxy against which it
struggles, what are the implications for the rhetor who
chooses heresy as his approach to dissent?

Do the

limitations of his choice relegate his efforts to, at
best, a truncated success?

Must he seek consolation in

the reformation of the orthodoxy he opposes or in the
influence he can effect on the way to that reformation? In
a democratic society that virtually demands a dialectical
approach to societal issues, what are the rhetorical
alternatives?

If a rhetorical approach such as heresy
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betrays its rhetor and is perceived as ineffective or
inappropriate for challenging society's foremost issues,
what is the alternative for those who seek change?

If

heresy contributes to it own demise, is society left with
only technical reasoning as a powerful and legitimizing
force?

Is there a rhetorical alternative?

Do all

rhetorical approaches carry with them the same
limitations?
The significance of this study, then, lies in its
identification of a contemporary practitioner of a
rhetoric of heresy, an analysis of the rhetorical
strategy, identification of rhetorical successes against
the orthodoxy of science and an analysis of how these
rhetorical successes ultimately and paradoxically succumb
to an invigorated orthodoxy.
Organization of Data
The dissertation will include six chapters that
conform to the following outline:
Chapter two:

This chapter will explore the

methodology chosen for this study. It will extend the
earlier discussion of Kurtz1 definition and criteria for
evaluating heresy.

Lessl's notions of heresy will be

examined for insights into understanding the phenomenon.
Chapter three:

This chapter will analyze several of

Rifkin's rhetorical artifacts to explicate the nearness
and remoteness that characterizes Rifkin's rhetoric as
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heretical.

Of particular importance will be an analysis

of Rifkin's ability to position himself as rhetorically
supportive of science but philosophically in opposition to
advancing technology, while skillfully turning scientific
orthodoxy upon itself.
Chapter four:

This chapter will analyze several of

Rifkin's rhetorical artifacts to explicate the social
construction that characterizes Rifkin's rhetoric as
heretical.

Here, the analysis will focus on the

conflicting perspectives of the biotechnology issue with
emphasis on the struggle for authority to govern
biotechnology.
Chapter five:

This chapter will analyze several

rhetorical artifacts to explicate the social consequences,
doctrinal consequences, and the heresy hunt ritual that
reflect Kurtz* remaining three characteristics of heresy.
This chapter will shift the emphasis from Rifkin's
rhetorical strategies and methods to those of the
defenders of the orthodoxy. This chapter will focus on the
rhetoric of the cacophony of groups within the scientific
community that may never have raised their voices and
almost certainly would never have coalesced except to take
a stand for their respective positions on the issue of
biotechnology.

The chapter will examine, too, Rifkin's

role in compelling the scientific community and government
agencies into making statements about genetically

engineered products and the enactment of legislation
governing biotechnology that eventually lead to orthodox
doctrine.

Finally, this chapter will analyze the rhetoric

of those who sought to maintain the orthodoxy of science
and biotechnology by denigrating Rifkin and attempting to
undermine his legitimacy and credibility.
Chapter six:

This chapter will offer the author's

conclusions about the role of a rhetoric of heresy in
responding to science-based social issues.

CHAPTER 2
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE

Overview
Seeking a thorough understanding of the critical
rhetorical elements of heresy and the fundamentals of the
phenomenon of heresy, I rely primarily on the works of
three authors for analysis: Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, Lester
R. Kurtz, and Thomas M. Lessl.
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell's three-stage process of
rhetorical criticism is the guiding beacon for the
remaining chapters of this dissertation.

Though guided by

Campbell's critical perspective, the criteria for analysis
are provided by Lester Kurtz' five elements of heresy.
Campbell describes the first stage of rhetorical
criticism as discovering "the unique characteristics of a
discourse..." The critic, at this point, becomes
completely familiar with the rhetorician's discourse
seeking to understand the speaker's role and purpose, and
makes himself fully aware of the intrinsic dynamics of the
discourse.

Campbell suggests that the critic concentrate

on the discourse itself and virtually ignore audience,
context, and other external elements.

108

The second stage of Campbell's process is extrinsic
in nature and focuses on what she terms the "historicalcultural" context.

In this stage the critic seeks to

identify the forces that influence the rhetorician's
43
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strategies.

The critic considers audience, social

context, opposing forces, the rhetorician's knowledge and
skill, and other obstacles with which the rhetorician must
contend to achieve his goal of persuading his
audience.109
The critic applying Campbell's third stage of
criticism synthesizes both internal descriptive analysis
and extrinsic analysis of the historical-cultural context
to create interpretive analysis.

Here, the critic selects

or creates the criteria for interpreting and evaluating
the work of the rhetorician.

Analyzing the discourse

against the criteria selected, the critic judges and
evaluates the worth of the work and "makes a contribution
to the ongoing dialogue about the role of persuasive
discourse in a humane society."110
All three stages of Campbell's approach are woven
into the fabric of this analysis.

Having traversed stage

one, I will engage stages two and three for the remainder
of this study.

In stage two Campbell suggests that the

critic study "the audience, the historical-cultural
context, other persuasive forces, and the rhetorician
himself."111 The audiences to which Rifkin addresses his
discourse, the context in which it is delivered, and
Rifkin himself will become the bases on which the stage
two analysis is accomplished.
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In stage three, according to Campbell, the critic
selects or creates a system of criticism and "bases his
decisions on his intrinsic descriptive analysis and
extrinsic analysis of the historical-cultural
context."

112

The system of criticism selected for this

study draws heavily from Lester Kurtz' analysis of heresy
in the early Roman Catholic Church.

Kurtz identifies five

distinguishing characteristics of heresy: nearness and
remoteness, social construction, social consequences,
doctrinal consequences, and the heresy-hunt ritual.113
Nearness/Remoteness
In an explanation of what appears to be his
contradictory notion of nearness and remoteness, Kurtz
chooses the "stranger" metaphor to make his point.

He

draws his comparison from an essay by Georg Simmel who
advances the notion that a stranger is both near and far
at the same time.

Describing the stranger relationship,

Simmel suggests that "the distance within this relation
indicates that one who is close by is remote, but his
strangeness indicates that one who is remote is near."114
Although he or she is physically close to a person or
group, a barrier remains between them, keeping the
stranger at a distance and apart from the group.
From Kurtz' perspective, the heretic and the stranger
have much in common.

Like the stranger who enters a room

and mingles with a group, but is not really "in the
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group," the heretic is "in the room" and technically part
of the institution, but remains detached from the
orthodoxy.113
Lessl suggests that the nearness/remoteness
phenomenon creates a crisis in an institution.

The crisis

springs from conflict and controversy into which heretics
draw the defenders of orthodoxy.

Lessl posits that the

conflict and controversy are different not only in kind,
but also in effectiveness.

He explains that heretics

"have a disruptive potency greater than, not merely
different from, that of external enemies of a social
institution."
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He argues that a heretic maintains a

certain amount of ethos simply because he is a technical
member of the group.

This ethos often lends credibility

to many of his arguments.
As mentioned earlier, for the purposes of this study,
heresy is defined broadly to include the beliefs of
individuals that deviate from the orthodoxy of social
institutions other than the Church and threaten the
stability of the controlling values and assumptions of
those institutions.

Although Rifkin declares himself a

heretic, sufficient evidence exists that one could arrive
at the same conclusion from a more objective evaluation.
By Kurtz' definition, Rifkin is inside the
institution of contemporary society, but outside its
orthodox beliefs concerning technical advancement in
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general and genetic engineering in particular.

Rifkin is

a member of a contemporary society that subscribes to what
he calls a "scientific world view."

Rifkin asserts that

people in today's society "are so enmeshed in the set of
assumptions that make up the modern scientific world
view...", that another way of thinking is almost
impossible to fathom.117

Rifkin's challenges to that set

of assumptions earn for him the heretic label.
Rifkin's "nearness" is based in his being a member of
contemporary society.

He is the recipient

of whatever

technological benefits accrue to one who lives in a
society with a "scientific world view."

Rifkin proclaimed

in a speech in Washington, D.C.,
I'm like a lot of people-I'm not a purist.
I do
believe you have to manipulate nature to
survive.
I don't want to take us back into the
stone age. I do believe we have to proceed on
into the future and we have to manipulate and
tinker and organize nature..."
Yet, in the presence of Rifkin's nearness, there is
evidence of his remoteness.

Kurtz suggests that "Every

heresy implies a political stance and every heretic is the
leader of an insurrection..."
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Rifkin's insurrection

manifests itself in challenges of the foundations of the
"scientific world view" that question the validity of
scientific inquiry and technological advancement.
Perhaps nothing illustrates what Kurtz would term
Rifkin's "deviant insider" status more concretely than his
repeated attacks on efficiency.

Rifkin asserts that man's
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quest for economic efficiency and speed disrupts the
environmental balance so that "planetary ecosystems are no
longer capable of renewing resources as fast as they are
being depleted... ,,12°
Rifkin affirms his stance as a heretic by leading an
insurrection against genetic engineering and what he would
term its goal of "hyperefficiency."

Arguing that the

primary objective of genetic engineering is efficiency and
speed, he suggests that this technology "signals the most
radical change in our relationship with the natural world
since the dawn of the Age of Pyrotechnology.1,121

Rifkin

claims that efficiency has become an end in itself and
that "An ever accelerating conversion of biological
resources into economic utilities becomes the alpha and
omega of the coming age."122
Further evidence of Rifkin's insurrection against
advancing technology comes in his challenges to what he
calls the continuing compression of time.

He suggests

that this time compression is incompatible with nature and
ultimately destructive.

According to Rifkin, computers

take time compression to new dimensions through their
ability to measure time in nanoseconds (billionths of a
second).

Rifkin argues that the computer marks a radical

turning point in time because never before has "time been
organized at a speed beyond the realm of
consciousness."

123

Rifkin predicts dire consequences of
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this time compression because "The new 'computime'
represents the final abstraction of time and its complete
separation from human experience and the rhythms of
nature.1,124
Rifkin exemplifies what Kurtz describes as the
"intense union of nearness and remoteness."123

Rifkin is

close enough to be a member, but distant enough to be
considered in error.

He is a member of a scientifically

oriented society striving for increased efficiency through
technological advancement who challenges the existing
methods of achieving progress and conducting scientific
inquiry.

Rifkin leads an insurrection against what he

believes are forces destined for inevitably disastrous
consequences.
Social Construction
Kurtz' second characteristic of heresy is that "it is
socially constructed in the midst of social conflict,"128
Lessl calls this social conflict "struggles over authority
within the institution."127

Typically, the two sides of

the conflict retreat to their position of either defending
the heretical position or refuting it.

From there, the

struggle becomes one of authority.
Kurtz explains that not every deviant position can be
considered heresy—only those that demonstrate a
"stubbornness of will" and are "held in explicit
opposition to ecclesiastical authority.”128

Lessl points
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out that "Only when error challenges authority is it
treated as heresy."

129

After the lines of contention are

drawn, self-interest groups tend to form and choose the
position for which they have an affinity.

He suggests,

however, that one should not assume that either the
"authorities or the heretics are necessarily malicious or
self-serving, although they may be."130 Often,
authorities will make tremendous personal sacrifices to
defend against what they believe to be a genuine threat to
the values and structures of their orthodoxy.

Heretics

will often make similar sacrifices to challenge what they
perceive as destructive forces within the institution.

It

is not unusual for both the authorities and the heretics
to sincerely believe that their actions are in the best
interest of the institution.
Lessl contends the struggles over authority that
characterize heresy may be regarded as political
struggles.

Denouncing heretics becomes an expedient

course of action for the defenders of the institution.

As

an example, Lessl points to the scientific creationism
controversy.

Scientific creationists first became vocal

in the 1960s, but it was only in the 197Ds that scientists
began denouncing their ideas.

It was in the 1970s that

these same groups "began challenging the authority of the
orthodox scientific community to determine how science
will be defined in public education."131

Clearly, Rifkin's discourse assumes political
overtones, engaging the scientific community in a struggle
for authority.

One of Rifkin's arguments against genetic

engineering is that the scientific community has no way to
assess the impact of a genetically engineered organism
after it is released into the environment. He says that on
the one hand the technology needs to be regulated; but, on
the other hand, the science capable of evaluating the
technology does not exist.

So, in the struggle for

authority, Rifkin claims that, "...we should heed the call
of other countries and impose a five-year moratorium
worldwide so that we can bring the best environmental
sciences together with our molecular biologists to see if
we can hammer out a reasonable risk-assessment
science."
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Rifkin's suggestion to negotiate a risk-

assessment compromise with the molecular scientists is his
attempt to establish a forum for those whom he identifies
as lacking a voice in decisions related to genetic
engineering.

Because the scientific community virtually

dominates those decision-making processes, any compromise
would involve the scientific community's relinquishing
some decision-making authority.
In another skirmish related to genetic engineering,
Rifkin challenges the authority of the United States
Patent Office to issue patents on genetically engineered
animals.

He says he worked for 14 months to get a bill
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before the United States House of Representatives to
overturn a decision by the Patent Office allowing the
patenting of "any genetically-engineered animal on the
planet."

133

In his characteristically vocal opposition

to the Patent Office decision, Rifkin asserts that, "In
one regulatory stroke, a handful of bureaucrats in the
Patent Office reduced the entire animal kingdom to the
lowly status of a commercial commodity indistinguishable
from microwave ovens or automobiles or tennis balls."
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Challenging the authority of the Patent Office further,
Rifkin says, "It makes no sense for two or three men at
the Patent Office to dictate the entire future control of
the gene pool of this planet."
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Whether or not Rifkin accurately characterizes the
decision-making process in the Patent Office, his argument
is consistent with his attempts to seek a compromise on
risk-assessment.

Again, Rifkin argues that decisions

about technologies such as genetic engineering need to be
made not only within the confines of the scientific
community and governmental regulatory agencies, but should
be broadened to include members of the public who may be
affected by their implementation.
Social Consequences
The third characteristic of Kurtz' notion of heresy
suggests that not only is the phenomenon socially
constructed, but it also has social consequences.

Kurtz
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argues that although the defenders of orthodoxy most often
view heresy as "divisive and disruptive, an affront to
authority and the social order," it cuts like a "two-edged
sword" and works to their benefit in at least one way.
According to Kurtz, for whatever disruption heresy causes,
it provides the defenders of orthodoxy a rallying point
around which they gather their supporters to do "battle
with a common enemy."136
Lessl extends Kurtz1 argument, suggesting that in a
scientific community heresy draws together "scientists who
are ordinarily isolated within their specializations and
produces among them a renewed social consciousness."137
As members of the scientific community join forces against
the heretic and his ideas, scientists who may never have
given the issue in question a second thought "suddenly
find themselves drawn around the righteous banner of
public responsibility."138
The solidarity that coalesced against Jeremy Rifkin
assumes two positions, primarily.

First, scientists argue

that it is only through continued, perhaps accelerated,
scientific inquiry and research that the needs of society
and a growing population can be met.

They suggest that

only science can respond to demands for more economically
efficient food and fiber production, improved medical
treatments and procedures, new energy alternatives,
creative environmental conservation approaches, and other

54
technologically oriented societal needs.

For example,

William E. Marshall, president of the Microbial Genetics
Division of Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., speaking
at a biotechnology forum, predicted that,
We could become independent of petroleum-related
inputs, our energy needs could be significantly
reduced, new crops could be developed more
quickly for new areas, food animals could be
developed more readily for specific market
targets, and our soil and water resources could
be regenerated. 3
Second, these scientists argue against the public’s
participation in decisions related to biotechnology
because of a lack of understanding of the science
involved.

Speaking at that same biotechnology forum,

Karen Rogers, education director for the Monsanto company,
suggested that the fears of people untrained in science
threaten the freedom and right to conduct research in the
United States.

Rogers argued that, "Biotechnology simply

is moving ahead too quickly for the public to assimilate
its advances into their existing educational, religious
and social frameworks."140
The efforts of Rifkin and others who oppose
recombinant DNA research produce other social
consequences, too.

Among the most visible results are

increased regulation of the technology and its products
and the reluctance on the part of some segments of society
to use the products.

For example, one of Rifkin's primary

targets is BST (bovine somatotropin), a genetically

engineered hormone designed to increase milk production.
In the foreword of a report on BST from the Congress of
the United States Office of Technology Assessment,
Director John H. Gibbons said, "Some states have placed a
moratorium on the use of this technology, even if approved
by FDA, and some large retail food chains have refused to
sell milk and dairy products from BST test herds even
though FDA has approved their sale.”

As an indication of

the bureaucratic interest in this product, Gibbons said
the study conducted by the Office of Technology Assessment
was requested by the Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry, the House Committee on Government
Operations, and the House Committee on Agriculture.141
The results of Rifkin's heretical discourse appear to
reflect what Kurtz referred to as the "two-edged" sword
effect.

On the one hand, Rifkin raises enough questions

about the technology to cause several regulatory agencies
to become involved and creates skepticism in the minds of
some users so that they become reluctant to employ the
products of the technology.

On the other hand, his

actions cause otherwise uninvolved scientists to enter the
public debate and state their rationale for conducting
research.

These social consequences have rhetorical

implications that include increased dialogue about
biotechnology and increased public awareness of the issues
involved in the debate.

It is likely that the 1987 United
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States Department of Agriculture (USDA) biotechnology
forum was, in part, a rhetorical response to the
challenges posed by the opponents of genetic engineering.
Doctrinal Consequences
The fourth of Kurtz* five characteristics of heresy
suggests that it produces doctrinal consequences.

He

contends that as the heretics and the authorities of
orthodoxy confront each other and engage in doctrinal
disputes, the defenders of authority solidify positions
that may have never been defined otherwise.

Kurtz

suggests that as people choose sides in a conflict, they
find it "increasingly difficult to mix positions and
beliefs that have conflicting political implications."142
By rejecting a particular heretical position, the
orthodoxy may find itself unintentionally endorsing a
position that was not previously doctrinal and may never
have become doctrinal otherwise.

Kurtz points out that to

really understand the doctrine of any orthodoxy, one needs
to examine the historical context in which it
developed.143
Lessl relates this process to scientific inquiry.

He

argues that "Assumptions that are clearly operational in
scientific research but which escape deliberate scrutiny
are drawn to the surface in heretical controversies and in
the process are more clearly defined for orthodoxy."144
Lessl contends that the threat posed by heretics brings to
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the surface the "metatheoretical groundwork" that
underlies theories, i.e., the larger framework of the
scientific world view in which they work.
Although Rifkin's opposition to recombinant ONA
research is couched in terms of economic, social, and
environmental effects, ethical dilemmas, and fear, his
underlying theses challenge the assumption that scientific
inquiry holds the answers to society's problems. His
opposition also challenges the freedom with which
scientific inquiry is conducted.

In his introduction to

Declaration of a Heretic. Rifkin claims that the world
"hangs precariously in the balance" because "the
scientific world view and the technologies it has
generated have taken our world to the very edge of earthly
existence..."1*5

In acknowledging the technological

achievements of science, Rifkin invokes an appeal to fear
and uncertainty, focusing attention on the destructive
aspects of certain technologies.

The implication is that,

given the choice, the public would have decided to live
without the benefits of nuclear technology to be free of
the threat posed by nuclear weapons.
Speaking to a national convention of agricultural
communication specialists in 1988, Rifkin said, "We're
entering a new chapter in our relationship to technology,
especially in agriculture.

Now, we're going to, as a

society, debate the pros and cons of each new
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technology..."
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In opening the debate on biotechnology

to the public, Rifkin's thesis suggests that people will
recognize the dangers that accompany genetic engineering
and will reject the technology because those potential
threats outweigh whatever benefits accompany them.
Although Rifkin's challenges focus on genetic
engineering and nuclear fission, many of his arguments
transcend these specific technologies and target the more
fundamental scientific-technological paradigm. For
example, Rifkin refers to a cadre of people that he calls
"warriors of the mind."

He claims their goal is "To

disarm the world view that has given rise.to the nuclear
bomb and genetic engineering..."1*7

Rifkin believes

scientific inquiry has reached the end of the line because
"With each passing day, this long-relied-on form of
reasoning appears more stilted, more tautological, more
tiresome."

Rifkin says, "Further reliance on this form of

knowledge would be self-defeating for the human race."1*8
Rifkin's questioning of the validity of scientific inquiry
in general, and the effects of genetic engineering and
nuclear fission in particular, draws unsolicited and
unwelcome attention to the scientific community.

This

scrutiny has resulted in increased governmental
participation in research.
Ultimately, this governmental regulation assumes some
of the control of the scientific community's research
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activities.

Though reluctant to relinquish research

prerogatives, in genetic engineering the scientific
community finds itself confronted with the involvement of
governmental and public bodies such as the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), and the U.S. Patent office.
Whether by choice or by coercion, submitting to
governmental regulation in developing technologies such as
genetic engineering may evolve into doctrine for the
scientific community.

Having submitted their science to

these bodies, these scientists and institutions then use
the findings of these agencies as endorsements of their
work.

For example, a representative of Monsanto, one of

the major manufacturers of BST, sent a letter to
agricultural interests introducing the Office of
Technology Assessment's report on BST.

Suggesting the

study endorses the BST technology, Peter Calcott of
Monsanto wrote,

"This strong endorsement comes on the

heels of strong support in the Journal of the American
Medical Association,

in Science, at a National Institutes

of Health review and the European Community technical
approval."
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It is likely that the doctrinal consequences of
Rifkin's challenges will continue to evolve beyond the
life of the debate.

Clearly, Rifkin's beliefs and

challenges are divergent enough to draw criticism from the

orthodox scientific community.

With that criticism comes

the likelihood of greater definition of the scientific
community's stand on recombinant DNA and increased
"boundary-work" for the ideology that surrounds the
technology.
For example, many scientists and administrators
conducting genetic engineering research have become
sensitive to the need to make communities located near
test sites aware of projects that involve releasing
genetically engineered organisms into the environment.
Describing preparations for a test of a genetically
engineered organism at the Monsanto Company headquarters,
Karen Rogers, a company education adviser, explained,
We did not take the test community for granted.
As early as 1985, we began a briefing program
for local officials.
Favorable stories appeared
in the local press, and briefings were conducted
for county farmers. All in all, the community
viewed the test positively.
Informing the public of genetic engineering
experiments is a radical departure from earlier positions
and appears to be a permanent element of recombinant DNA
research.

Heresy Hunt..Ritual
Finally, Kurtz defines the fifth characteristic of
heresy as "the process of defining and denouncing heresy
and heretics" as ritual.131

Kurtz and Lessl agree that

the heresy hunt ritual is an effort by orthodoxy to
relieve its anxiety and the tensions resulting from the
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conflict.

The heretic Is a convenient object onto which

these anxieties can be focused.
Lessl suggests that as scientists employ the heresy
hunt ritual to stop the spread of heresy they begin to
substitute rhetorical solutions where more direct remedies
are not available.

Lessl contends that these efforts are

attempts to "solace the anxieties of their constituents
and maintain political quiescence."132 According to
Lessl, scientists involved in the creationist controversy
found the actual problems of public and political
ambivalence difficult, if not impossible, to solve
directly.

Their solution was to attack those close at

hand, the "deviant insiders," with the most powerful
weapons in their arsenal—scientific evidence and
argument.133
Rifkin appears to be the primary target on which
proponents of recombinant DNA research focus their
anxieties.

Several scientists, chemical companies, and

other allied industries have openly criticized Rifkin for
his stand on biotechnology.

For example, in the preface

to one of his books, Rifkin admits that,
I have been accused of being opposed to
scientific inquiry, academic freedom and, worst
of all, the march of progress. I have been
castigated as an obstructionist, a spoiler, a
man dedicated to slowing, retarding or halting
the further advances of the human race.
Occasionally a scientist, corporate leader or
policy maker will cast doubt on my temporal
sanity, insisting that my real desire is to turn
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back the clock of time; how far back is often
determined by the ire of the assailant.
In a profile of Rifkin, Time magazine quoted Norton
Zinder, a geneticist at Rockefeller University in New York
City, who referred to Rifkin as a "fool" and a
"demagogue."

The article also quoted from Harvard

Professor Stephen Jay Gould's review of Rifkin's Alaeny.
Gould wrote that Alaeny was "a cleverly constructed tract
of anti-intellectual propaganda masquerading as
scholarship...1 don't think I have ever read a shoddier
work. "135
Those familiar with Rifkin's work readily recognize
that almost without exception, Rifkin assumes the role of
challenger, the one who takes the offensive questioning
the validity of continued scientific inquiry and the
technological advances it produces.

Yet, as the recipient

of criticism from the scientific community, Rifkin
portrays himself as the victim, the heir to denigrating
comments and epithets. In his "dramatistic analysis of
order," Kenneth Burke suggests that "victimage" is
preceded by "redemption," which is preceded by
"guilt."156

Burke argues that "guilt" begets

"redemption" which begets "victimage."

From Burke's

perspective of victimage, Rifkin seems to suggest that the
scientific community is using him as a scapegoat for its
inability to live up to its promise of solving society's
problems through technological advances.

As Lessl
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suggests, the scientific community is substituting
rhetorical solutions to problems that are difficult or
impossible to resolve directly.
Conclusion
Rhetorically, Rifkin is a "thorn in the side" of the
scientific community.

Using statistics and scientific

evidence of past accomplishments, scientists argue that
only the technology produced by scientific inquiry can
respond to society's future nutritional, medical,
economic, and environmental needs. Rifkin agrees that
technological advancement has produced benefits for
society, but argues that it has also brought the world to
the brink of destruction and that more technology will
only increase the dangers.

Rifkin suggests that values

need to be placed higher on the agenda of human existence
and that can be accomplished only in the absence of what
he terms the threatening technologies of atomic fission
and genetic engineering.
Rifkin's challenges have focused public and
governmental attention on scientists and research that may
have never received such scrutiny otherwise.

The

increased visibility of these programs has drawn otherwise
laboratory-bound scientists into the public debate about
genetic engineering.

As these confrontations continue, so

does the discourse that produces what Kurtz refers to as
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"boundary-work" or the defining and redefining of
scientific orthodoxy as it relates to genetic engineering.
In the rhetorical refining of orthodoxy, scientists
seek to purge the system of those elements that they
perceive to be detrimental to the paradigm.

In the case

of genetic engineering, the scientific community focuses
much of its rhetorical effort on Rifkin, questioning his
knowledge of science, his motives, his tactics, and his
strategies.

In a concerted effort to discredit Rifkin and

his challenges, the scientific community seeks to redirect
to Rifkin a share of the responsibility for science not
achieving more "success" through genetic engineering.

In

the "victimage" process, scientists retreat to scientific
dogma, virtually ignoring the value-based arguments of
their challenger.
Chapters three and four will examine Rifkin's
rhetorical approach from the perspective of Kurtz' first
two characteristics of heresy.

Chapter five focuses on

the rhetorical strategies of the scientific orthodoxy and
reflects Kurtz' last three characteristics of heresy.

An

analysis of the crisis created in an institution resulting
from the nearness/remoteness phenomenon is the focus of
chapter three.

CHAPTER 3
THE CRISIS
Chapter three presents the argument that Rifkin's
depiction of the scientific world view is consistent with
Kurtz' first characteristic of heresy—that heresy is the
result of a deviant member of the institution who actively
rebels against the orthodox beliefs of the institution.
This chapter argues, too, that Rifkin's rhetorical
approach reflects Lessl's notion that the phenomenon
described by Kurtz results in crisis within the
institution.

Rifkin develops a rhetorical strategy that

challenges the validity of the orthodoxy of what he
describes as the scientific world view.

These challenges

create a crisis within the scientific community as
scientists recognize the threat to the freedom with which
it operates.

The crisis Rifkin creates within the

scientific community is the result of his challenges of
what he considers the world's two most important and
dangerous technological discoveries—nuclear fission and
recombinant DNA manipulation.
Nearness/Remoteness Analysis
In characterizing the nature of heresy, Kurtz first
describes his notion of nearness/remoteness.

In his

descriptive analysis of the phenomenon, he suggests that
the heretic is an individual who possesses the credentials
for membership in the orthodoxy of an institution, but
65
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chooses not to subscribe to the tenets of that orthodoxy.
The heretic is, at once, near or inside the orthodoxy, but
remote or apart from its beliefs.

Rifkin is a member of a

society, perhaps begrudgingly, that subscribes to the
scientific world view, yet he strenuously opposes the
orthodoxy of the scientific community.

At every

opportunity, Rifkin challenges the processes that produce
and maintain the scientific world view, questioning its
assumptions, methods, goals, and results.

His rhetorical

assaults assail the very existence of the scientific
establishment, advocating radical modification.
Lessl contends that a more crucial point is the
result of the nearness/remoteness phenomenon that
manifests itself in the heretic's advocacy of an
insurrection against the orthodoxy.

Being a technical

member of the orthodoxy, the heretic maintains a certain
ethos that makes his arguments credible.

As a member of

the orthodoxy, he is credited with knowing the system and
having the ability to identify strengths and
weaknesses.
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It is likely that some of those hearing

the challenges of the heretic reason "where there is
smoke, there must be fire," i.e., there must be some basis
for the heretic's charges, otherwise why bring them up?
Lessl's extension of

Kurtz' notion of

nearness/remoteness transcends description and suggests
that the phenomenon results in crisis within the heretic's

institution.

Lessl's analysis of the creationism debate

argues that the appearance of this heretical doctrine
posed a significant threat to the defenders of
evolutionary theory because it undermined the political
support afforded institutionalized science.

Lessl

contends that "Creationism represents a crisis for
scientists to the extent that it gives immediacy to
perceived attitudes of the general public that contravene
the normative bases of scientific culture.1,158
In many ways the effects of Rifkin's challenges are
similar to those Lessl describes in the creationism
debate.

Rifkin's advocacy challenges the validity of

scientific institutions with the intent of threatening not
only genetic engineering, but science as a whole.

While

Rifkin's impeding the advances of biotechnology draws the
ire of those scientists involved in this research, his
activities in nuclear technology and genetic engineering
are only symptomatic of his stated goal of achieving a
world view that replaces scientific research and
technology with an "empathetic" approach to the world.
Condemning the scientific world view as exploitative,
Rifkin argues, "The idea is to develop a philosophy of
science that works with the environment, that is
empathetic to the natural resource base rather than a
philosophy of science based on exploitation and short-term
gains only."
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This goal and its accompanying
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challenges are the genesis of the crisis to which the
scientific community finds itself responding in the
genetic engineering debate.
The first rhetorical elements of Rifkin's attempts to
create a crisis are found in a scenario in which he
requires his audiences to choose.

He presents his

perspective in declarative statements as though they were
undisputed facts.

For example, he claims the world is in

the midst of a long-term transition: "He are moving out of
fossil fuels, the energy base for industrial technology,
and we're now moving into renewable resources, the energy
base for biological based technology."

Creating a sense

of urgency, Rifkin implies that this trend is irreversible
and predicts its effects will be unprecedented in modern
history.

Rifkin says, "This transformation will be as

significant, in my opinion, as the transformation from
Medieval agriculture to the industrial, urban way of life
of the last 200 years."160

Rifkin predicts that, "The

world's germ plasm will become as important to the
economic fortunes of each country as fossil fuels and
metals were during the brief expanse of the Industrial
Age.. ."161
Rifkin's suggestion that society's movement from a
fossil fuel energy base to a renewable resource energy
base will be as significant as moving from Medieval
agriculture to 20th century urban life dramatizes the

changes that he predicts lay ahead.

Rifkin's analogy

encompasses several hundred years of the most dramatic
changes in the history of man.

The transformation from a

Medieval agricultural society in which citizens fled to
the country side for relief from urban centers to 20th
century society concentrated in cities with complex
economies, politics, transportation, and communications
moves mankind from one extreme to another.
rhetorical strategy is two-fold.
the future is uncertain.

Rifkin's

First, he suggests that

Rifkin's analogy suggests that,

on a biologically based technology continuum, 20th century
society finds itself in the same relative position as
Medieval agriculture found itself on the fossil fuel
technology continuum.

Rifkin's analogy implies that 20th

century citizens are no more able to predict the changes
that lay in store for them in the biotechnology era than
citizens of Medieval Europe could have predicted the
industrialization of today's society.
creates a sense of urgency.

Second, Rifkin

His analogy spanned several

hundred years, but he implies that because of the speed of
advancing technology, particularly genetic engineering, we
may experience a similar transformation within our
lifetime.
Having established an occurrence of worldwide
proportions, Rifkin suggests that alternatives exist for
society's approach to the future.

Rifkin then narrows
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those choices, suggesting that only two alternatives exist
for the future use of renewable resources and that those
choices are mutually exclusive.

Rifkin argues, "I think

there's two broad philosophical approaches to organizing
renewable resources.
approach..."

The first is an ecological

"There's also another approach...genetic

engineering."162
Having narrowed to two his audience's choices, Rifkin
contrasts the two alternatives in what Richard Weaver
describes as god-terms and devil-terms.

God-terms and

devil-terms fall under Weaver's definition of "ultimate"
terms on which the rhetor relies and to which the populace
attributes greatest sanction.

163

Weaver proposes that a

god-term is an "expression about which all other
expressions are ranked as subordinate and serving
dominations and powers" and has the capacity to demand
164
sacrifice.
Devil-terms, on the other hand,
characterize what is perceived as the greatest evil of a
165
culture.
Presenting his two alternatives in god-terms
and devil terms, Rifkin suggests that only one reasonable
choice really exists:

"We can choose to engineer the life

of the planet, creating a second nature in our image, or
we can choose to participate with the rest of the living
kingdom."166
Rifkin's characterization of the biotechnology choice
is encrusted with devil-terms.

First, he says genetic
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engineering is "powerful."

Rifkin claims that, "Genetic

engineering is the most powerful technology we have ever
conceived to control the forces of nature."167

He

further suggests that to choose genetic engineering is to
abandon human values:

"Genetic engineering simply means

placing engineering principles into the gene pool...we*re
learning how to apply engineering assumptions into the
blueprint for microbes, plants, animals, and the human
race."

166

Rifkin's engineering assumptions carry with

them the characterization of devil-terms, too, and include
"quality control, predictability of outcome,
utilitarianism, and efficiency...the assumptions that we
used...in organizing inanimate materials during the fossil
fuel era."
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Rifkin contends that biotechnology is an

appropriate choice if society's highest priority is
"physical security" and "perpetuation at all costs."170
Rifkin's claim that the Industrial Age has become a
metaphor for "the process of transforming, exchanging, and
discarding nonrenewable energy" includes more of his
devil-terms.171 Rifkin's devil-term vocabulary includes
other frequently used terms such as "desacralize,"
"domination," "appropriating life," "exercising power over
nature," "extract," "expropriate," "distill," "process,"
"consume", "regiment," "short-term gains," "controlling,"
and "devour." Rifkin typically casts these words in
negative contexts to depict the world view of those who
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choose to support or engage in genetic engineering
research.
On the other hand, Rifkin's characterization of the
alternative to genetic engineering is presented as an
effort to achieve oneness with nature, the environment,
and, perhaps, God.

In that holistic context, Rifkin

employs what have become god-terms for him to describe and
define the world view for which he argues.

For example,

Rifkin labels the alternative to genetic engineering "an
ecological approach, a stewardship approach" that is
"empathetic to the natural resource base” in which "we use
new tools to develop sustainability with our resources"
and provide "justice for the homo sapiens species and
equity and justice for all the other creatures..."172
Describing man's relationship to the environment from the
"empathetic" world view perspective, Rifkin uses other
god-terms such as "cajole," "select," "congenial,"
"resacralize," "partnership," "companionship,"
"connecting," "mutual give and take," and "maintaining an
endowment for future generations."
Rifkin's use of these god-terms attempts to move
audiences to his world view by instilling a sense of
guilt.

Rifkin hopes individuals will either choose to

"resacralize" their relationship with nature and be more
"empathetic" to the environment or feel guilty for not
doing so.

Rifkin implies that to reject the values of his
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world view is to separate oneself from God and nature.

He

suggests that those who do not "resacralize" and become
"empathetic" violate the sacred relationship between
humans and their environment; they seek material wealth at
the expense of nature.
Rifkin characterizes the scientific world view as
essentially devoid of values and as the creator of a world
in which decisions are based only on the exploitation of
nature, expediency, and production efficiency.

Thus, he

creates a rhetorical environment that requires the
audience to reject that approach to the world and to seek
an alternative.

Conveniently, he provides a choice that

is as difficult to reject as his depiction of the
scientific world view is to accept,

significantly, he

provides only one alternative and it assumes an almost
religious approach that is molded from life enriching
values such as wisdom,
patience, sacrifice, and discipline. Choosing terms such
as "ecological approach" and

"stewardship approach,"

Rifkin suggests not only that the "empathetic" world view
is concerned with the wise, thoughtful use of renewable
resources, but implies that the scientific world view is
unconcerned with these issues.

From this foundation

Rifkin builds his arguments against many of society's
technological achievements.

He credits the scientific
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community with what he terms the two greatest evils in the
history of mankind—nuclear energy and genetic engineering.
Rifkin's depiction of the domination of science
suggests that it is the end product of philosophers and
scientists who place their priorities not on human values,
but on quantifying nature, understanding how it operates,
appropriating its resources for the material benefit of
mankind, and seeking more expedient methods of converting
these natural resources into consumer goods.

From this

perspective, Rifkin fashions for the scientific community
a syllogism, or what he terms an "age-old equation:
knowledge = power « control = security."

Rifkin argues

that efficiency drives this equation, "Efficiency as both
a method and a value reorients the whole of the human
experience to one end: total mastery of the physical
world."173
Rifkin's challenge of the orthodox scientific world
view is the foundation on which he builds his case against
the validity of genetic engineering.

The arguments

supporting Rifkin's insurrection against genetic
engineering are based, in large part, on his comparison of
biotechnology to nuclear technology.

Rifkin claims, "The

first sustained nuclear reaction and the discovery of the
double helix are products of the scientific world
view. "m
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Rifkin's strategy of comparing genetic engineering to
nuclear technology has two rhetorical advantages.

First,

it can be argued, with little disagreement, that nuclear
technology is the result of scientific research and the
scientific world view.

Second, it can be persuasively

maintained that with the benefits of nuclear technology
come serious concerns about the ever-present dangers
resulting from nuclear weapons.

Rifkin employs both of

these assumptions as he draws parallels between nuclear
technology and genetic engineering.
First, Rifkin argues that technologies, regardless of
their initial significance, are eventually developed to
their fullest potential whether they are ultimately
beneficial or detrimental or both.

In an interesting

choice of words in the following quotation, Rifkin chooses
not to acknowledge that technology is either "beneficial"
or "detrimental." Rather he chooses to contrast a neutral
term to a devil-term.

Rifkin asserts that, "the

possibilities inherent to a new technological category
have been fully exploited over time, whether their
purposes were benign or satanic."175

Rifkin argues that

even the most beneficial technologies can have dangerous
consequences.

For example, he cites nuclear weapons as

the ultimate extension of one of the most fundamental and
beneficial human discoveries— fire.

Claiming that fire is

the tool we used to "recast the face of the earth in our

own image,11 Rifkin contends that humans have used fire to
dominate and control all of creation.176

Nuclear

technology, according to Rifkin, is fire in its ultimate
form.

Rifkin's use of the fire metaphor in this context

helps reduce the complexities of nuclear technology to one
of the most basic tools of our existence.

Although fire

is used for countless beneficial purposes, its potential
for pain and destruction are among our earliest lessons.
To suggest that nuclear technology takes fire to its limit
is to suggest pain and destruction beyond comprehension,
perhaps to equal the forces of Hell.

Rifkin would suggest

that power of this magnitude must be an enemy of nature
and a threat to mankind.
Continuing to build his case against nuclear
technology, Rifkin argues that it was introduced as a
technological revolution with major benefits and minimum
risks, but has failed to live up to those
expectations.177

Rifkin cites the "near meltdown of the

nuclear core at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, and the
full meltdown at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union" as two
examples of the danger inherent in nuclear technology when
it is used for peaceful purposes.
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Rifkin suggests

that the "myth" of cheap energy has been dispelled by
enormous costs of nuclear power plant construction. He
argues that power plants generate social and health
problems for which there are no technical solutions.
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Rifkin cites as examples health problems encountered by
miners of uranium and associated problems in communities
near the mines.

Finally, Rifkin points to the long-term

problems of disposing of nuclear waste.170
Rifkin challenges nuclear technology from still
another perspective—must any technology be used just
because it is available?

Rifkin's rhetorical strategy on

this issue is to engage in a discussion of the dangers of
nuclear weapons including the potential for annihilationfollowed by rhetorical questions for which he conditions
his audience for the desired response.

He asks, "How many

of us would vote to split the atom had we to make that
decision over again?
split the atom?"
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How many of us would vote not to

Acknowledging that many people find

it difficult to say no to nuclear power based on the
benefits and dangers of the technology, even after a
vividly descriptive account of its destructive power,
Rifkin employs the devil-term "power" again.

Rifkin

proclaims that nuclear technology "... is a new form of raw
power, more compelling than any other ever made available
to the human race." "Is the extraordinary power intrinsic
to the process of nuclear fission and fusion appropriate
to exploit or not?"
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Suggesting that the continued use

of nuclear power threatens human existence, Rifkin asks
rhetorically, "What price are we willing to pay for the
survival of life here on earth?"
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Rifkin's use of rhetorical questions reflects his
approach of limiting the choices available to his
audience.

The last question suggests to the person

answering it that the only way to survive on earth is to
discontinue the use of nuclear technology.

The question

regarding the appropriateness of using nuclear technology
seems to imply that to use such a powerful resource to
generate electricity is an "over-kill" and that until more
productive uses of nuclear energy can be found, the
technology should be abandoned.
Having argued that nuclear technology, like all other
technologies, began as a simple, beneficial tool that was
developed to its ultimate potential and evolved into the
world's most destructive force; having argued that the
dangers of nuclear technology outweigh its benefits;
having argued that mankind is not necessarily compelled to
employ a technology just because it exists; and having
argued that it is time for society to stop the
proliferation of advancing technology, Rifkin introduces
genetic engineering as a technology not unlike nuclear
technology.
The age of fire, according to Rifkin, depended on the
"alchemic process."

He argues that the alchemist viewed

nature as a process growing toward perfection and that the
task of the alchemist was to help achieve that end.
Alchemy, then, was the process that allowed people to
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"melt, fuse, purify, putrefy, distill and coagulate his
base material, creating new combinations and forms, each
one closer to the ideal golden state.”183

Rifkin claims

it was this process-turned-philosophy that evolved into
the modern scientific world view.
Drawing the parallel between biotechnology and fire
technology, Rifkin introduces and contrasts the term
"algeny” to alchemy. Rifkin defines algeny as "the means
to change the essence of a living thing by transforming it
from one state to another...the upgrading of existing
organisms and the design of wholly new ones with the
intent of 'perfecting' their performance."

Rifkin's

definition of algeny, like that of alchemy, is
characterized as a process of human intervention in nature
to achieve perfection, but with living organisms.184
Comparing recombinant DNA technology to the first
uses of fire, Rifkin argues that it is now possible "to
snip, insert, stitch, edit, program and produce new
combinations of living things just as our ancestors were
able to heat, burn, melt and solder together various inert
materials creating new shapes, combinations and
forms."
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Rifkin's comparison lays the groundwork for

one of his most prominent arguments against genetic
engineering—that the technology "seduces" scientists and
society at large into perceiving living organisms in the
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same way they perceive inanimate objects and that this
modified view of living organisms is innocuous.
One of the elements of Rifkin's rhetorical strategy
in challenging "the creation of new forms" is his taking
the offensive against the scientific community's argument
that genetic engineering is a logical, natural extension
of traditional breeding and hybridizing techniques.
Scientists, according to Rifkin, say to him, "Well,
Jeremy, gee, lighten up...this is just a more
sophisticated approach to the kind of domesticating
technologies we've been using since Neolithic
agriculture."
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Rifkin rejects the notion that genetic

engineering is an extension of conventional breeding
techniques countering with, "Now, we have a technology
called gene-splicing that allows us in both theory and
practice to eliminate the idea of a species as an
identifiable being with...an essential nature."167
Rifkin implies that scientists tread sacred ground
when they contemplate "recombining genetic traits across
mating walls."
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Rifkin appeals to a fear of

reductionism with its attendant amoral consequences when
he argues that "species as a separate, recognizable
entity" should be left intact and that crossing these
"natural species boundaries” turns "all of life into
manipulable chemical materials."160
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Rhetorically, Rifkin invokes the fear of the unknown
when he suggests that scientists who engage in genetic
engineering will view gene manipulation as another form of
chemical experiment.

The inference of this prediction is

that this chemical experimentation will evolve into an
ultimately destructive force similar to nuclear
technology.

Rifkin invokes fear at still another level.

Janice Rushing and Thomas Frentz argue that culture
possesses repressed fears about its relationship to
technology that are expressed through what they term "The
Frankenstein myth" in which the maker is threatened by the
made, and "the original roles of master and slave are in
doubt."
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Rushing and Frentz suggest that two

perspectives of technology pervade science fiction cinema
and reflect cultural views and fears.

The "utopian" view

envisions the "triumph of reason, the Enlightenment dream
of human progress."

The "dystopian" perspective creates

"foreboding images" of technology, "regards the machine as
a malevolent threat," and "extrapolates from and
exaggerates present conditions in imagining the
future..."191 Rifkin assumes the "dystopian" perspective
as he rhetorically creates "foreboding images" and
extrapolates about the future.

Rifkin asserts,

It is now only a matter of a handful of years
before biologists will be able to irreversibly
change the evolutionary wisdom of billions of
years with the creation of new plants, new
animals^ and new forms of human and post-human

82
Rifkin contrasts the utopian/dystopian perspectives
in yet another expression of genetic engineering:
"Researchers say this technique will ultimately provide a
cure for dwarfism.

Just as easily, it could be used to
1B3
develop a basketball team of ten-footers.”
Rifkin
takes his rhetoric one step further as he invokes the
genocidal horrors that were a product of Hitler's Third
Reich.

Rifkin asserts that even before Hitler's rise to

power in Germany, "American geneticists and social
ideologues had begun working closely together to fashion
similar technologies and programs designed to both
eliminate the so-called inferior stock from the human
species. . ."104
Rifkin's comparison of genetic engineering to nuclear
technology is evidence that fear is an important part of
his strategy to halt or impede the progress of
biotechnology.

Rifkin incorporates fear primarily at two

levels—one involves the uncertainty of the consequences of
releasing genetically engineered organisms into the
environment; another confronts the issue of determining
the point at which gene manipulation in humans begins and
ends.
As there are costs associated with the benefits of
nuclear technology, Rifkin invokes the fear of the unknown
predicting that still greater costs will accompany
whatever benefits accrue from genetic engineering.

Rifkin
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makes that claim metaphorically: "All great technological
revolutions secure the present by mortgaging the future.
In this respect, genetic engineering represents the
ultimate lien on the future."195

Continuing with the

metaphor, Rifkin argues that every time a new genetically
modified organism is introduced into the environment, "the
ecological interest rate moves up a point."

Invoking fear

through Rushing and Frentz* dystopian expression of
exaggerating "present conditions in imagining the
future,"

196

Rifkin claims that "every genetically

engineered product presents a threat to the ecosystem it
is released in."
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Rifkin amplifies the threat of these

releases with his description of three characteristics
common to genetically engineered organisms.
are alive and inherently unpredictable.

First, they

Second, these

organisms have mobility because they can reproduce,
mutate, and migrate off site.

Third, genetically

engineered organisms released into the environment cannot
be recalled.198
To dramatize the effects of what Rifkin terms the
inevitable problems that genetically engineered organisms
will create, he returns to his strategy of comparing
genetic engineering eventualities with what he
characterizes as similar problems already existing
nature.

in

For example, Rifkin cites the introduction of

exotic species and the inability to control pests such as
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kudzu vine, Dutch elm disease, chestnut blight, and gypsy
moth.
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Rifkin admits that the level of risk posed by

the release of these genetically engineered organisms is
relatively small, but argues that because "industry is
expected to introduce thousands of new genetically
engineered products into the environment each year,"
statistically, sooner or later one of these products will
create problems.200

Characteristically, Rifkin paints a

worst-case scenario in his description of the effects of
genetically engineered organisms set loose in the
environment.

He predicts, "If only a tiny fraction turn

out to be pests, because of the scale of introduction, the
biological pollution could well exceed chemical
pollution..." and "You're stuck for centuries, perhaps,
201
millennia."
Rifkin's other prominent infusion of fear
into his challenge of genetic engineering becomes apparent
as he raises the issue of human gene manipulation.

While

he makes no claims of similarities between genetic
engineering and the German holocaust in World War II,
Rifkin raises the specter of the Nazi regime in his
discussions of recombinant DNA.

He argues that while the

old eugenics were steeped in political ideology and
motivated by hate and fear, the new eugenics are
commercial and are presented in terms of "increased
economic efficiency, better performance standards and
improvement in the quality of life."202

What he implies,
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but does not say, is that the motivation behind genetic
engineering is different from that behind the Nazi
campaign, but the results are the same.
Rifkin posits that, like nuclear technology, "Once we
decide to begin the process of human genetic engineering,
there is really no logical place to stop."203

Rifkin

suggests that the first steps in the process have already
been taken with the introduction of human growth hormone
genes into the "permanent hereditary make-up of pigs,
sheep and other domestic animals."204 Rifkin argues that
having taken this first step, scientists have demonstrated
that they do not consider the human growth hormone gene
unique and are more likely to view the other human genes
in a similar manner.

This is Rifkin's rhetorical effort

to reinforce his contention that living organisms, human
beings included, are relegated to the level of inanimate
objects by recombinant DNA researchers.
Moving from the rather simple concept of transferring
human genes to domestic animals, Rifkin expresses concern
about the ultimate potential and perhaps the most
troublesome aspect of biotechnology.

Rifkin concedes that

the first occurrence of human gene manipulation will
likely be directed toward curing diseases such as
diabetes, sickle cell anemia, and cancer.

If genetic

manipulation can cure these diseases, Rifkin asks why
should we not consider other "disorders" such as "myopia,
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color blindness, left-handedness?"
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Rifkin predicts

that as scientists learn more about the makeup and
functions of genes, the possibility of behavior
modification will become a reality:

"Many scientists are

already contending that schizophrenia and other 'abnormal'
psychological states result from genetic disorders or
defects."206 Rifkin points out that part of the
complexity of the issue is who defines "defect,"
"disease," and "abnormal."
Rifkin raises serious questions that are easily
within the realm of possibility if genetic engineering is
taken to its ultimate potential.
society's choices to two.

Rifkin, again, narrows

Either we abandon genetic

engineering completely or allow it to run its course.
Citing the development of nuclear technology, he contends
there is no middle ground.
Rifkin's repeated direct attacks on scientific
assumptions and his somewhat more passive challenges to
that world view through direct attacks on nuclear
technology and recombinant DNA have put the scientific
community in the position of having to defend itself and
justify its activities, goals, and methods.

Because

scientific inquiry enjoys the exalted position of being
almost beyond reproach, the questions raised by Rifkin and
others represent a decidedly heretical perspective and
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create within the scientific community an unwelcome crisis
of justification.

Cpntslttplon
This chapter cited elements of Rifkin's rhetorical
strategy that suggest it is consistent with Kurtz* notion
of nearness/remoteness and Lessl's idea that the
nearness/remoteness phenomenon results in crisis in the
institution's orthodoxy.

This chapter analyzed Rifkin's

rhetorical approach challenging the validity of the
scientific world view and what he suggests are its two
most important technological achievements—nuclear
technology and genetic engineering.
Chapter four will argue that Rifkin's rhetorical
strategy is consistent with Kurtz' second characteristic
of heresy—that it is socially constructed.

The analysis

in chapter four will suggest that the crisis described in
chapter three results from social factors such as
political confrontations and struggles for power between
the heretics and those who support the organization's
orthodoxy.

CHAPTER 4
THE CONFLICT
It was argued in Chapter Three that Jeremy Rifkin's
rhetorical strategy to replace what he terms the
scientific world view with his "empathetic" world view
creates a crisis within the scientific community
consistent with Kurtz* first characteristic of heresy and
Lessl's formulation of crisis.

This chapter will analyze

the issues on which Rifkin focuses that create the crisis.
I will argue that his attempt to wrest some or all of the
decision-making control of the scientific process from the
scientific community is consistent with Kurtz' second
characteristic of heresy, i.e., heresy is socially
constructed.

By examining Rifkin's rhetoric in this way,

we can learn how rhetors who challenge the orthodoxy of an
institution draw the defenders of that orthodoxy into a
confrontation.

This analysis of Rifkin's strategies

provides insight into the heretics rhetorical appeals that
put the orthodoxy on the defensive and delineates the
point(s) of contention.
Social Construction Analysis
Kurtz argues that heresy is socially constructed amid
social conflict.

The conflict arises when the defenders

of the orthodoxy and the heretics find themselves on
opposing sides of a tenet of the institution. Lessl
contends that these confrontations are struggles over
88
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authority in the institution.

Kurtz and Lessl agree that

earning the label of heretic requires more of an
institution's member than merely holding errant beliefs;
he must challenge the orthodoxy with those beliefs.

Lessl

points out that "Only when error challenges authority is
it treated as heresy."207

The act of challenging the

orthodoxy draws a line of contention for both sides, and
self-interest groups tend to form and choose the position
for which they have an affinity.
Lessl contends the struggles over authority that
characterize heresy may be regarded as political
confrontations.
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While the heretic attempts to

undermine the authority of the orthodoxy and assume
control of some or all of the decision-making processes,
the orthodoxy attempts to solidify its position by
reinforcing its authority, rallying its supporters and
denouncing the heretics.

Lessl argues that heresy focuses

much of an institution's attention on its authoritarian
basis.

He cites as an example the centralization of Papal

authority as an ecclesiastical respqnse to the modernist
heresy.

Lessl contends, too, that more conservative

religious groups tend to become more dogmatic about
stricter interpretation of the scriptures.209

Kurtz

points out that sacred doctrines and institutions "require
perpetual defense from destructive forces..." and that
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those responsible for the defense must discharge their
obligation whatever the cost.210
Rifkin's rhetorical strategy assumes unmistakably
political overtones. And it undeniably attempts not only
to establish control of the decision-making process, but
to overthrow the orthodoxy within which the decision
making process resides and to replace it with one of his
own design.

Rifkin complains, "The power to control the

future biological design of living tissue has been signed
over to the scientists, the corporations, and the state
without ceremony."
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The transfer of power may have

occurred without ceremony, as Rifkin suggests, but not
without notice.
Clearly, the scientific community's power to control
genetic engineering has Rifkin's attention, and those
scientists involved with the technology are the subjects
of Rifkin's considerable rhetorical expertise.

Although

Rifkin does not delineate a division in his rhetorical
strategy in the power struggle with the scientific
community, his efforts seem to manifest themselves in
short-term and long-term approaches.

The short-term

efforts employ books, speeches, media events, legislative
lobbying, and demonstrations to achieve visibility for the
controversy.

The long-term strategy seeks to persuade

society to invoke passive resistance against technical
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advancement toward a goal of exorcising the existing
scientific world view.
Short-Term Strategy: Active Resistance
Genetic engineering's momentum is one point of
conflict for Rifkin and the scientific community.

While

Rifkin would like to increase the public's involvement in
discussions about genetic engineering, his first point of
contention is to stop or delay the research.

So, in the

struggle for authority, Rifkin advocates a halt in
recombinant DNA activities: "I think we should heed the
call of other countries and impose a five-year moratorium
worldwide so that we can bring the best environmental
sciences together with our molecular biologists to see if
we can hammer out a reasonable risk-assessment
science."
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Rifkin's Foundation on Economic Trends made

a similar plea.

A news release issued from the Washington

office called for "an international moratorium on the
deliberate release of genetically engineered organisms
into the environment pending a thorough review of
potential environmental and public health risks."213
Rifkin cites Germany, Denmark, and Japan as countries with
genetic engineering capabilities that have chosen to
impose moratoriums on the release of the organisms into
the environment.
Although Rifkin may be appealing to the scientific
community with these calls for a moratorium, he seems to
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be addressing governmental agencies with either budgetary
or regulatory control over those involved in the research.
Realizing that a self-imposed moratorium by the scientific
community is both unlikely and unrealistic, Rifkin
challenges the world's governments to assume the
responsibility of the safety of their citizenry.

He also

challenges them to halt the release of genetically
engineered organisms until there is assurance that these
experiments can be conducted safely.

He cites three

genetic engineering-capable governments that have already
taken that step.
One implication of Rifkin's call for a moratorium is
that if he were successful, it would signal a major
victory for the opponents of genetic engineering.

Because

the scientific community virtually dominates the decision
making processes of recombinant DNA, any compromise would
involve the scientific community's relinquishing some
decision-making authority.
Another of Rifkin's strategies to impose a moratorium
on genetic engineering research is based on riskassessment.

He argues that genetically engineered

organisms should not be released into the environment
until assurances for safe experimental procedures exist.
He protests: "There is no science of risk-assessment which
(sic) we can judge these introductions."214

Rifkin's

argument implies that he would agree to genetic
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engineering research if only risk-assessment procedures
were in place; however, he knows that consensus on riskassessment procedures is not likely.

Indeed, Douglas and

Wildavsky's analysis of risk-assessment has shown that
between those people who are risk-takers and those who are
risk averse, "There is neither agreement over appropriate
methods to assess risks nor acceptance of the outcomes of
public processes."
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Douglas and Wildavsky's research

indicates that four approaches to risk-assessment are
used; all are biased; and no consensus exists on which is
most appropriate.
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They suggest that all four methods develop
relationships between advantages and disadvantages, but
the criteria are different for each.

The "revealed

preference" approach assumes people weigh benefits against
risks internally and risk assessors determine what people
are willing to accept by observing risk-takers1 actions.
The "expressed preference" method uses surveys and similar
instruments to determine the risks people are willing to
accept.

"Natural standards" shifts the burden of risk-

assessment from people to nature.

Rather than focusing on

what risks people are willing to accept, risk assessors
try to determine how much risk nature can support.
Finally, the "cost-benefit" approach to risk-assessment
weighs risks against benefits using common economic
criteria centered around values that can be
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calculated.
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Although Rifkin advocates establishing

risk-assessment procedures for biotechnology through a
cost-benefit approach, his use of "cost-benefit" is based
on personal values rather than economic criteria.
Indeed, Rifkin's criteria for risk-assessment seem to
evolve from two of Douglas and Wildavsky's approaches.
One of Rifkin's stated goals is to involve the public in
discussions and debates about scientific research and
technology.

This approach is consistent with Douglas and

Wildavsky's expressed preferences notion of riskassessment.

Not only does expressed preferences reflect

Rifkin's strategy because it seeks people's involvement
through an expression of their opinion, but also like
Rifkin, it assumes that what people want is different from
what they are getting.

Elements of Douglas and

Wildavsky's natural standards approach is also part of
Rifkin's risk-assessment strategy.

Arguing that the

burden of proof in this approach shifts from the citizenry
to nature, Douglas and Wildavsky contend that nature will
reflect "...whatever version of reality the looker wishes
to see in it.

If you want to forbid new things, just say

that adding to background radiation or chemical wastes
will disrupt the delicate balance of nature."218
Rifkin's rhetorical strategy to developing a riskassessment procedure rejects the risk-takers' argument for
greater efficiency in the use of natural resources.
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Rifkin*s position is consistent with that of the risk
averse.

Douglas and Wildavsky observe that, "They [the

risk averse] insist that human life is priceless and
cannot be measured by vulgar money.

They object that the

whole exercise is immoral when life and nature seem to be
bought and sold."
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While scientists argue from the

risk-takers position of an objective economic cost-benefit
approach, Rifkin assumes a risk averse stance based on
subjective, human values.

Rifkin focuses on risks; the

scientists focus on benefits. Consensus among Rifkin and
scientists on a risk-assessment procedure appears
unlikely.

Rifkin's argument to halt genetic engineering

experimentation until the development of a risk-assessment
procedure, then, is an effort to take research out of the
hands of the scientific community indefinitely.
On the one hand, Rifkin seeks a moratorium to stop
genetically engineered organisms from being released into
the environment.

On the other hand, he wrestles with the

scientific community over specific recombinant DNA
products such as BST (bovine somatotropin).

Rifkin often

refers to the product as B6H (bovine growth hormone).

BST

became one of the most highly publicized and controversial
recombinant DNA products to date, in part, because it was
the first commercially successful product of its kind and,
in part, because of the opposition mounted by Rifkin.
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Rifkin attacks the BST issue from two angles, economic
consequences and health concerns.
BST manufacturers developed the product to increase
milk production in cows.

Rifkin appeals to the economic

security of dairy farmers and the tax-paying public when
he suggests that increased milk production will ultimately
increase costs to both groups.

Rifkin argues that if

increased milk production is the reason for its
introduction, it should be taken off the market because,
nThe last thing we need is more milk.

Every industrial

nation in the world is awash in milk surpluses...1,220
Rifkin claims increased milk production will result in
lower prices paid to the farmer and may force "up to
thirty percent of the American dairy farms...out of
business."
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His appeal to the public at large suggests

that although milk prices may decrease, the government is
committed to buying surplus milk products such as butter
and cheese and that increased milk production will
increase taxes spent on these purchases.

Rifkin asks

rhetorically, "Will the taxpayers want to pay to buy up
all of the surpluses?"222
Rifkin's health argument takes two approaches: first,
he appeals to people's compassion suggesting that the
hormone is detrimental to the health of the animals; and
second, he appeals to people's fear of the unknown,
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contending that the hormone is transmitted to the milk and
may have negative effects on human health.
Rifkin appeals to people's compassion for animals
when he charges that BST presents health hazards for the
cows.

He argues, "If you're going to put massive

injections of a hormone into an animal beyond what it was
biologically designed for, it's naive and disingenuous to
believe that won't stress that animal."223

Rifkin

contends that research shows "...the cows are facing
sterility, mastitis, a whole range of production stresses
and it stands to reason."
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Rifkin combines a fear of the unknown with a fear of
"chemical additives in our food" to form the basis of his
rhetorical strategy to raise concerns about the
transmission of BST through milk to humans.

A television

commercial produced by Rifkin's organization claimed that,
"It [BST] could be a health hazard to cows, and the milk
you drink will contain that hormone.
to our milk?"
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What are they doing

The audience is to infer that the

hormone is harmful and that the conspiratorial "they" are
tampering with milk purity and nutritional quality.
Rifkin's rhetorical strategy to discredit BST as a
viable product includes demonstrating that increased milk
production is unnecessary and economically disruptive to
both farmers and the public.

Moreover, this strategy

raises concerns about the well-being of the animals being
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injected with BST and questions the hormone's effects on
human health.
Rifkin's preference of the term BGH over BST is by
design.

"Growth hormone" carries more ominous

connotations than its scientific equivalent, particularly
when it ends up in a primary food source.

Both are

accurate, but each suggests a slightly different nuance in
perception.
Rifkin's goal is to have BST removed from the market.
A successful campaign to ban BST or to severely limit its
use would mark a significant victory for those opposing
genetic engineering.

For Rifkin it would signify a

measure of success, an incremental step toward greater
participation in the decision-making processes related to
genetic engineering and, more important, justification for
continuing the power struggle with the scientific
orthodoxy.
Another product-specific challenge occurred when
Rifkin blocked field experiments of the first genetically
engineered organism to be released into the
environment.
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The organism was named Ice-Minus by its

developer Steven Lindow, a plant pathologist at the
University of California, Berkeley.

Lindow discovered in

the frost-forming bacteria, P-syringae, the necessary
genetic modification to delete the ice-creating
instructions so that when the new organisms were sprayed
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on a field they would displace the naturally occurring
bacteria and protect plants down to 24 degrees
Fahrenheit.227

Noticing that Lindow and the National

Institutes of Health (NIH), which sponsored the research,
failed to consider fully the environmental impact of the
spraying, Rifkin sued to block the experiment.

As a

result, experimentation was delayed for three years.228
Rifkin predicts that spraying Ice-Minus on crops will have
several unintended, detrimental effects.

Among the

problems Rifkin anticipates are long-term effects "on
worldwide precipitation patterns" and putting local flora
and fauna at a disadvantage against frost damage.229
It was not, necessarily, Rifkin's rhetorical strategy
that provided the opportunity to block the Ice-Minus
experiment, but an oversight on the part of the
researchers.

The fact that the project was delayed three

years provided Rifkin with justification for his challenge
and lent some credibility to his argument that Ice-Minus
was not completely harmless.
Rifkin called on the courts to assist in his struggle
with the scientific community during the Ice-Minus
controversy, and although he uses the court system and
existing laws to achieve his goals, he is also active in
influencing legislation that benefits his cause.

The

National Journal said in 1986 that Rifkin was one of 150
people in the United States with the most influence in
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shaping federal policy.230

For example, Rifkin claims

that he worked for 14 months to get a bill before the
United States House of Representatives to overturn a
decision by the United States Patent office allowing the
patenting of "any genetically engineered animal on the
231

planet."

Though he was working to change a government

agency policy, Rifkin implies that the scientific
community was behind the move to patent animals and that
failure to take action would have played into the hands of
biotechnology-oriented corporations.

He predicted that

"It'll mean a few chemical and pharmaceutical and biotech
companies in the next twenty years literally taking over
animal husbandry as they have poultry."
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Again, Rifkin's strategy challenges the scientific
community's authority to take genetic engineering in
whatever direction it chooses without public discussion,
without debate.

Rifkin continues to question the freedom

with which scientists pursue their research as he seeks to
provoke discussions about genetic engineering and open
them to public participation.

Rifkin predicts, "We're

going to, as a society, debate the pros and cons of each
new technology so we can have a more sophisticated
analysis of cost benefit—so that when we proceed into
these new areas we do so with a sense that we've taken
care."
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Rifkin, convinced that the good he does

outweighs his mistakes, suggests, "We're opening up the

101
process of debate around some of the most important things
in our lives.

We*re opening up science and technology to

scrutiny beyond the scientific establishment.1,234
Another of Rifkin's strategies is to confront the
scientific community with challenges that he claims
represent the concerns of thousands of people and
organizations, not just himself.

Andrew King observes

that "Anyone who has built a constituency is to be feared.
Those who have done so have discovered a basis upon which
to unify people outside the prevailing power
structure."
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Rifkin contends that his challenges to

biotechnology represent views of a constituency that is to
be recognized and respected, if not feared.

Rifkin often

refers to coalitions in which he is involved that are
actively building opposition to genetic engineering in one
way or another.

Rifkin spoke of Germany, Denmark, and

Japan as countries that chose to invoke a moratorium on
genetically engineered releases into the environment.
Rifkin's reference to "our international coalition" during
a speech about BST cites the International Coalition
Against Bovine Growth Hormone.238

In that same speech,

Rifkin referred to another coalition, presumably against
genetic engineering, that consisted of "the National
Farmers Union, the American Agricultural Movement, Save
the Family Farm Coalition...the Humane Society, the
ASPCA..."
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Again, in that speech, Rifkin claimed to be
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establishing a "global coalition...of farm
organizations...environmental groups, food and consumer
groups, religious leaders..."
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Rifkin warns that a

group of angry, poor, developing countries in the Southern
Hemisphere is coalescing to protect gene pools native to
their countries against acquisitions by the hightechnology countries of the Northern Hemisphere.

Rifkin

argues that these developing nations claim "genetic
resources as part of their heritage...and they should be
compensated for their use."
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Repeated references to groups of countries uniting
against genetic engineering and coalitions of
organizations and groups forming to challenge the
technology reflect Rifkin's rhetorical strategy of
undermining the scientific community's favored position by
demonstrating growing disenchantment with the paradigm.
Consistent with Kurtz' argument that "The interests of
conflicting parties become attached either to a defense of
the alleged heresy or to the refutation of it," Rifkin
enumerates the growing number of coalitions to illustrate
how interests opposed to genetic engineering have "become
attached ...to a defense of the alleged heresy..."
The result would appear to be the isolation of the
scientific community and the legitimization of the
heretic's claims.
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One final strategy Rifkin employs to engage actively
the scientific community is face-to-face confrontation.
Rifkin is an accomplished speaker whose presentations vary
from 30 minutes to eight hours, depending on the
contract.
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Although most of his paid appearances are

likely before friendly audiences, he does not limit
himself to that speaking environment.

For example, The

National Institutes of Health convened the Technology
Assessment Conference on Bovine Somatotropin from December
5-7, 1990.

One journal reported the results of the

meeting:
The conference's concluding news conference was
enlivened by the presence of BST opponent Jeremy
Rifkin, president of the Foundation on Economic
Trends, who shouted questions from the press
section until he was asked to remain silent by
NIH officials."
Rifkin also addressed representatives of the
agricultural units of land-grant universities as part of a
debate on genetic engineering in Washington, D.C., in
1988.

Though the speaking situation was not

confrontational, Rifkin arrived at that meeting prepared
to address an audience that represented scientific
interests and could be characterized as less than
friendly. Having attended that speech, I thought that
Rifkin addressed the topic forcefully and articulately,
with no evidence of being intimidated by an audience that,
for the most part, offered him little more than contempt.
Rhetorically, Rifkin probably accomplishes very little in
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genuinely confrontational situations such as the NIH
meeting.

Although the rhetor employing that kind of

disruptive discourse is likely to be discounted as a
radical with minimal credibility, that kind of exchange
serves to make the defenders of the orthodoxy aware that
opposition is still very much present and active.
By contrast, when Rifkin addresses a specific
audience face-to-face—hostile groups included—he leaves a
lasting impression.

Time said of Rifkin, "Twenty years of

teaching, preaching and raising consciences...have refined
this show [Rifkin's lectures] to the point that it has a
slick, thoroughly professional sheen."243

Suggesting

that Rifkin's lecture style is better suited for college
students than scientists, The New York Times Magazine
judged Rifkin's style appealing: "But his natural ease and
charm, his ability to glide from an analysis of ancient
and medieval cosmologies to shameless shtick tends to
intimidate adversaries."
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Even when members of the

audience disagree with Rifkin's philosophies and
perspective and disparage his tactics, they begrudgingly
admit that he is articulate, persuasive, and a force with
which the scientific community must reckon.
Long-term Strategy: Passive Resistance
Rifkin, in his books, speeches, and interviews,
consistently challenges the legitimacy of the scientific
world view, arguing that it must be replaced with his
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"empathetic" world view.

Although this approach to the

world is an unequivocal challenge to science, the "how to”
of Rifkin's insurrection is never clearly articulated.
Instead, he offers adjectives that describe the
relationship with nature that will be experienced by those
who adopt this world view.

Passive resistance is the

terminology I choose to describe the road to Rifkin's
rather nebulous world of the future.
Recalling Rifkin's equation for the scientific world
view: knowledge *= power = control = security, his passive
resistance approach to the world argues that power does
not guarantee security as the equation suggests.

He

points to the nuclear arms race as evidence of his claim.
Rifkin proclaims, "It is time to entertain the ultimate
heresy: to consider the idea of renouncing the use of
power as a means of obtaining security."
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Arguing that

security comes from peace of mind rather than from a
nuclear arsenal, Rifkin philosophizes that "It is
impossible to control a mind that refuses to cooperate,
that will not acknowledge the underlying assumptions
governing the pursuit of power."2*8 Rifkin's rhetorical
strategy is intended to ultimately transform the power
struggle from one of physical conflict to one of moral
combat.

The transformation establishes Rifkin and his

supporters as the moral elite.

In his discussion of non

violent power strategies, King suggests that these
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struggles produce new identities for the combatants.

The

strong, in this case the scientists, are cast as
oppressors.

King contends that the goal of the non

violent practitioner

is to instill guilt in the oppressors

so that they "... at once surrender their prerogatives and
redress the grievances of the weaker party. "247

Rifkin

argues that power can work only in circumstances where
people are willing to cooperate, to become either the
"victimizers or victims."248

Rifkin claims that, "By the

mere act of letting go of the drive for power, one
automatically cancels the exercise of that drive by
others, whether they

beindividuals or nations."

Rifkin

asserts that letting

go of power means losing a measure of

control and "will require that we renounce our drive for
sovereignty over everything that lives..."249

Rifkin

predicts that relinquishing the quest for power will
neutralize science and permit mankind to establish a
closer relationship with nature and the environment.
Rifkin's strategy also seeks to make a virtue of
sacrifice.

Admitting that the new world view will require

sacrificing some personal security, Rifkin declares that
the reward is the security of nature for future
generations.

Rifkin contends that, "Instead of forcing

the cosmos to conform with our behavior, we would have to
refashion our behavior to conform with the cosmos."250
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Rifkin's "empathetic" world view is offered as an
alternative to the existing scientific world view and
reflects what Douglas and Wildavsky term "sectarian
cosmology."

Sectarianism is defined as "exclusive or

narrow-minded attachment to a sect, denomination, party or
school."
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Douglas and Wildavsky posit that the

characteristics of sectarianism include: a) an expectation
that life of the future will be radically changed for the
worse, b) a belief that the disaster has been caused by
corrupt worldliness that includes ambition of big
organizations and continuing development of new
technology, c) dichotomized values, i.e., good and bad, d)
espousal of the widest causes for all mankind, and e)
references to God or nature as justification for its
actions.

252

Douglas and Wildavsky suggest that

environmental groups often exhibit the characteristics of
sectarianism.

Rifkin's "empathetic" world view embodies

these same characteristics.

He advocates a world of peace

and mutual respect for all living creatures— a place where
everything and everybody lives in perfect harmony with
nature.

Rhetorically, Rifkin creates a sectarian world

that is free of nuclear weapons, genetically engineered
organisms, polluting industries, and other technological
creations of science.

It is this withdrawal from

technological inquiry and advancement that forms the basis

108
for Rifkin's threat to the scientific world view and
creates the crisis within the scientific community.
Perhaps it is the nature of sectarianism to produce
discourse that is couched in terms that lack specificity.
Certainly, Rifkin's vision of the "empathetic" world is
rich with descriptive language, but virtually devoid of
details about how the paradigm works.
ambiguity is intentional.

I believe the

By not dealing in specifics

Rifkin concentrates his discourse on the positive
relationships with nature that mankind will enjoy without
discussing the more troublesome aspects of that world.
For example, Rifkin's empathetic world frees itself of
nuclear weapons, produces its food through organic
farming, heats ecologically compatible shelters with
passive solar devices, and engages in a holistic approach
to human health.

Rifkin's empathetic approach ignores the

interdependence of the nations of the world, problems of
hunger in the regions of the world that are incapable of
producing food, the rapidly expanding world population,
and the control of dread diseases and epidemics.
Since the Renaissance sectarianism has provided a
cosmology for challenging authority.

Douglas and

Wildavsky trace the origins of sectarianism in America
from the earliest colonial settlements to the present, but
suggest that the two decades from 1960 to 1980 were
particularly fertile for sectarian movements because of
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technological innovations and increased government
support.
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Although Rifkin's "empathetic" world view

reflects the characteristics of the sectarian movement,
the values he espouses seem to have grown from the
agrarian tradition.

Perhaps because the genesis of

biotechnology experimentation was in agricultural
disciplines, Rifkin finds it easier to argue from an
agrarian perspective and employ agrarian values.
These agrarian values have been a part of persuasive
discourse since Thomas Jefferson, and collectively have
become designated as the "agrarian myth."

Richard

Hofstadter first coined the term "agrarian myth" to
designate what he called a sentimental attachment to rural
living based on notions about rural people and their
lives.
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Hofstadter's use of the term "myth" does not

suggest that the notion is necessarily false, rather it
denotes an idea "that so effectively embodies men's values
that it profoundly influences their way of perceiving
reality..."2M
Hofstadter's explains that the agrarian myth consists
of several themes.

Among them is the notion that the

yeoman farmer was "the ideal man and the ideal citizen."
The myth contends that the "special virtues" of farmers
and the "special values" of rural life made agriculture
uniquely important to society.

Another theme describes

the farmer as the "incarnation of the simple, honest.
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independent, healthy, happy, human being."

The agrarian

myth also suggests that the farmer's life was wholesome
and filled with integrity because of his "close communion"
with beneficent nature.

Finally, the farmer's well being

was not merely physical, it was moral.
Rifkin does not suggest that everyone should become a
farmer, but the values for which he argues are embodied in
the agrarian myth.

Rifkin's ideal citizen is honest,

happy, and healthy because he communes with nature.
Rifkin argues that the "empathetic" world view engenders
stewards who "participate with and nurture other things.
Their sense of security does not come from being in
control, but rather from taking care of other beings."236
Rifkin argues that today's "high tech" agriculture needs a
new perspective, one with a "new vision...that can allow
us not only to deal with and adjust to the current
greenhouse crisis, but could allow to plan a new
agricultural policy for the world in coming centuries that
will be based on resacralizing our relationship with
life.'*257
Rhetorically, Rifkin sells the idea of his spiritual
world as an embodiment of the teachings of Jesus Christ,
Mohandas Gandhi, Mother Theresa, and Martin Luther
King.
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Characterizing his "empathetic" world view in

god terms, literally, Rifkin identifies his paradigm with
the world's most revered humanitarians.

Taking his vision
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one step further, Rifkin employs a rhetoric of
transcendence as he discusses the potential of the
"empathetic" world view.

Kenneth Burke suggests that

transcendence is the capacity for words or symbols to
enhance the object in nature that they represent—to add a
"new dimension" to things of nature.259

As Rifkin

describes the "empathetic" world view, his words extricate
themselves of earthly bonds and assume utopian
connotations.

Rifkin posits that the new world may be the

route back to the Garden of Eden.

Rifkin's rhetoric soars

as he envisions his approach to the Garden gates and
proclaims,
And as our generation walks through those gates,
and gazes once again upon the beauty of the
garden as Adam and Eve once did, we will be
cleansed and rejuvenated. The long, weary
journey to secure the immortality of the human
race will have ended where it began. Our
generation will have finally discovered the
sweet secret of immortality.
Rifkin's depiction of the "empathetic" world view as
a return to Paradise cuts like a two-edged sword because
it is more than a description of a utopian world. In fact,
because that world beyond the gates of the Garden of Eden
is in a state of imperfection striving toward a return to
the Garden, the implication for the existing scientific
world view is that it is neither the roost direct return
route to the Garden nor is it the best approach to solving
the world's problems.
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Rifkin's world view is attractive because it creates
rhetorically a utopian world, a return to the Garden of
Eden where humans become one with nature and all of their
needs are provided.

Rifkin implies that the "empathetic"

world, because of its "oneness with nature" will be free
of conflict, free of the dangers inherent in a
technological society, and free of the stress that
accompanies a materialistic culture.
Rifkin's arguments appeal at still another level.

As

Douglas and Wildavsky point out, conservation and
ecological activism became a socially acceptable activity
in the decades of 1960 and 1970.281

Rifkin incorporates

in his rhetoric the tenets and values of the environmental
movement.

Preserving natural resources for future

generations is a central theme in Rifkin's arguments.
Rifkin quotes the philosophy of the Iroquois Indians when
he argues this point.

He suggests that, "When the

Iroquois Indians made a decision, they asked 'How does the
decision we make today affect seven generations
removed?'"262
Conclusion
This chapter presented arguments supporting the
notion that Rifkin's challenges to science represent a
power struggle that is consistent with Kurtz' second
characteristic of heresy, i.e., that heresy is socially
constructed in the midst of conflict.

By definition,

power resides within the orthodoxy of an institution.

The

implication for the heretic is that he assumes
responsibility for initiating the conflict and the
inevitable power struggles that ensue.

Whether

confrontation is simply inherent in heresy or whether, in
Rifkin's case, it is characteristic of his personality and
approach to life, ample evidence exists to suggest that
Rifkin eagerly leads the insurrection against the
scientific orthodoxy on several fronts and actively seeks
to wrest whatever power over genetic engineering he can
from the orthodoxy.
The social construction of heresy, according to
Kurtz, produces social consequences.

Chapter five will

examine some of the consequences within the scientific
community that result from Rifkin's rhetorical challenges.

CHAPTER 5
THE RESPONSE
In Chapters three and four, I demonstrated how
Rifkin's rhetorical strategy is consistent with Kurtz'
first two characteristics of heresy.

First, the "deviant

insider" produces crisis in the institution, and second,
crisis is socially constructed.

Chapter five will argue

that Rifkin's heretical stance and rhetorical strategy
draw scientists fromtheir laboratories to
biotechnology.

This

debate

involvement in public debate by the

scientists constitutes what Kurtz' calls the social
consequences of heresy.
Scientists have lost some of the freedom with which
they conduct their research.
this loss of freedom

It is

my contention

that

is a permanent change within the

scientific establishment.

This change is a result of

Rifkin's heretical challenge and reflects Kurtz1 notion of
the doctrinal consequences of heresy.
Finally, this chapter details the scientific
community's efforts to seize the rhetorical advantage in
this controversy by undermining Rifkin's credibility
through name-calling.
heresy-hunt ritual.

Kurtz labels this activity the
The last three of Kurtz'

characteristics of heresy differ from the previous two
because they reflect the rhetorical strategies of the
orthodoxy rather than those of the heretic.
114
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Social Consequences Analysis
The social consequences observed in the biotechnology
controversy occur within the scientific community as
scientists increase their exposure to the public by
responding to Rifkin's challenges and countering with
their own discourse.

They leave the laboratory to develop

arguments, publicly debate the issues, and recruit support
for their cause.
Heresy produces social consequences beyond the
boundaries of the institution in which it resides. In the
case of recombinant DNA, public regulatory agencies adopt
rules and guidelines that restrict the freedom of
scientific inquiry into the technology. Retailers refuse
to stock some items because of public concern about
agricultural commodities developed from genetically
engineered products.
Social consequences are one edge of what Kurtz
described as the two-edged sword of heresy.

The defenders

of the orthodoxy perceive heresy as disruptive, even
destructive, to their institution.

What is not readily

apparent to them, according to Kurtz, is that the social
consequences of a heretical challenge benefit their cause
by pulling their people together against a common enemy.
Kurtz argues that the social consequences of heresy
demonstrate that, in one way, "the propagation of error"
ultimately benefits the institution.

As Kurtz points out
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"...[heresy] is not only disruptive but can be used for
the creation of intragroup solidarity and for purposes of
social control..."
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By labeling heresy as an enemy of

the institution, the defenders of the orthodoxy can rally
their supporters in a way that may not have been possible
without the heresy.
Lessl reinforces Kurtz* argument that the threat
posed by heresy results in social changes within the
institution: "By identifying heresy and defining it as a
viral infestation of speciosity threatening to induce a
new fever of public credulity, scientists create for
themselves a renewed sense of solidarity and social
264
importance."
Lessl contends that one strategy for
building institutional solidarity is retreating to
scientific dogma as a response to the heretic.

Lessl

observes that although instituting dogma is common
practice, "this impulse is troublesome for scientists as
members of an institutional group defined by its rejection
of authoritarian answers to phenomenal questions."
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Kurtz and Lessl concentrate their commentary
regarding social consequences on the institution in which
the heresy arises.

I believe this analysis of social

consequences should extend beyond the boundaries of the
institution in which the heresy occurs.

While the

defenders of the orthodoxy are building their support
within the institution, the heretic may be building
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support outside the institution that can affect the
orthodoxy.

This appears to be the case with Rifkin.

His

heretical stance against the biotechnology orthodoxy
attracts the interest of several groups including
governmental agencies.

Whatever solidarity occurs within

and among these outside groups can be categorized as
social consequences that influence the heretic and his
institution.
Social Consequences Within the Institution
Opponents of biotechnology, the most prominent of
whom is Jeremy Rifkin, have compelled substantial numbers
of scientists and representatives of private and public
research institutions to defend their participation in
recombinant DNA research.

Moreover, as some of these

defenders of biotechnology surface, they actively
encourage their colleagues to promote biotechnology
research.
Perhaps there is no better example of the orthodoxy
of agricultural biotechnology rallying its supporters
against the growing influence of heresy than the United
States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Biotechnology
Challenge Forum.

On February 5-6, 1987, the USDA convened

the "Biotechnology: The Challenge" Forum.

The Forum

brought together scientists, corporate executives,
government officials, and others to express their views on
biotechnology and the challenges it faces.
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The
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preface to the Proceedings outlined the goals of the
meeting as increasing public knowledge about agricultural
biotechnology research and examining the role of the
federal government in regulating the results of this
research.

Although the Forum may have achieved these

goals, the Proceedings indicate that there were attempts
to bring together those in attendance to form a united
front against critics of biotechnology.
Because of the views expressed in that forum, there
can be little doubt that the symposium was the result of
the growing intensity of public debate on biotechnology
and the increasing involvement of government as a result
of the public debate. The agenda drew forth several
defenders of genetic engineering that may never have
engaged in a public discussion of the subject except that
their work was publicly challenged.
The rhetorical strategies employed by the scientific
orthodoxy in this meeting included minimizing the novelty
of the technology, questioning the scientific competence
of those who challenge genetic engineering, invoking
scientific dogma, and emphasizing the potential benefits
of the research.
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By minimizing the novelty of genetic engineering,
defenders of biotechnology implement a rhetorical strategy
that Andrew King terms manipulating the context of an
event.

King contends that "one can change the

persuasiveness of an argument or appeal by expanding or
diminishing the context in which a group of listeners
think about it."
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So, the biotechnology orthodoxy

argues that recombinant DNA is not new; it is simply an
extension of traditional breeding techniques that have
always sought improved plants and animals through cross
breeding.

For example, Henry I. Hiller, H.D., special

assistant to the commissioner of the Food and Drug
Administration, accused biotechnology critics of confusing
the public by suggesting the technology is new.

He argued

that genetic engineering involves new techniques that are
refinements of older biotechnology, "not technological
disjunctions, as was the advent of nuclear fission, or as
would be the case for time travel."
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The effectiveness

of this argument would appear to be minimized by the
paradox it creates.

On the one hand scientists argue that

biotechnology is not new, while on the other hand they
contend that it has the potential of unprecedented
discoveries in food, medicine and the environment.
Rhetorically, the scientists employ the notion of
minimizing the novelty of genetic engineering to refute
one of Rifkin's primary arguments—that genetic engineering
permits combinations of genetic traits across species
boundaries that were never possible with traditional
breeding techniques.

Rifkin contends that biotechnology's

unique potential lies in its capability to introduce
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genetic traits from any animal to any other animal,
including humans, and from plants to animals and animals
to plants.

In fact, Rifkin cites as an example of the

possibilities the introduction of the "light" gene from
the fire fly into tobacco plants to make them glow at
night.
One strategy scientists used to discredit the
heretic's credibility is to question the biotechnology
challengers' knowledge of science.

One Forum speaker, a

microbiologist, exhibited frustration about public
involvement in the biotechnology debate and governmental
involvement in regulating the industry.

Suggesting that

biotechnology research has had no safety problems in ten
years, he complained that "nonscientific issues may play a
dominant role in the future of biotechnology development
and implementation in the United States."270

Implying

that these "nonscientific issues" may be irrational, he
invoked the fear that these divergent opinions may cause
the United States' biotechnology efforts to become secondrate. He predicted that "First, the regulatory climate
could, if not rational, present U.S. industry with an
insurmountable problem for the eventual introduction of
products being developed now, leading to a future
withdrawal of activities in these areas."271

At once

narrowing the listeners' choices to purely "scientific"
concerns, defining those choices and invoking the sanctity
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of science, the speaker implied that only rational and
irrational approaches to the biotechnology debate exist.
Moreover, for him, any approach that is not science-based
is not rational and therefore not worthy of serious
consideration by scientists.
A Monsanto Company representative argued against the
public's participation in decisions related to
biotechnology because of its lack of understanding of the
science involved.

Karen Rogers, education director for

Monsanto, suggested that the fears of people untrained in
science threaten the freedom and right to conduct research
in the United States.

For Rogers, "Biotechnology simply

is moving ahead too quickly for the public to assimilate
its advances into their existing educational, religious
and social frameworks."
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On one hand Rogers' comments

seem to suggest that a general lack of education is the
reason the public should not participate in genetic
engineering decisions; but another comment reveals that
she believes a different kind of education would help
biotechnology achieve the public consensus it seeks.
Rogers argued that the conduct of scientific inquiry is a
right.

By suggesting that genetic engineering is a right,

she attempts to elevate the rationale for biotechnology
research to a higher and therefore more legitimizing moral
plane.

Rogers predicted that "Unless science and math
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literacy is improved, we could lose our right to conduct
273

research-whether basic or applied.”

Rogers' comments exemplify Kurtz' notion that heresy
provides for the defenders of the orthodoxy an opportunity
to rally their faithful.

Rogers admonished the group:

"The time when scientists could conduct research in the
quiet and solitude of their laboratories without entering
the public debate is over."
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Rogers then offered a

plan for responding to the challengers of genetic
engineering.

She suggested that the industry needs a

spokesperson for lectures and media appearances, more
visible scientists, more involvement by universities, an
education program for journalists, and an emphasis on
biotechnology in the science programs of schools.275
In a retreat to scientific dogma, another speaker
responded to one of Rifkin's recurring public challenges.
Rifkin's suggestion that genetically engineered products
may become as uncontrollable as Kudzu vine, the gypsy
moth, and chestnut blight was the subject of this
speaker's comments.

Alan Goldhammer, director of

technical affairs for the Industrial Biotechnology
Association, attempted to limit the scope of the
biotechnology argument by reducing the debate to
quantifiable, scientific data.

He argued that ''It is

imperative that any risk assessment be science based.
is easy to conjure up scenarios of ecological damage by

It
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genetically engineered organisms, but these will easily
fall apart when the scientific data are scrutinized.,,Z76
Goldhammer's metaphorical reference to the scenarios
"falling apart" is a reductionist approach that suggests
all the answers are in the scientific data.

By

discounting all considerations beyond the data,
Goldhammer, in effect, reduces the human implications of
ecological damage to the level of quantifiable data.
Kenneth Burke contends that human relationships are of a
higher order than scientific correlations (data).

Burke

observes that, "Any attempt to deal with human
relationships after the analogy of naturalistic
correlations becomes necessarily the reduction of some
higher or more complex realm of being to the terms of a
lower or less complex realm of being."
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Richard J. Patterson, a plant pathologist and
biochemist, told the Forum that scientists should
concentrate on the products of biotechnology when talking
to the public.

Patterson said his goal is to manage the

fear that results from the cases of uncertainty brought to
the attention of the public by "the antagonists of the
development of biotechnology..."

Patterson said his

approach to the debate is to "convey knowledge" because
"the public develops a clearer understanding if you talk
about the products of biotechnology. 1,278

Patterson's

strategy implies that discussions of genetically
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engineered products (rather than the methods, effects, or
consequences) is synonymous with "knowledge." Patterson
seems to rhetorically construct the public as a rational
body as he suggests that if the public is simply
"knowledgeable" about the products of biotechnology it
will support continued research.

This argument, too, is a

form of scientific dogma based on the rationale that when
results (data) are analyzed they will provide the desired
results. Other considerations are not part of the
equation.
The 1987 biotechnology forum in Washington, D.C.,
preceded four similar meetings the following year.

In the

spring of 1988, the USDA, the nation's land grant
universities, state agricultural experiment stations, and
cooperative extension services conducted four regional
information conferences.

Headlined as "Agricultural

Biotechnology and the Public," these conferences were held
in Raleigh, North Carolina; Reno, Nevada; New Brunswick,
New Jersey; and Minneapolis, Minnesota.

A published

report by the USDA summarized the content of those
conferences.

In many ways these conferences were

extensions of the Biotechnology Challenge Forum sponsored
by the USDA in Washington, D.C., in February of 1987.
Apparently, primarily agricultural scientists convened at
these meetings to discuss the future of biotechnology,
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explore its potential, and plan strategies to overcome
obstacles.
Because the participants at these conferences were
scientists engaged in genetic engineering research, their
rhetorical strategy focused on reinforcing existing
beliefs about biotechnology and developing arguments for
the defense of the industry.

Some of the scientists

argued for the necessity of genetic engineering.

In a

section titled "The Promise," the report noted that "ag
biotechnology can circumvent natural, slow reproduction
and selection for desirable traits in both plants and
animals, and greatly speed up the improvement and
•

versatility of plant and animal species."
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The notion

of the necessity of accelerated scientific inquiry was
repeated by some scientists because "Agriculture's urgent
challenge is to discover further 'quantum leaps,' such as
the one we got from nitrogen fertilizer."

The scientists

press for urgency "because our entire food base is so
narrow.
crops."

Human life depends on a small handful of
280

King observes that expanding the context of

an argument can "make a small event seem far more critical
than it ordinarily appears."281

By linking more rapid

technological development with the necessity of
maintaining an adequate food supply, scientists transfer
to their research a moral imperative.

The role of
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recombinant DNA scientists becomes one of humanitarianism,
saving the world from hunger.
Patrick Jordan, administrator of the Cooperative
State Research Service of the USDA, during these
conferences, perhaps inadvertently agreed with one of
Rifkin's positions when he declared that HWe are seeing
the dawn of a new era; a technical revolution that could
rival the impact of the industrial revolution."

Jordan

issued a rallying call to the scientists, reaffirming that
science and biotechnology hold the answers to society's
problems.

He predicted that "If we will communicate well

with the public and listen well, and adjust accordingly,
we can meet the rendezvous with destiny that the
scientific community has in solving major problems of
mankind."202
The themes argued at the Washington, D.C., forum and
the four regional conferences recur as scientists, at
different times in other places, increase their visibility
and willingness to enter the public debate on genetic
engineering.

Even James Watson, one of the two scientists

who made the 1953 discovery of the double helix, tries to
allay the fears of those outside science by minimizing the
effects of genetic technology.

Watson commented on the

concerns of genetic research in a newspaper interview:

"A

lot of people say they're worried about changing our
genetic instructions, but those [instructions] are just a
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product of evolution designed to adapt us for certain
404
conditions that may not exist today."
Watson, too,
attempts to minimize the scope of the debate with what
King labels a reductionist approach in which "the finite
solution concentrates on eliminating the effects of the
problem."

Watson's use of highly mechanistic language

suggests control that minimizes detrimental effects.
Karen Rogers' notion that the public is ill-informed
to make decisions about genetic engineering is echoed by
other scientists.

Arguing that non-scientists lack the

knowledge to participate in decisions about genetic
engineering is a power-play by scientists.

King observes

that, "In a democratic, technologically oriented society,
an elite may rest its privileges on merit or special
knowledge."
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By maintaining that only scientists

possess the expertise necessary to make decisions about
biotechnology, scientists establish themselves as a
privileged elite.

Scientists argue that they alone can

make the appropriate decision for the good of everybody.
For example, California Institute of Technology biologist
LeRoy Hood contends that "If you don't have the faintest
idea of biology, you can't think about it.

And when you

hear a fearmonger spouting nonsense, you can't say, 'this
is ridiculous.'"
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James Lauderdale, Upjohn Corporation

Bovine Somatotropin project leader, leaves his laboratory
to suggest that "This country has got an excellent market
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for fear."
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Jerry Caulder, president of the Industrial

Biotechnology Association, is direct when he proclaims
that the BGH safety debate is "a result of living in a
society that's relatively scientifically illiterate."288
Some scientists choose to respond to Rifkin's charges
that genetically engineered organisms, plants and animals,
are unsafe for humans and the environment.

King contends

that because "An elite is, by definition, a minority, it
must constantly guard against counter-organization."289
Sensing restlessness among the public and the government
regulators, scientists marshalled their forces to defend
genetic engineering.

According to the Science News,

scientists from several disciplines met in May of 1989 at
the Boyce Thompson Institute for Plant Research in Ithaca,
New York, "to try to preempt and evaluate the worries of
consumers and federal officials..."290
On January 19, 1989, the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) approved the first introduction of a foreign
gene into humans.
therapy.

The procedure is referred to as gene

By the end of that month Rifkin had put the NIH

Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) on notice.

He

warned that he would file suit to assure that the "ethical
and social implications of this work" were addressed.291
LeRoy Walters, a Georgetown University ethicist and RAC
member, responded to Rifkin's charges suggesting that
"Gene therapy is the most extensively debated therapy in
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history."
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Ignoring the issues of ethics and social

implications raised by Rifkin, Halters' reiterated that
gene therapy had been "extensively debated" implying that
the issues that needed to be discussed had been covered.
Walters' strategy relegated Rifkin's concerns to non
issues .
Other scientists in those meetings joined the effort
to minimize the novelty of genetic engineering and limit
the scope of the discussion.

Biologist Roger Beach of

Washington University claimed, "Breeders have been
altering the genetic pool of plants for centuries.
Genetic engineering is nothing but plant breeding done
with exquisite precision."293

Beach attempts to engender

a feeling of security when he uses the words "exquisite
precision."

This term implies that the scientist's

approach to genetic engineering is calculated to produce
predictable results with minimum risks.

Plant scientists

argue further that genetic engineering is not producing
radically different species.

Howard Schneiderman, senior

vice president and chief scientist for Monsanto, explains
that "To convert a corn plant into a weed would require
hundreds of genetic changes because corn simply does not
have a weedy personality."

By minimizing plant

alterations and comparing the newly created plants to
those with which we are familiar, Schneiderman, too,
appeals to our desire for security.
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Some scientists feel compelled to respond to Rifkin
by arguing that it is only through continued, perhaps
accelerated, scientific inquiry and research that the
needs of society and a growing population can be met.

By

establishing science as the paradigm uniquely qualified to
fill this role, scientists elevate their world view to a
heroic social force.

They suggest that only science can

respond to demands for more economically efficient food
and fiber production, improved medical treatments and
procedures, new energy alternatives, creative
environmental conservation approaches, and other
technologically oriented societal needs.

For example,

William E. Marshall, president of the Microbial Genetics
Division of Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., speaking
at the USDA Biotechnology Challenge Forum, predicted that,
We could become independent of petroleum-related
inputs, our energy needs could be significantly
reduced, new crops could be developed more
quickly for new areas, food animals could be
developed more readily for specific market
targets, and our soil and water resources could
be regenerated.
Still other scientists tout the benefits of
genetically engineered products that will profit the
consuming public, if not on the scale of miracle cures and
the like.

For example, DNA Plant Technologies Corporation

boasts of celery without strings.

The Wall street Journal

reports that genetic engineering companies are
"researching ways to identify specific types of DNA, to
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'map* or track them, and in many cases, to mix and match
genes, in hopes of creating sweeter carrots, more-colorful
flowers, longer-lasting tomatoes and leaner beef."
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This strategy deflects the argument away from the dangers
and ethical concerns of genetic engineering to a
discussion of products; a discussion of ends rather than
means.

The implication of this strategy is that ends

justify the means.
Regardless of the scientist-rhetor's choice of
rhetorical strategies, the motivation to step beyond the
laboratory and enter the debate on genetic engineering is
to defend his or her research activities against
biotechnology critics.
Social Consequences Bevond the Institution
Although Kurtz and Lessl examine the social
consequences of a heretical insurrection on the
institution in which it occurs, they do not address the
effects of that heresy on other institutions.

Rifkin's

challenges have resulted in several social consequences in
institutions beyond the scientific community that affect
scientific activities.
It would be disingenuous to suggest that Rifkin is
responsible for all of the regulations governing
biotechnology, but it is likely he has influenced
legislation more than any other individual outside
government.

The National Journal said of Rifkin in 1986
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that he was one of the 150 people in the United States
with the most influence in shaping federal policy.297
Rifkin directs his challenges toward influencing
regulations primarily in three agencies that regulate
agriculture: the USDA, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

USDA

approves the field trials of genetically engineered
plants, the EPA sets tolerance levels for chemical
pesticides, genetically engineered or otherwise, and FDA
evaluates genetically engineered plants destined for human
consumption.
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Rifkin also targets the National

Institutes of Health (NIH) concerning its regulation of
medical applications of genetic engineering in humans.299
Rifkin's most successful campaign and the effort that
has created the most social consequences outside the
scientific community is his opposition to B6H (bovine
growth hormone.

Although BGH has been in the FDA approval

process for years, the Wall Street Journal reports,
"Monsanto Co.'s efforts to gain Food and Drug
Administration approval for its method of increasing milk
production in cows...have stalled."300
the pressure of Rifkin's efforts.

Monsanto has felt

Monsanto spokesperson

Deb DeGraff explains that Rifkin forced her company into
the public debate about biotechnology:

''We've had to do a

lot more public relations work, we've had to justify our
research.

We've had to get information out much earlier
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than we ever had to do before, to be visual and vocal
about defending research.1,301
There are other BGH-related consequences for which
Rifkin is responsible.

Rifkin took his campaign public,

arguing that milk produced by cows injected with BGH
transmits the hormone to those who drink it, posing
possible health problems.

That suggestion was enough to

scare several companies handling milk products.

As

Science magazine reported in 1989,
Fear of a consumer backlash was enough to
frighten Kraft USA, Borden, Inc., Dannon, Inc.,
and other food processors to announce that they
will not sell BGH milk products while the
hormone is still under FDA review. And in
August, four of the nation's largest grocery
chains, including Safeway Stores, Inc., and
Kroger Company, and a major 0$ilJc cooperative,
adopted a similar position.3
Consumer reaction to BGH is an example of the social
consequences produced outside the scientific community by
Rifkin's campaign.

Rifkin's goal is for these social

consequences to produce effects within the scientific
community that could eventually cause the abandonment of
BGH.

According to Rifkin, "This particular one [battle

over genetic engineering] will be won; Monsanto, Eli
Lilly, Upjohn and American Cyanamid will lose.
will lose millions of dollars.

And they

They will be

defeated. "303
As social consequences evolve in a heretical dispute,
and the defenders of the orthodoxy begin debating the
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issues raised by the heretic, the orthodoxy undergoes
still another change.

Those who speak for the orthodoxy

find themselves developing opinions and stances on issues
never before considered to be doctrine.

Kurtz contends

that as these stands are taken, they eventually develop
into orthodox doctrine.
Doctrinal Consequences Analysis
Kurtz labels his fourth characteristic of heresy
"doctrinal consequences."

Kurtz does not suggest these

doctrinal modifications result from the leaders of the
orthodoxy establishing committees that hammer out a
consensus to appease the heretics, but these changes are
no less permanent modifications in operational procedures
of the institution.

According to Kurtz, "It is in the

heat of escalating conflicts that orthodoxy is formulated,
often through explicit disagreement with a position held
by 'heretics...'"
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Lessl agrees with Kurtz and

explains that "In the process of trying to keep deviance
at bay, the advocates of orthodoxy are pressed to draw
doctrinal lines which, by showing what is not correct,
serve to clarify what is correct."
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Lessl posits that

institutional assumptions exist that may have escaped
deliberate scrutiny, but are drawn to the surface by
heretics.

In the process, they become more clearly

defined and become part of the orthodoxy.

Kurtz suggests

that as people choose sides in a conflict, they find it
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"increasingly difficult to mix positions and beliefs that
have conflicting political implications."306

By

rejecting a particular heretical position, the orthodoxy
may find itself unintentionally endorsing a position that
was not previously doctrinal and may never have become
doctrinal otherwise.
One of the most prominent of Rifkin's arguments
against biotechnology is that scientists have too much
latitude in conducting their research:
Chief among the scientific assumptions now being
contested is the right of total freedom of
scientific inquiry uninhibited by any outside
controls. Scientists like Edward Teller,
"father of the H-bomb," believe that a
researcher should not deny himself a discovery
for fear of the social consequences.30
The most important doctrinal consequence of Jeremy
Rifkin's heretical challenge to biotechnology is that
scientists in this field must yield as never before much
of the freedom with which they conduct their research.
This acquiescence manifests itself primarily in two areas.
First, biotechnology research is conducted within the
framework of increased government involvement and
regulations.

Second, genetic engineering research is

subject to public scrutiny, often before experiments are
conducted.
Complying with Government Regulations
It is generally agreed that a meeting of molecular
biologists in Asilomar, California, in February of 1975
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inadvertently led to the first federal regulations
governing recombinant DNA research.

Scientists attending

that meeting approved several self-imposed safety
practices regulating their experimentation. Their vote to
regulate themselves was recognized by outsiders as an
indication of continued research and a step toward tighter
safety precautions.

The scientists left the Asilomar

meeting convinced that they could return to the seclusion
of their laboratories to continue their research with
little concern about outside interference.

But, less than

18 months later NIH issued the first federal guidelines
regulating recombinant DNA, inspired in part by the
Asilomar meeting.
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Alan Gross observes that the

scientific community offered little opposition to the
regulations at this stage of the controversy:
...the proponents of the research generally
supported these guidelines as a shield for
ongoing activities, while their opponents fought
for legislation and court rulings further to
restrict or to eliminate recombinant
research.309
These fights for legislation and court rulings draw
unsolicited and unwelcome attention to the scientific
community in general and biotechnology in particular.
This scrutiny often translates into increased governmental
involvement in research.

Rifkin's role in involving

government regulators in biotechnology research through
legislation and court rulings has been considerable.
example, in a 1989 profile of Rifkin, Time magazine

For
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suggested that even though he loses more court battles
than he wins, "he has forced the Government to establish
regulatory pathways for some genetically engineered
products and clarify practices for others.310
Ultimately, this governmental regulation assumes
control of some of the decision making process for the
scientific community's research activities.

Though

reluctant to relinquish research prerogatives, the
scientific community is confronted with the mandatory
participation of governmental and public bodies such as
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the U.S. Patent Office, and the
National Institutes of Health (NIH).
At least three of these agencies have been involved
in the Bovine Growth Hormone (BGH) controversy.

No

genetically engineered product to date has become more
entangled in the federal bureaucracy than BGH and n o .
product serves as a better example of how the scientific
community yielded to government regulation.

As early as

the mid-1980s the FDA deemed BGH safe for human
consumption, but as recently as February, 1992, the
product was still not available commercially.

311.

The FDA

continues to evaluate the product to determine whether it
is safe for animals that produce milk.

Host of the BGH

delays have resulted from Rifkin's lawsuits forcing
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government agencies to enforce technicalities they
bypassed.
Since the original approval by the FDA, other
agencies have become involved. On December 5-7, 1990, the
NIH convened the Technology Assessment Conference on
Bovine Somatotropin to review the data.

The Journal of

the American Medical Association reported on the
conference, noting that the NIH findings essentially
duplicated the FDA data.312 And, in May 1991, the United
States Congress Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
issued a special report on BGH.

The OTA found that "It

[BST] is a technology that, based on today's research
findings, poses no additional risk to consumers, one that
does not produce adverse health effects to cows, and one
that alone will not economically disadvantage the
traditional farm operator."
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These conclusions were

essentially the same as those of the FDA and the NIH.

One

might assume that the BGH situation is a unique
bureaucratic quagmire, but it seems just as likely that
Rifkin and the government set a precedent with BGH that
may become the standard for the future.

The message to

scientists should be clear: anticipate complying with
existing regulations and prepare to respond to lawsuits.
One of Rifkin's earliest efforts to have the
government intercede in a genetic engineering experiment
was the Ice-Minus controversy.

That incident also
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prompted government agencies to begin developing rules
under which genetically engineered products could be
tested in fields.

Although the NIH reviewed the

University of California research, it failed to consider
the experiment's environmental impact.

Rifkin learned of

the oversight and sued to stop the experiment.

Time

magazine reports that "testing was postponed for three
years while NIH, the Department of Agriculture and the
Environmental Protection Agency struggled to draw up rules
under which genetically engineered products would move
from the lab to the field."31*
The human gene therapy confrontation is another
example of a long project review followed by a lawsuit
claiming the process was short-circuited.

On January 19,

1989, the NIH approved what is termed gene therapy, the
first introduction of a foreign gene into a human.

At a

January 30, 1989, meeting of the NIH Recombinant DNA
Advisory Committee (RAC) Rifkin challenged the committee's
review procedures and called for a moratorium on that
experiment and all human gene therapy research.

Rifkin

accused the RAC of ignoring the social and ethical
consequences of gene therapy and called for the
establishment of a Human Eugenics Advisory Committee.315
Robert M. Cook-Deegan, then acting executive director of a
congressionally appointed Biomedical Ethics Advisory
Committee, protested Rifkin's challenge: "I can't think of
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any other technology that's received so much public
scrutiny."

Cook-Deegan said gene therapy had been the

subject of private and government reports, hearings, and
public symposia, including five NIH committees since
1983.
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Still, Rifkin sought postponement of the test

until the committee he proposed could be established and
could act on the proposed research.
Another genetic engineering case in which Rifkin
seeks increased regulation surfaced in 1990.

In late 1989

about 5,000 cases of eosinophilia-mylgia syndrome (EMS)
were reported among people taking a sleeping pill
containing the amino acid L-tryptophan.

The bacterium

used to produce the amino acid was genetically engineered.
Although the bacterium was not determined to be the
contaminant, in October of 1990 Rifkin filed a petition
with the FDA urging several measures to limit the use of
such genetically engineered organisms.

Science magazine

reports that Rifkin's petition requested new rules for
reviewing all products of recombinant DNA origins, that
all those products be labeled as to their origins, and
that studies be initiated to establish a "predictive
science" for analyzing genetic engineering processes.317
On a biotechnology-related issue, Rifkin supported
legislation that protects an individual's genetic
information.

The bill was proposed by Congressman John

Conyers, Democrat from Michigan, and would regulate the
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"collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of
genetic information gathered from individuals by the
federal government and its contractors and grantees."318
Commenting on the bill, Rifkin exhibited his usual
exuberance predicting that, "we will see in this decade a
genetic rights movement as potent and as powerful as the
civil rights movement of the 1960s."310
Yet, as the regulations become a reality for
scientists, they, too, agree that some research needs
oversight.

For example, Rifkin filed suit in 1988 against

two government agencies to effect regulatory involvement
in two genetic engineering research projects.

The suit,

filed against NIH and the Department of Health and Human
Services, sought immediate suspension of certain
experiments involving oncogenes and the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV).

Rifkin also sought an

environmental impact study from NIH on all such research.
Of particular concern was the work of Malcolm Martin,
chief of the molecular biology and microbiology laboratory
at the national Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Disease.

Martin had created a transgenic mouse by

introducing the entire genetic code of HIV into a strain
of lab mice.

That meant that every cell of the mice

carried the HIV genetic code and the virus could be
transmitted to future generations.
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Science magazine points out that "Martin's research
has raised eyebrows even within the scientific
fraternity."

Martin defended his colleagues' concern

noting that "They were worried about putting the AIDS
virus into the germline of mice" that could escape from
320

the research facility.

At the time, William Gartland,

chief of the Office of Recombinant DNA Activities at NIH,
said there were no rules for working with transgenic
animals.

Furthermore, there were no established protocols

for working with transgenic mice with HIV.321
Government intervention and regulations have become
part of the culture of biotechnology research.

Scientists

now approach biotechnology research projects with more
than passive attention directed to the federal agencies
that oversee genetic engineering experimentation.

There

is little doubt that Rifkin's lawsuits and lobbying
efforts have introduced a broader scope of regulation into
scientific research.

Yielding a greater degree of the

scientific research decision making process to these,
agencies is now part of the institution of scientific
inquiry.
Involving the Public
Rifkin argues that there have been two great
scientific discoveries this century—nuclear fission and
genetic engineering.322

He claims that one of those

discoveries, nuclear fission, included too little public
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debate during its development resulting in a technology
that is more harmful than beneficial.

Rifkin argues that,

like nuclear fission, the potential for genetic
engineering is too great for the scientific community to
exclude the public from discussions about its use. Rifkin
maintains that the reason he spends so much time, energy
and money trying to stop or delay genetic engineering
experiments is to allow time for more public involvement.
Gross contends in his analysis of the recombinant DNA
controversy that even while the debate was young "...the
opponents of recombinant research wrested the issue from
the control of the scientific community and successfully
brought their case into the relatively uncontrolled arena
of public debate."
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Speaking to a national convention

of agricultural communication specialists in 1988, Rifkin
proclaimed, "We’re entering a new chapter in our
relationship to technology, especially in agriculture.
Now, we're going to, as a society, debate the pros and
cons of each new technology..."
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Rifkin argues that,

"Scientists should show us how these new technologies
work.

Then society, not scientists, should decide if it

wants to use them."
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Rifkin explains that his 1989

gene therapy lawsuit against the NIH was a move to provoke
broad public debate on the issue: "This is a transition
point in human medicine that should be thoroughly
discussed, debated, and assessed."326
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Rifkin's initiatives to involve the public are
recognized by the scientific community, and in some cases
have become sensitive issues.

Jerry Caulder, president of

Hycogen Corp. of San Diego, California, suggests that
testing and marketing biotechnology products has become an
expensive and time consuming process.

He contends that

"Previous industries had the luxury of developing
relatively free from public scrutiny until their products
had a significant impact on the economy and society."327
As genetic engineering research comes under increased
public scrutiny, scientists find they must interact with
the public to defend their work.

The technical

perspective scientists bring to the debate does little to
achieve consensus on experimental procedures and
oversight.

Farrell and Goodnight observe that technical

reasoning and discourse had a similar effect during the
Three Mile Island nuclear incident.

Their assessment of

the discourse of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant
incident contends that technical reasoning usurped social
reasoning long before that crisis occurred.

They argue

that the event "...marked the failure of technical
reasoning and concomitant communication practices to
master contemporary rhetorical demands."320

Farrell and

Goodnight posit that technological reasoning disables
consensual discourse because "...inference structures
relating technical and social judgments remain
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inaccessible..."

329

According to Farrell and Goodnight,

technical reasoning consists of the development of
inferences in specialized forums.

Moreover, the language

of these inferences is coded for particular disciplines
and evaluated by state-of-the art methods.

Social

reasoning, on the other hand, develops inferences arising
from events in everyday life that affect a large
population.

The inferences are grounded in the notion

that those affected are competent to make decisions about
their circumstances.330
Consensual discourse appears as elusive in the
recombinant DMA controversy as the discourse described by
Farrell and Goodnight.

In a manner similar to the Three

Mile Island incident, technical reasoning concerning
biotechnology excludes the public and usurps social
reasoning.

Scientists contend that the solutions to

social problems are found in technological development.
As scientists argue that they alone are qualified to
assess the problems and develop solutions, they assume the
role of "judge, jury and executioner."

While scientists

are willing to publicly debate biotechnology, their
strategy seems to be directed primarily toward
rationalizing and justifying the need for continued,
minimally regulated research, not the incorporation of
social perspectives on the issues.

Scientists attempt to

discredit the scientific knowledge of non-scientists by
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undermining their credibility.

Fred Davison of the

University of Georgia is a scientist who is clearly
frustrated by the constraint public involvement imposes.
He complains, "Our pipelines to that information
[biotechnology] are so clogged with so much ignorance,
regulations, and fear that we can't get it [leadership in
biotechnology] done."

Davison deplores what he terms

"setting policy toward science in the voting booth."331
A Monsanto Company experience also exemplifies how
scientists are becoming more sensitive to the need to
inform the public of some of their work.

Monsanto planned

a field test of a genetically engineered organism in a
town about 15 miles from it headquarters in Missouri.
Describing the planning procedure for the test to other
scientists, a Monsanto spokesperson explained,
We did not take the test community for granted.
As early as 1985, we began a briefing program
for local officials.
Favorable stories appeared
in the local press, and briefings were conducted
for county farmers.
All in all, the community
viewed the test positively.
Another scientist, Richard J. Patterson, speaking on
that same program, suggested that "Biotechnology speakers,
in trying to reach the public should talk about such
things as screening the blood supply for antibodies to the
AIDS virus, and avoid esoteric terminology..."

Patterson

is the president of the non-profit North Carolina
Biotechnology Center at Triangle Park.

He explained:
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"The Center's first 'in-house' program was Public
Information and Education in Biotechnology.”333
By instructing scientists and administrators in the
technical aspects of communication, the biotechnology
industry appears to be responding to the rhetorical
dilemma of public involvement and government regulations.
Farrell and Goodnight, however, contend that the "problems
of formulating a deliberative rhetoric..." are
considerably more complex than teaching scientists the
"how to" of public speaking and the techniques of
effective media interviews.

They argue that to achieve

consensual discourse, "...the language, the modes of
decision-making, and procedures for establishing consensus
must be discovered for both experts and generalists
alike."33*
Still another segment of the scientific community
appears to have gained an appreciation for the public's
growing influence on biotechnology.

In the "Agricultural

Biotechnology and the Public" regional conferences during
the spring of 1988, more than 18 speakers addressed the
issue of communicating biotechnology issues to the public.
The published summary of those meetings declared, "It is
generally agreed: The public is a full player in
establishing the biotech success curve through influencing
the flow of funds into research, the rules for testing and
releasing biotech materials, and the acceptance of biotech

products."

335

Although these scientists recognize the

need to communicate with the public about biotechnology
research, they do not seem to appreciate the rhetorical
challenge they face.

The first sentence in the

"Communicating with the Public" section of the USDA
summary announces that, "With the new, wonderful world of
biotechnology at work, would you believe that the big
problem with agricultural biotechnology is public
opinion...fear.. .that*s the main deterrent?"336 Although
these scientists verbalize the need for the public to be
involved, they perceive the necessity of dealing with the
public as a problem.

They view public opinion as a

obstacle that restricts the freedom with which they
conduct their research. The scientists assume that if they
initiate a campaign to explain to the public what
biotechnology is and how it works, the citizenry will
support their research.

The assumption underlying this

strategy is that public reluctance to endorse
biotechnology is based on a lack of understanding of
genetic engineering.

This assumption ignores the position

that Rifkin advocates—that if even if people understand
all the benefits biotechnology has to offer, they may
choose not to support it.

The scientists' perspective

reflects Farrell and Goodnight's observation that
technical reasoning is indifferent to the demands of
social reasoning: "It seems that even as technical
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reasoning encompasses an increasing array of social
questions, its very logic precludes it practitioners from
full social responsibility."337
At least one speaker at that meeting seemed to
recognize the dilemma; he suggested to the scientists that
merely demonstrating the products of genetic engineering
may not be enough to gain public support.

Orion

Samuelson, vice president and agricultural services
director of WGN Continental Broadcasting Company in
Chicago, suggested that the public is concerned about
safety.

He advised that,

Ethical-moral questions about biotechnology are
alive in the public; there's a feeling that
biotechnology is dealing with creation...and
emotional animal right concerns are there—and
they need to be dealt with. Be truthful...don't
be evasive...and don't get angry.
James Watson, director of the NIH Human Genome
Project, is aware of the public concern for the ethical,
social, and legal implications of genetic research and
plans to allocate from three to ten percent of his budget
to study these issues including the appointing of an
ethics committee.339
One of Rifkin's stated goals is to open to public
discussion the issues surrounding genetic engineering.
The evidence suggests that biotechnology, unlike any other
scientific effort, is fostering unprecedented public
debate.

Public involvement in scientific research is a

relatively new notion for most scientists.

Scientists are
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grappling with how they will invite public discussion
while minimizing the effects of those discussions on their
continuing research.

The notion of non-scientists

dictating what may or may not be investigated by
scientists and the loss of freedom of inquiry it
represents for the scientific community is a phenomenon
with which scientists are having difficulty.

Their

initial response seems to be to invoke technical
reasoning, to let the facts (data) speak for themselves.
Even some members of the scientific community understand,
though, that the debate extends beyond scientific
experimentation and that ignoring societal concerns will
not win the rhetorical battle.
The doctrinal consequences surrounding Rifkin*s
heretical challenges exemplify Lessl's contention that
institutional assumptions surface during these conflicts.
The institutional assumptions that are the point of issue
in this debate relate to the scientific community's
freedom of inquiry.

However, rather than affirming the

assumption that scientists are free to conduct whatever
experiments they choose and having that assumption become
doctrine, the opposite is occurring.

The heretical

challenges focus attention on those assumptions causing
government agencies and others to question the validity of
unbridled scientific inquiry.

Scientists, then, are

forced to live by new doctrine that is contrary to one of
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their most fundamental assumptions.

In the case of the

Rifkin*s heresy, the new doctrine creates tension for the
scientists that must be relieved.
With these tensions come anxieties about the
intrusions of non-scientists into a once solely scientific
domain.

Scientists see the loss of latitude in their

research as a result of unnecessary involvement by
governmental agencies and the public.

These intrusions

are also viewed as obstacles to scientific progress.

From

the scientists' perspective, the time they spend defending
their research could be better spent in the pursuit of
advancing technology.

A USDA report explains that, "The

President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness
reported...our development and use of technology is
lagging.

Regulatory restraints are inhibiting innovation

and commercialization."

340

Scientists tout the

capability of rapid changes in new plant and animal
developments as one of the primary advantages of
biotechnology; however, this increased efficiency has
failed to proliferate new, genetically engineered
products.

Thus, the inability to live up to expectations

becomes a source of mounting anxieties in the
biotechnology community.

The relief of tensions and

anxieties lead to ritual and Kurtz' fifth characteristic
of heresy—the heresy hunt ritual— and the person whom the
scientists cite as the source of most of their problems.
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Heresy Hunt_Ritual Analysis
Kurtz defines the heresy hunt ritual as "the process
of defining and denouncing heresy and heretics.1,341

One

of the roles of a ritual, he contends, is to relieve
tensions and focus anxiety on that which is controllable.
In the case of heresies, it is not clear if the ritual
actually fulfills the role of relieving anxieties, but it
serves as a form of action where action is required.
Lessl suggests the ritual may actually relieve some
tensions that did not originate in the heresy.

He argues

that, regardless of the source of the anxieties, "the
heretic is a convenient object onto which these anxieties
can be focused."

342

According to Lessl, scientists involved in the
creationist controversy found the actual problems of
public and political ambivalence difficult, if not
impossible, to solve directly.

Their solution was to

attack those close at hand, the "deviant insiders," with
the most powerful weapons in their arsenal-scientific
evidence and argument.343

Extending his argument, Lessl

contends that "Scientists respond to general social and
political problems growing out of the complex relationship
between contemporary science and Western culture by
focusing on a localized issue that can be remedied simply
through scientific demonstrations."344
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It appears the biotechnology segment of the
scientific community finds dealing with the larger issue
of a challenge to its political prominence a frustration
it cannot solve easily or directly.

Regulatory oversight

and growing public involvement are obstacles for which
there are no quantifiable scientific solutions in a
laboratory or experimentation field.

So, rather than

dealing with the larger, more complex issue, the
scientific community focuses its anxieties on an object
close at hand—the person it holds responsible for their
problems-Jeremy Rifkin.
In his analysis of the anti-modernist movement in the
Roman Catholic Church, Kurtz argues that the Church
orthodoxy took a similar approach.

Choosing not to

address the larger issue of the challenge to the Church's
authority, the orthodoxy focused on the heretics close at
hand and their specific challenges.

In the pursuit of

these individuals, Kurtz points out that the Church
hierarchy developed an arsenal of several weapons.345 The
proponents of biotechnology, too, developed rhetorical
weapons to defend its orthodoxy against heresy.

The

defense reflects what Andrew King describes as the
"destruction of legitimacy."

King contends that "Because

government claims to act for the common good, exposure of
hidden partisanship destroys its legitimacy."346 Rifkin
claims to act on the public's behalf in his challenge of
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genetic engineering.

Biotechnology proponents attempt to

undermine Rifkin's legitimacy by revealing what they claim
are his hidden agendas.

The weapons of choice are the

characterization of Rifkin as a "devil" and demonstrations
of the integrity of decisions based on scientific data.

Rifkin-the "devil"
Scientists and spokespersons for chemical companies
and other allied industries openly criticize Rifkin for
his stand on biotechnology.

Whether it is a source of

pride or frustration, Rifkin appears to accept the
criticism as part of his stance. For example, in the
preface to one of his books, Rifkin admits that,
I have been accused of being opposed to
scientific inquiry, academic freedom and, worst
of all, the march of progress. I have been
castigated as an obstructionist, a spoiler, a
man dedicated to slowing, retarding or halting
the further advances of the human race.
Occasionally a scientist, corporate leader or
policy maker will cast doubt on my temporal
sanity, insisting that my real desire is to turn
back the clock of time; how far back is often
determined by the ire of the assailant. *
As Rifkin suggests, there is an extensive list of
people and agencies that not only disagree with him, but
publicly denigrate his motives, methods, and knowledge of
science.

Biotechnology proponents cast Rifkin in a

devil's role by characterizing him as the antithesis of
good as portrayed by science.

He earns that

characterization, in the eyes of scientists, for assailing
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the preeminence of science, the good it produces for
society, and the promises it holds for the future.
Much of the strategy to characterize Rifkin as a
devil centers around name calling, tout the names that are
used suggest the effort extends beyond merely applying
labels.

For example, in a profile of Rifkin, Time

magazine revealed that scientists view Rifkin as a
"Luddite, whose opposition to DNA research is based on
skewed science and misplaced mystical zeal."

Time quoted

Norton Zinder, a geneticist at Rockefeller University in
New York City, who referred to Rifkin as a "fool" and a
"demagogue."3*8

Forbes magazine, in an article titled

"Ministry of Fear," labeled Rifkin a Luddite and
fearmonger.

The author of the article, Ronald Bailey,

declared, "Jeremy Rifkin, a modern-day Luddite, wants to
put biotechnology development on permanent hold.
frightening is that he seems to be succeeding."

What's
The

Forbes article predicted that "Unless the industry
confronts fearmongers like Rifkin headon..." biotechnology
will become overregulated like the nuclear industry.348
The use of "Luddite" suggests that Rifkin is against any
technological advancement; that he is not particularly
interested in biotechnology, it just happens to be the
area he chose to challenge.

This argument suggests that

Rifkin is an opportunist with little, if any, legitimate
claim to challenging biotechnology.

Labeling Rifkin a
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"demagogue" goes to the heart of his legitimacy.

To label

Rifkin a demagogue and make it stick is to brand him as
insincere in his arguments and an advocate using
questionable emotional appeals as means to purely personal
ends.
In 1988 Rifkin was the subject of a feature article
in the New York Times Magazine.

That article suggests

that scientists characterize Rifkin "essentially, as a
nuisance, a rabble-rouser, a professional extremist, and,
most simply, a nut bent on delaying the work of committed
scientists and federal officials. 1,350

Labels such as

"nuisance," "rabble-rouser," and "nut" do not inflict the
same penetrating damage as do "Luddite" and "demagogue,"
but they help build a profile of Rifkin that reinforces
the devil image.

These terms attempt to minimize Rifkin's

arguments and characterize them as "light-weight."

The

article also quoted from Harvard Professor Stephen Jay
Gould's review of Rifkin's Algenv.

Gould wrote that

Alaenv was "a cleverly constructed tract of anti
intellectual propaganda masquerading as scholarship...1
don't think I have ever read a shoddier work."351
allegation is more serious.

This

Gould challenges Rifkin*s

integrity and casts him as a charlatan who intentionally
misleads his constituents.
Because of his highly visible role in the BGH
controversy, Rifkin became the target of several
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proponents of the hormone.

Clearly frustrated that BGH

was not available commercially to farmers, Harry Schwartz,
a guest columnist in a "face-off" with Rifkin in ysA
Today. declared, "the pied piper of ignorant knownothingism, Jeremy Rifkin, has panicked five supermarket
chains...with his usual gall, Rifkin doesn't wait for
tests to be completed but conjures up a frightening stew
of imaginary illnesses he claims will result from use of
the hormone."

352

Employing the metaphor of a pied piper,

Schwartz suggests that people should ignore Rifkin*s
comments because they have such an alluring appeal that
they will have little choice but to follow his lead.
Challenging Rifkin's credibility, Schwartz combines the
pied piper metaphor with highly emotional and denigrating
labels implying that Rifkin's arguments are devoid of fact
and reason.

Continuing his strategy to destroy Rifkin's

credibility, Schwartz implies that test results will
exonerate BGH of Rifkin's charges.

Moreover, Schwartz

argues that Rifkin's charges against BGH are "conjured up"
for no other reason that to instill fear and manipulate
the public into boycotting milk containing BGH.
In the summer of 1991, a dairy industry magazine
featured Rifkin on its cover with an in-depth article on
the BGH issue and Rifkin's role in the controversy.

The

magazine said of Rifkin, "...few [people] are at a loss
for words to describe the man: a charismatic speaker, a
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zealot, an educator, a fear-monger, a champion of the
people, a manipulator, and a man who doesn't hesitate to
take on chemical companies in a war against
biotechnology."

353

Rifkin*s detractors' use of terms

such as "fear-monger" and "manipulator" are further
attempts to characterize him as an adversary of good.
Suggesting that he is a "fear-monger,” or one who deals in
fear, and a manipulator, Rifkin's opponents imply that his
motives are other than his stated intentions of protecting
the public and the environment.
An editorial in a Midwestern newspaper questioned
Rifkin's motives in the BGH controversy.

The writer of

the editorial argued that, "With respect to the Foundation
on Economic Trends [of which Rifkin is president], its
real target is not BGH, per se.

Instead, it's trying to

thwart advances in biogenetic technology."

In an apparent

reference to Rifkin, the writer predicted that, "If
Luddites persuade the United States to abandon development
and implementation of biotechnology...there are plenty of
other nations eager and able to take it up."35*

Again,

another detractor employs a strategy to destroy Rifkin's
credibility by suggesting that his motives are less than
honorable.
Members of the scientific orthodoxy often criticize
Rifkin for his beliefs, his motives and his methods, but
they rarely suggest that he is not effective.

Although
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Karen Rogers of Monsanto begrudgingly credits Rifkin and
others for taking advantage of a weakness in the
biotechnology industry, she, too, challenges his
credibility.

She explains that biotechnology opponents

generate unexpected public pressure because "...of the gap
between technological literacy and technological advance.
The opposition took the lead early on, and has several
articulate, aggressive spokesmen who are influencing the
debate with questionable tactics and even questionable
information... "355

Integrity of Scientific Data
Another rhetorical strategy scientists employ to
negate Rifkin's legitimacy is to reinforce their own
legitimacy through quantification of scientific data.

By

legitimizing decisions about genetic engineering on
quantitative data, scientists hope to undermine the
legitimacy of qualitative, value-based decisions advocated
by Rifkin.

King contends that quantitative decisions are

easier to make than qualitative decision because "they are
highly persuasive in a culture where bigger is usually
better and constant growth is a national imperative."356
Schwartz, in his USA Today "face off" with Rifkin
invoked the integrity of government testing procedures to
support his claim that Rifkin's charges about BGH are
unfounded and that BGH is a safe product.

He recounted
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how the hormone was "carefully and cautiously tested under
Food and Drug Administration auspices."357
Not only did another scientist use quantitative data
to defend BGH in the Wisconsin legislative process, he
argued that only scientists accurately interpret
scientific data.

Richard A. Spritz, an associate

professor in Medical Genetics and Pediatrics at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison, in 1989, provided
testimony to Wisconsin Assembly committee members against
a bill banning BGH.

In that testimony Spritz enumerated

seven points, substantiated with scientific data, that BGH
was a safe product.

Although he never mentioned Rifkin by

name, Spritz referred to "political special interest
groups" that raise objections to human-health issues.
These groups "...are misguided, based on insufficient or
wrong understanding of the facts.

At worst, appear to be

attempts by individuals or groups...to influence public
policy by misrepresentation and scaremongering."358
On another genetic engineering related topic, Science
magazine questioned Rifkin's motives in his challenge of
NIH rules dealing with gene therapy.

After NIH approved

the first-ever gene therapy experiment on a human, Rifkin
filed a lawsuit to force NIH to halt the experiment until
ethical concerns could be addressed.

The rhetorical

strategy of the response to Rifkin took two forms.

First,

even though NIH apparently overlooked a procedural step,

the scientists sought to redirect the responsibility for
any delays from themselves to Rifkin.

Then, despite the

oversight, the scientists sought to justify proceeding
with the test with explanations of the thoroughness of the
process to that point.

In a March 19, 1989, article.

Science magazine suggested that "...he [Rifkin] seems to
be trying to hang NIH on a technicality of the review
process in order to force debate on the larger issue of
human genetic engineering and its potential misuse." In
that same article, Science labeled Rifkin a "perennial
qcg

critic of modern technology..."

The magazine followed

with comments by NIH committee members on the thoroughness
of the review process.

The Chronicle of Higher Education

reported that the mood of the meeting was to reject
Rifkin's petition and proceed with the experiment.
According to The Chronicle. "Scientists proposing the
experiment said that ample debate had already taken place,
that the experiment was safe, and that it was time to try
to put genetic engineering into practical medical use with
patients."

W. French Anderson, in an apparent reference

to Rifkin, argued that "It's one thing to sit around a
table and talk about what might happen way in the future,
but I have to go back and talk to parents and kids who are
suffering and dying now."360

Anderson's comment suggests

that scientists are not above using emotion in their
rhetorical appeals.

Clearly, Anderson steps away from the
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data as he appeals to the committee's sympathy for
children.
Rifkin frequently raises the issue of the safety of
genetic engineering and what he calls the
"unpredictability" of some of the newly developed strains
of bacteria and viruses.

Alan Goldhammer, director of

technical affairs for the Industrial Biotechnology
Association, argues that regulations are in place that
minimize risk.

Goldhammer takes a page from Rifkin's

rhetorical strategy as he argues that biotechnology is
more in concert with the environment that the introduction
of exotic species.

Making that argument Goldhammer cites

one of Rifkin's challenges to the proliferation of
genetically engineered products as inappropriate:
...making analogies to exotic species'
introductions that have caused problems: Kudzu,
gypsy moth, chestnut blight and the like. This
is faulty comparison because those introductions
involved organisms totally unrelated to the
ecosystem. These new biotechnology products, on
the other hand, will involve modification of
organisms that are indigenous to the parent
ecosystem.
Another industry representative attacks Rifkin's
tactics, challenging his dramatization of the potential
hazards of some genetically engineered products. Paul
Bendix of the Talbott Group of Palo Alto, California,
laments that "Biotechnology results...particularly bad
results...are fantasized."

People fear "that if you make

something living in the laboratory it will get out of hand
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and become highly mobile and toxic and nothing will
eradicate it except the National Guard.**362
As discussed in an earlier chapter, the conflict
between the orthodoxy and the heretic is political, each
side vying for the power to make decisions about certain
doctrines.

Fred Smith, president of the Competitive

Enterprise Institute, recognizes Rifkin's attempts to move
control of research decisions from scientists to the
public.

For Smith, "choices are best made by private

individuals held fully accountable for their actions...A
political approach to risk management is not only costly
but risky to mankind's safety."

Conceding that scientists

have lost some of their decision making authority. Smith
admits most people believe that we "must impose 'wise*
political regulation over the biotech field."363

Ponglesion
Kurtz and Lessl contend that the socially constructed
crisis created within an institution by heretics produces
social consequences.

One of these consequences is that

the defenders of the orthodoxy can rally their supporters
against the heretics.

Another consequence is that

scientists cloistered in their laboratories sometimes find
themselves thrust to the forefront of the debate,
developing arguments that support and justify their
research.

This chapter argued that members of the

scientific community who engage in biotechnology convene
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forums and seminars to help coalesce their position among
their peers from several states.

It was argued here that

rhetorical strategies surfaced in these meetings.

The

strategies include minimizing the novelty of genetic
engineering, questioning the scientific competence of
those who challenge genetic engineering, invoicing
scientific dogma, and emphasizing the potential benefits
of this research.

Their rhetorical strategies serve to

reinforce their beliefs about science and genetic
engineering and propose arguments to respond to the
challenges of their adversaries.
This chapter argued, too, that heresy produces
doctrinal consequences.

The most important doctrinal

consequence to evolve as a result of Jeremy Rifkin's
heretical challenge is the scientists' loss of a degree of
freedom in the conduct of genetic engineering research.
The loss manifests itself in increased government
oversight and regulation of the genetic engineering
research and broader public discussion of the issues
surrounding the technology.

Neither Kurtz nor Lessl

mentioned that institutional adoption of or adaptation to
the doctrinal consequences of heresy is easy.

The

foregoing analysis shows that yielding any freedom for
conducting research is a difficult experience for
scientists and the scientific community as a whole.
analysis suggests, too, that involving scientists in

This
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public debate may present an entirely new set of problems
for the scientific community.

First, scientists must

acquire communication skills appropriate for public
debate, including public speaking skills, the ability to
write for popular publications, and knowledge about
broadcast media.

Even if they acquire the communications

skills but fail to address the more complex problem of
consensual discourse, scientists will be little closer to
resolving their rhetorical dilemma.

Scientists should

recognize that while they try to "educate" the public
about biotechnology from the scientific perspective, they
must be open and responsive to the nonscientific
perspective that exists in the public.

Furthermore, they

most exercise some sensitivity to the different kinds of
publics that exist.

As they expect the public to have an

appreciation for the necessity of scientific research,
they must appreciate the public's concerns for safety, and
moral and ethical dilemmas.

Herein lies the rhetorical

challenge for the orthodoxy.
Although scientists appear to be reluctantly adopting
the new doctrine of presenting to the public the
scientific perspective of genetic engineering, effectively
adapting to consensual discourse will be a more formidable
task.

Ample evidence exists to suggest that Rifkin's

heretical stance creates frustrations and anxieties in the
genetic engineering scientific community.

Evidence also

166
suggests that Rifkin Is the object of a ritual to relieve
those anxieties.

The heresy hunt ritual the scientists

engage in employs name calling and discrediting the issues
Rifkin raises in his opposition to genetic engineering.
It is significant that a world view as pervasive and
with as much momentum as science has finds itself
struggling to extricate a segment of its endeavors from a
vigorously active entanglement of bureaucratic regulations
and public perceptions.

The scientists and

representatives of industry engaged in the struggle
exhibit mounting frustration and exasperation as they
endeavor to comply with regulations only to be confronted
with additional lawsuits, petitions for moratoriums, and
public boycotts of their products.

Sensing increasing

encroachment on their prerogative to determine the destiny
of their research programs and realizing the slower-thananticipated maturation of the biotechnology industry,
genetic engineering scientists focus their anxieties on
the person whom they hold responsible for their dilemma.
As they direct their attacks toward Rifkin, he
accommodates their assaults by accepting responsibility
for most of what they blame on him.
Much of the effort by the defenders of the
biotechnology orthodoxy to expunge Rifkin the heretic
centers on labeling him with the scientists' own brand of
devil terms.

Rifkin has earned for himself

characterizations such as "Luddite," "fearmonger,"
"scaremonger," "nut," "obstructionist," "fool,"
"demagogue," "pied piper of ignorant know-nothingism,"
"gadfly," "zealot," "manipulator," "crackpot," and other
less concise descriptions.

It is probably these exercises

in name-calling that best fulfill the role of the heresy
hunt ritual and relieve the anxieties of the orthodoxy.
The defenders of the orthodoxy transfer to Rifkin the
responsibility for whatever genetic engineering has
promised but failed to deliver, whether it is lower
production costs for farmers, more productive varieties of
plants or a safer, cleaner environment, on what they term
the emotion-laden, scientifically unenlightened opposition
fostered by Rifkin.
Not all of the heresy hunt relies on name calling.
As scientists defend genetic engineering, they turn to
Rifkin's arguments as examples of issues lacking
substance.

The scientific community attempts to undermine

Rifkin*s legitimacy by categorizing his charges as
misrepresentation of the facts and overly dramatized scare
tactics.

They contend his dramatizations are unrealistic

and his analogies inappropriate.

Other scientists target

Rifkin*s knowledge of science, suggesting his lack of
scientific training compromises his credibility for
questioning scientific procedures and goals.
scientists question his motives.

Still other

Scientists frequently
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accuse Rifkin of initiating lawsuits on one issue with the
ulterior motive of advancing another issue.

For example,

scientists argued that Rifkin's suit proposing that a
committee address the moral and ethical concerns of gene
therapy was, in reality, a delaying tactic to "buy time"
for more debate on the broader issue of genetic
engineering.

Rifkin was accused of similar tactics when

he promoted a public boycott of BGH for health and
economic reasons.

Scientists contend that Rifkin's

motivation was based less in health and economics than in
general opposition to genetic engineering.
So, scientists who participate in the biotechnology
heresy hunt ritual focus their anxieties about the lack of
progress in biotechnology on Rifkin through name calling
and formulating their rhetorical strategies around
discrediting the issues he raises.
I have one final thought about the rituals attendant
to the genetic engineering genre of scientific discourse.
Another ritual, while relieving a specific anxiety, does
not seem to have Rifkin as its target.

The ritual I offer

for consideration is the compelling need for scientists to
reiterate the necessity to communicate with the public.
Opening the decision-making processes of scientific
inquiry to public debate is one of Rifkin's stated
objectives. It is not because of Rifkin's contention that
public debate of scientific issues is a good idea that the
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scientific community feels compelled to enter the
discussion.

Rather, the act of saving they need to

communicate with the public relieves scientists' anxieties
resulting from their forced participation in events over
which they have little, if any, control. Furthermore,
scientists believe that greater involvement on their part
in public discussions about biotechnology will minimize
the tendency toward increased regulation and public
rejection of its products. The ritual relieves scientists'
anxiety about their participation in an activity with
which they are neither familiar nor comfortable.

CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Descriptive/Analytical Summary
This dissertation analyzed rhetorical artifacts
resulting from Jeremy Rifkin1s involvement in the
recombinant DNA research controversy.

Examining these

books, speeches, journal articles, interviews, and
newspaper and magazine articles provided a unique
perspective of the age-old debate between science and the
more humanistic approach to the world.

Although the

conflict is well documented, this study contributes more
evidence that the gulf between these two world views is
wide, deep, and often treacherous for those who try to
cross it.

Rhetoric remains one of the most viable

vehicles available to traverse this gulf, but it, too, has
its shortcomings and they are brought into sharp focus in
this study.
Rifkin's rhetorical challenges of biotechnology and
science as a whole manifest themselves in an array of
forms including legal battles, legislative lobbying,
public debates, lectures, media campaigns, and
demonstrations.

Although Rifkin's approach is

multifaceted, it maintains an underlying, philosophically
heretical consistency.

Rifkin takes an unapologetic, and

often uncompromising, stance against what some scientists
and philosophers argue is the most promising scientific
170
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discovery to date—biotechnology.

Assuming this position,

Rifkin, then, finds himself diametrically opposed to not
only the scientific community, but a culture that affirms
the scientific world view's orientation toward
technological growth.

Rifkin's opposition to the

orthodoxy of science and a culture that embraces that
world view earns for him the label of heretic.

In his

role as heretic, Rifkin's rhetorical strategies become a
rhetoric of heresy.

Just as enlightening as Rifkin's

challenges are the scientific community's responses to his
attacks.

Rifkin's heretical actions compel rhetors within

the scientific orthodoxy to enter the fray.

The debate

and the development of rhetorical strategies on both sides
is fascinating.
Lester Kurtz' analysis of heresy in the early Roman
Catholic Church provided the criteria against which
Rifkin's activities were examined.

Kurtz contends that

heresy results, in part, from a phenomenon that he calls
nearness and remoteness; that heresy is socially
constructed; it produces social consequences; it results
in doctrinal consequences; and it includes the heresy hunt
ritual.

Additionally, Thomas Lessl's application of

Kurtz' heresy criteria in an analysis of the scientific
creationism debate provided a rhetorical perspective of
heresy.

Rifkin's rhetorical strategies were examined in

the light of these two pivotal works.
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Nearness and Remoteness
Kurtz* contends that his notion of the
nearness/remoteness phenomenon positions the heretic
inside an institution's orthodoxy as a bona fide,
technical member, but outside the orthodoxy's belief
system.

The "deviant insider" who holds and advocates

"errant beliefs" is a threat to the "faith and to the
institution."

Kurtz maintains that every heresy suggests

a political stance and every heretic is the leader of an
insurrection.

As the heretic leads the opposition against

the orthodoxy, he or she produces crisis within the
institution.384
Rifkin the heretic is the agent leading the
insurrection against biotechnology.

His arguments focus

on recombinant DNA and related genetic manipulation
issues, but the threat he poses to science is more
fundamental.

The crisis he creates within the scientific

establishment is a result of his challenging the validity
of that world view.

Rifkin condemns the scientific

approach, accusing technological advancement of exploiting
people and the environment.

This condemnation leads to

his suggestion that the scientific world view should be
replaced with what he calls an "empathetic" approach to
the world.
Rifkin's rhetorical strategy employs devil terms to
characterize technological growth and a narrowing of his
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audiences' choices to one nonscientific alternative.
Perhaps the most effective of these arguments is his
comparison of genetic engineering to nuclear technology.
Rifkin first develops a scenario in which he depicts
nuclear fission as a technology with far more
disadvantages than advantages.

He argues that even with

whatever advantages nuclear technology offers, because of
its human species threatening uses, people would choose to
eliminate it if they could.

Rifkin contends that nuclear

technology was never open to public debate and that if it
had been its implementation may have been different or
nonexistent.

Arguing the necessity for public discussion

on issues as important as nuclear fission and
biotechnology, Rifkin contends that the scientific
community is implementing biotechnology in increments
intended to draw little attention.

Using as examples

nuclear technology and what he calls the human speciesthreatening danger that it has developed in small,
incremental steps, Rifkin contends that biotechnology is
being implemented in a similar manner.

Rifkin argues,

though, that biotechnology is less imposing than nuclear
technology.

He contends that nuclear weapons can destroy

every living creature on earth in a matter of minutes, but
the threat that recombinant DNA poses through the redesign
of the genetic makeup of plants, animals and humans is
more diabolical.

Rifkin's "worst-case-scenarios" would
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suggest that nuclear annihilation might be a better
alternative.
Although biotechnology is the focus of Rifkin's
argument, the point of the comparison to nuclear
technology is the depiction of both technologies in devil
terms and characterization of them as destructive products
of scientific inquiry.
Rifkin's attacks on science and his somewhat more
passive challenges to that world view through direct
attacks on nuclear technology and recombinant DNA have put
the scientific community in the position of having to
defend itself and justify its activities, goals, and
methods.

The questions raised by Rifkin and others

represent a decidedly heretical perspective and create
within the scientific community an unwelcome crisis of
justification.
Social Construction of Heresy
Conflict is the focus of Kurtz' second characteristic
of heresy, social construction.

Rifkin's attempts to

involve the public in recombinant DNA research issues is
an overt attempt to assume some of the scientific
community's decision-making prerogatives on how the
research is conducted and applied.
conflict.

This is the point of

Lessl contends that this kind of confrontation

is a struggle over authority in the institution.365
While the heretic attempts to undermine the authority of
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the orthodoxy, the defenders of the institution attempt to
solidify their position by reinforcing authority, rallying
its supporters, and denouncing the heretics.

Again,

Rifkin not only attempts to establish control of the
decision-making process, but he tries to overthrow the
orthodoxy

and replace it with one of his own design.

The analysis in chapter four revealed Rifkin's twotier rhetorical approach.

In what I term his "short-term"

approach, Rifkin uses books, speeches, media events,
legislative lobbying, and demonstrations to achieve
visibility and support for his position in the
controversy.

His "long-term" strategy seeks to inspire in

the populace a passive resistance to technological
advancement toward a goal of exorcising the existing
scientific world view.
One the most prominent of Rifkin's short-term
strategies is delaying or blocking specific recombinant
DNA research and distribution of genetically engineered
products.

Rifkin's activities include calling for

moratoriums, imploring regulatory agencies to involve
themselves in recombinant DNA research oversight,
advocating risk-assessment studies, suing researchers who
fail to comply with existing regulations, blocking the
sale of biotechnology products, and organizing media
campaigns to engender public resistance against products
such as B6H.
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While arguing for more political clout in specific
recombinant DNA cases, Rifkin*s long-term strategy appears
to be to exercise the ultimate political prerogative-to
replace what he sees as the dominant world view with his
"empathetic" world view.

Rifkin contends that the

scientific community bases the legitimacy of its continued
prominence on its unique role in preserving security.
Rifkin argues that the equation for security, adopted by
the scientific establishment, is: knowledge = power =
control = security.

However, he points to the nuclear

arms race as evidence that power does not guarantee
security.
From this rationale, Rifkin employs a rhetorical
strategy intended to transcend physical issues, elevating
the debate to a moral plane.

Assuming moral superiority,

Rifkin and his supporters become the moral elite in the
controversy.

Rifkin*s strategy also seeks to make a

virtue of sacrifice.

From this exalted moral position, he

invokes names of renown humanitarians such as Jesus
Christ, Martin Luther King, Mohandas Gandhi, and others as
examples of people who chose the high road of morality,
making tremendous sacrifices for the good of all.

By

invoking these names and the causes with which they were
associated, Rifkin binds his opposition to recombinant DNA
to some of the most remarkable crusades of human history
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and elevates his cause from mere opposition to science to
a movement to save humanity.
Social Consequences of Heresy
Kurtz' first two characteristics of heresy, the
nearness/remoteness phenomenon and social construction,
focus the rhetorical critic's attention on the heretic's
rhetorical strategies.

Kurtz' final three

characteristics- social consequences, doctrinal
consequences, and the heresy hunt ritual-concentrate on
the rhetorical responses and approaches of the orthodoxy.
The most significant social consequence of Rifkin's
rhetorical challenge is the increased exposure and
visibility of scientists engaged in recombinant DNA
research.

As these scientists are drawn into the public

aspects of the controversy to respond to Rifkin*s attacks,
they leave the laboratory to develop arguments, publicly
debate the issues, and recruit support for their cause.
As distasteful as heresy may be to the orthodoxy,
Kurtz contends that it has a beneficial side, too.

Kurtz

points out that defenders of the orthodoxy readily
recognize that heresy is disruptive to their institution,
but what is not so apparent to them is that a heretical
challenge benefits their cause by pulling their people
together against a common enemy.
One example of how recombinant DNA opponents drew
scientists together to address their challenges was the
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United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA)
Biotechnology Challenge Forum in 1987.

The agenda

included defenders of genetic engineering that may never
have become involved in public discussions except that
their work was publicly challenged.

The rhetorical

strategies that surfaced in that meeting included
minimizing the novelty of the technology, questioning the
scientific competence of those who challenge genetic
engineering, invoking scientific dogma, and emphasizing
the potential benefits of the research.
Ostensibly, the meeting was called to examine some of
the questions and issues surrounding the biotechnology
controversy.

An examination of the proceedings of that

meeting, however, suggests that the speakers engaged less
in critical evaluation of the issues than in developing
rhetorical strategies to overcome the obstacles presented
by the challenges. Much of the discourse was couched in
scientific dogma reiterating the utility of technological
developments and the necessity of continued, unrestrained
scientific inquiry.

Some speakers focused on

personalities such as Rifkin.

Others focused on the

"irrationality" of the arguments and the "ill-informed"
opinions of those opposing genetic engineering.

Still

another proposed a plan to increase the visibility of the
scientific view of the controversy.
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Certainly, understanding the rhetorical approaches of
those who spoke at this meeting and other similar
gatherings is important.

Understanding their rhetorical

strategies reinforces Kurtz' notion that heresy pulls
together the supporters of the orthodoxy.

But, the fact

that they met, apparently in response to the heretic's
challenges, may be equally important.

The act of calling

the meeting reflects Kurtz notion that heretical
challenges draw members of the orthodoxy out of their
cloisters and into the public arena to engage in the
debate.
Rifkin's heretical acts produce social consequences
in institutions other than those of science.

The effects

of his attacks are particularly evident in the federal
regulatory agencies such as the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the
National Institutes of Health (NIH).

Due in part to

Rifkin's efforts, these agencies have developed
increasingly stringent regulatory guidelines to govern the
conduct of recombinant DNA research.

Also, Rifkin's

monitoring of researchers involved in biotechnology
produces stricter enforcement of the regulations by these
federal agencies.
Rifkin's stance against BST produced other social
consequences beyond the scientific laboratories.

His
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public campaign against the growth hormone argues that
milk produced by cows injected with BST transmits the
hormone to those who drink it, posing possible health
problems.

These charges were enough to convince several

national food companies to reject handling milk products
containing BST.
These consequences cause defenders of the orthodoxy
to begin debating the issues raised by the heretic,
developing opinions and stances on issues never before
considered to be doctrine.

Kurtz contends that these

positions sometimes develop into orthodox doctrine.
Doctrinal Consequences of Heresy
Kurtz argues that defenders of the orthodoxy, through
their explicit disagreement with a heretical challenge,
find themselves formulating doctrine on issues that may
not have been considered previously.

Lessl suggests that

institutional assumptions that may never have received
thoughtful consideration are sometimes drawn to the
surface in a heretical dispute.

As these assumptions and

issues are debated, they often evolve into orthodox
doctrine.
Rifkin's heretical challenge draws into public view
the scientific community's assumption that its freedom of
inquiry is virtually unlimited.

The public scrutiny of

this assumption results in more government involvement and
an erosion of the latitude with which scientists approach

their work.

Scientists find they must yield unprecedented

decision making authority to federal regulatory agencies.
Submitting extensive research plans and complying with
complex regulations play an increasingly important role in
the formulation and conduct of recombinant DNA research.
Still, the loss of freedom of inquiry does not end with
mounting regulations.

Some scientists who believe they

have complied with all the necessary regulations find
themselves engaged in legal battles with Rifkin over
noncompliance with specific regulations and trying to
jump-start their stalled projects. The effect of the
regulations and the lawsuits is a slower, more complicated
approach to scientific research.

Stricter regulation and

the resulting restricted freedom of inquiry is one of the
doctrines that continues to evolve in the recombinant DNA
debate.
Another doctrine that seems to be developing as a
result of Rifkin's challenges is more exposure of
scientific research to public scrutiny.

Scientists find

that as a result of Rifkin*s involvement in recombinant
DNA, other members of the public are likely to want a
voice in determining how recombinant DNA research is
conducted.

Moreover, they may want to be a part of

determining whether it is conducted.

As a result,

scientists find themselves in the dilemma of grappling
with how to invite public discussion while minimizing the
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effects of those discussions on their continuing research.
As the heretical challenges focus attention on the
assumptions of the scientific community, scientists are
forced to live by new doctrines that are contrary to their
most fundamental assumptions.
Heresy Hunt Ritual
The increasing involvement of government in
recombinant DNA research and a failure to deliver quickly
the promised cornucopia of biotechnology products creates
tension and anxiety among those working with this
research.

To relieve these tensions and redirect these

anxieties, scientists and corporate executives engage in a
ritual called the heresy hunt.

Kurtz defines the heresy

hunt ritual as "the process of defining and denouncing
heresy and heretics."36a

Kurtz contends that one of the

roles of a ritual is to relieve these tensions by focusing
anxieties on that which is controllable.
The biotechnology segment of the scientific community
apparently finds dealing with the larger issue of
challenges to its political prominence frustrating and
virtually without solution.

So, rather than dealing with

a problem that is difficult or impossible to resolve,
scientists choose to direct their attention to Rifkin and
other challengers of the technology.

By focusing

attention on Rifkin, the scientific community tries to
deflect attention from itself and its weaknesses.
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Additionally, scientists can then blame Rifkin for their
shortcomings.
Much of the heresy hunt ritual manifests itself in
characterizing Rifkin as a "devil."

The scientific

orthodoxy employs devil terms rather liberally to
undermine Rifkin's legitimacy.

For example, their

labelling Rifkin a "demagogue" brands him as insincere in
his arguments and an advocate using questionable emotional
appeals as means to purely personal ends.

Other name-

calling efforts attempt to build a profile of Rifkin as a
"light-weight" and a person not to be taken seriously.
Another strategy scientists employ in the heresy hunt
ritual is to negate Rifkin*s legitimacy by reinforcing
their own through quantification of scientific data.
Bruno Latour observes that scientists obtain desired
rhetorical results by "stacking so many tiers of black
boxes that at one point the reader, obstinate enough to
dissent, will be confronted with facts so old and so
unanimously accepted that in order to go on doubting he or
she will be left alone."

367

Reiterating the testing

procedures and the length of time a project has been under
review, listing the agencies involved in the review,
quoting statistical studies and similar arguments-all of
these tactics are used by recombinant DNA scientists to
legitimize their activities.

By stacking the numbers

higher, the scientific community hopes to prove that the
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data indicates the issue is beyond discussion.

By

legitimizing decisions about genetic engineering on
quantitative data, scientists hope to undermine the
legitimacy of qualitative, value-based decisions advocated
by Rifkin.
While the name calling and number stacking relieves
tension and anxiety, it also provides an alternative
activity to addressing the issues that Rifkin raises.
Scientists can engage in these rhetorical exercises and
draw applause for their efforts from their peers because
this approach gives the superficial appearance of
responding to Rifkin.

Even though these activities may

serve to massage the orthodoxy's ego, the issues remain,
and the conflict that evolves from the issues grows more
intense.

In the end, the heresy hunt ritual turns into a

"chewing gum" approach—a lot of activity and not much to
show for it.
Methodology Summary
Lester Kurtz may have never considered that his
analysis of heresy in the Roman Catholic Church would
become a methodological instrument for examining the
rhetorical implications of deviance.

Thomas Lessl not

only considered using the analysis as a basis for
investigation, but built a study of the scientific
creationism debate around Kurtz1 five characteristics of
heresy.

Lessl, in his concluding remarks, suggests that
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the Kurtz' model "...provides an understanding of the ways
in which rhetorical responses to deviance contribute to
the construction and reconstruction of institutional
reality."

366

Lessl focuses on the changes that the

institution and its defenders undergo as they respond to
the heretical challenge.

Lessl demonstrates that Kurtz'

model is an effective tool for understanding how
responding to deviance brings together fragmented elements
of the orthodoxy to form a united front against a common
enemy.

Lessl notes that the Kurtz model illustrates how

the heretic attacks the weakest part of the institution
which points the orthodoxy to the areas that need
improvement.

Lessl suggests that, indirectly, the heretic

"...causes the scientists to inspect, repair, and,
occasionally, to build new walls in order to preserve
institutional autonomy."389
Certainly, I would not argue that Lessl's findings
are less than accurate.

I would, however, suggest that

the Kurtz model offers more than a means to understanding
how an institution rejuvenates itself in the midst of a
heretical challenge.

The Kurtz model, in this study,

highlights those aspects of the scientific community noted
by Lessl.

However, there is more.

In the investigation

of the Rifkin challenge, Kurtz' five characteristics of
heresy employs deviance to more clearly delineate the
lines of contention in a technical reasoning vs. social
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reasoning context.

The effects of deviance on the

institution of science are serious considerations, but so
too is an understanding of the rhetorical barriers that
develop in these disputes and ultimately prevent
consensual discourse.
The first two of Kurtz* characteristics assist the
critic in developing an understanding of the heretic's
deviant position, the rhetorical strategies involved, and
the philosophical perspective in which the challenge is
grounded.

The final three characteristics turn the

critics attention to the rhetorical responses of the
defenders of the institution.

Again, Kurtz' model aids

the critic in understanding the genesis of the orthodoxy's
rhetorical strategies and responses and the philosophical
grounding from which they grow.

The Kurtz model provides

an instrument to examine both sides of a controversy in
which deviance plays a role.

In the case of the Rifkin

heresy, it brings into sharp focus the range of
difficulties encountered by the two world views
represented by technical reasoning and social reasoning.
Deviance is an ever-present phenomenon in
contemporary society.

Not all deviance is heresy, but

Kurtz' model provides the critic with a means of
distinguishing heretical stances from other forms of
deviance.

Heresy is an extreme form of deviance and an

important phenomenon to examine.

The rhetorical aspects
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of a heretical challenge provide insight into
understanding an institution, its defenders, and those who
rebel against the orthodoxy.

Kurtz' model of heresy and

Lessl's rhetorical perspective on that model provide a
reliable instrument for the examination of these
controversies.

Conclusion
Anti-Science Rhetoric
Those groups and individuals opposed to science and
technological development have in Jeremy Rifkin an
intelligent, aggressive, prolific, high profile,
articulate, spokesman.

Rifkin's efforts suggest that the

rhetorical strategies of those opposed to the dominance of
science have become highly sophisticated.

This

sophistication permeates not only the rhetoric itself, but
also the media choices, legislative efforts, and other
tactics such as legal battles and demonstrations.
Anti-science advocates, as with most good rhetors,
look for the weakest part of the opposition's argument and
attack it.

Rifkin targets examples of technological

development that he contends are ultimately destructive
and what he labels the almost boundless freedom within
which scientists work.

Rifkin's rhetorical strategy of

choice may be the use of scientific data, but I believe
Rifkin has discovered the difficulty, if not the futility,
of trying to "out data" the data suppliers—the scientists.

188
One of the myths in which scientists have successfully
shrouded themselves maintains that only scientists can
reliably interpret scientific data.

Interestingly, this

myth survives despite scientists who contradict each
other's interpretations of identical data.

Nevertheless,

because of the pervasiveness of this myth, Rifkin and
other nonscientists are, in large part, confronted with
the inaccessibility of scientific data as a basis of their
anti-science rhetoric.
Lacking access to the tools necessary to debate
scientists on scientific terms, opponents of science seek
alternative rhetorical means.

Although Rifkin employs

several rhetorical devices, at the heart of his strategy
is the depiction and characterization of science as the
procreator of awesomely destructive technological evils.
One of the vehicles Rifkin uses to help build that
characterization is the dichotomy between his empathetic
world view and the scientific world view.

Rifkin's

depiction of science as a powerful, dominating, unfeeling,
uncaring, elitist approach to the world does not serve the
scientific community well.

Particularly relevant to this

effort is Rifkin's success at eliciting responses from the
scientific community that confirm Rifkin*s contentions.
Scientists' arguments that genetic engineering is not new,
that the public is not knowledgeable enough about science
to make decisions about biotechnology, and that only
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science holds the answers to society's ills plays into
Ri£kin's hands.

These responses make the scientists who

deliver them sound elitist and dogmatic.
Rifkin demonstrates in other ways that anti-science
rhetoric is successful when it turns science into a
villain.

Rifkin contends that scientists promoting

nuclear fission promised more than they were able to
deliver.

He maintains that in the early stages of nuclear

development the technology was hailed as a solution to
several societal concerns.

Instead, according to Rifkin,

nuclear fission has evolved into a species-threatening
phenomenon.

Rifkin's perspective turns a highly visible

scientific achievement into negative rhetorical baggage of
which the scientific community cannot rid itself.

Rifkin

argues that the fear of a nuclear holocaust and the
problems associated with the disposal of nuclear waste far
outweigh any good that may be attendant to nuclear
technology.

Then, suggesting that the two great

technological achievements of the 20th century are nuclear
fission and biotechnology, Rifkin ties recombinant DNA to
the evil nuclear technology.

Continuing his argument that

the two technologies are similar, Rifkin contends that
scientists speak of biotechnology in its infancy in the
same terms they spoke of nuclear technology in its early
stages.

By rhetorically linking biotechnology to nuclear

technology, Rifkin transfers to genetic engineering the
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fear, guilt, and uncertainty that have evolved over the
decades to become part of society's infrastructure.
Biotechnology suddenly becomes a vehicle that instills a
fear of annihilation, guilt for developing such an awesome
capability and the uncertainty of where the technology
will lead.
By challenging the scientific community's two
greatest achievements, Rifkin attempts to shake the very
foundation of science.

But, attacking the products of

science is only one aspect of his anti-science position.
Another strategy is to challenge the scientists
themselves.
Rifkin's characterization of scientists engaged in
genetic engineering suggests that they are ambitious,
amoral individuals who are blind to the ethical
considerations of their research and see only the next
experiment.

He contends that scientists develop

technology because it can be done, not because it needs to
be done.

This notion implies that scientists ignore the

ethical and social ramifications of their research, in
effect, ignoring the human consequences of the technology.
Rifkin argues that because of this approach to science,
these individuals are not worthy of the scientific freedom
with which they work.

He contends that left to their own

devices, scientists will be driven to take recombinant DNA
incrementally to its ultimate implementation—eugenics.
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Rifkin argues that scientists are Indifferent to the
effects of their research on society.

This argument makes

the task of persuading those outside of science to limit
the freedom of scientific inquiry considerably easier.
One other aspect of anti-science rhetoric is worthy
of consideration here.
specific cases.

Typically, scientists argue

They choose data for a given topic and

point to a specific result.
specifics.
scientists.

Their arguments focus on

As often as not, scientists talk only to other
All too often, scientists forfeit much of

their credibility because of their inability or
unwillingness to analyze their audiences and discuss those
aspects of science important to those audiences in terms
they understand.

Opponents of science, on the other hand,

argue in generalities and tune into what moves their
audiences.

Rifkin cites numerous specific examples of

problems created by scientific inquiry, but then talks in
only the broadest terms when describing alternatives.
Unlike some opponents of science, Rifkin offers an
alternative to the scientific world view.

However, the

alternative is his "empathetic" world view which is
cloaked in a veil of rich, descriptive language, but is
almost devoid of the "how to" required to achieve it.
Finding fault is considerably easier than developing
solutions.

This appears to be one of the strategies
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employed by Rifkin andf perhaps, by other opponents of
science.
Anti-science rhetoric has become more sophisticated
and its rhetors have become more credible to much of the
public.

Rifkin grounds his challenges to science in a

diverse knowledge of philosophy, history, economics,
sociology, current events, and other areas.

Resources for

support of his position range from ancient philosophers to
contemporary scientists.

He is well-read, knowledgeable,

and keenly sensitive to the mood of contemporary society.
More important, Rifkin knows the system and how use it to
his advantage.

He knows how to get published, how to get

time on television and radio, how to lobby legislatures,
how to file suit against federal agencies, how to
influence legislation, how to monitor research, and on and
on.

Anti-science advocates like Rifkin arm themselves

with more than scientific data to debate the proponents of
science.

These opponents of science are not intimidated

by the prominence of science and assume an offensive
rhetorical posture.
The rhetorical sophistication of those opposed to
recombinant DNA research is destined to become more
evident as molecular biologists expand their gene
manipulation research to humans.

The Human Genome

Project, jointly sponsored by the National Institutes of
Health and the Department of Energy, is a massive effort
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to map the genetic code of human beings.

Although the

project can boast of significant support, it is already
drawing severe criticism from those who fear a revival of
eugenics and others who argue that personal and corporate
financial gain is the motivation for much of the
research.370
Pro-science Rhetoric
The evidence developed by this study suggests that
science as a whole has not formulated and organized a
rhetorical strategy to defend itself against its heretics.
Scientists, institutions, corporations, and other
organizations, individually, have developed arguments in
response to the heretical attacks.

These arguments can be

broadly categorized into three groups: challenging the
legitimacy of the opponents of science; reiterating the
necessity and desirability of technical advancement; and
demonstrating the safety of biotechnology.
Rather than confronting the issues "up front,"
scientists first concentrate their efforts on undermining
the credibility of their opponents.

Legitimacy, or the

lack thereof, lies at the center of the scientific
community's defense against its challengers.

On the rare

occasions when scientists are willing to admit that
societal concerns related to recombinant DNA should be
considered, they still question the legitimacy of those
who raise the issue.

The scientists approach this
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rhetorical strategy from two perspectives.

First, they

employ name-calling that characterizes Rifkin and others
as insincere, self-promoting charlatans.

Using terms such

as "demagogues," the scientists depict Rifkin as an
individual who plays on the emotions of his audience to
achieve his own personal goals which may or may not be in
the best interest of his audience and supporters.
"Luddite" is another term frequently used by scientists to
describe Rifkin.

Luddites are infamous for their

opposition to progress.

So, scientists use these labels

to suggest that while Rifkin is vociferously opposing
biotechnology, he is only using recombinant DNA as a focal
point for his opposition to science as a whole.

Rifkin,

scientists argue, is an unreliable source for scientific
information and should not to be taken seriously.
Therefore, his challenges are without merit.
Scientists contend that other non-scientists should
not be taken seriously either, but for a different reason.
For the most part, the scientists in this study regard the
public as a group of science illiterates whose opinions on
science are not to be considered.

In an effort to

undermine the credibility of those people outside the
scientific community, scientists maintain that the public
knows too little about the technology to be involved in
the decision-making process regarding its development and
application.

Scientists contend that the public is too
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susceptible to fear appeals and scare tactics to make
sound decisions about recombinant DNA research*

The

public's legitimacy for challenging biotechnology is
clearly the target of the scientific community's
arguments.

By discrediting those outside their paradigm,

scientists elevate themselves to the status of the
informed elite—the ones who, because of their expertise
and privileged insight, should determine the destiny of
recombinant DNA research.
Interestingly, scientists themselves appeal to the
public's fear or sense of insecurity as they argue for the
necessity of technological advancement.

Scientists cite

biotechnology as one of the primary tools necessary to
offset the decreasing number of farms and farmers and the
increasing world population.

Implying that food shortages

may occur if genetic engineering progress is impeded,
scientists argue that they must have the freedom to
explore all aspects of plant and animal molecular biology.
Scientists contend that refining plants and animals so
that they produce food more efficiently is the key to
human survival and that biotechnology hold the keys that
unlock that potential.
The potential for disastrous consequences has been a
primary argument of the opponents of biotechnology.
Because, by definition, the products of biotechnology are
new and unique, scientists have more difficulty refuting
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the opposition's argument that researchers cannot predict
how these new plants and animals will respond when they
are released into the environment.

Knowing that

predictions are based on what has happened in the past,
and knowing that genetically engineered products
technically have no past, scientists developed another
argument.
In an effort to transform biotechnology into a
predictive discipline, scientists attempt to redefine it.
Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca observe that it
is through associations that one brings unity to otherwise
separate entities.
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According to Perelman and

Olbrechts-Tyteca, the key to one type of association is
defining two elements as equivalent:
In order that a definition should not suggest to
us that the terms which are being offered as
equivalent are identical, it must insist on the
distinction between the terms, as is the case
with definitions by approximation or example, in
which the reader is expressly asked to attempt
to purify or generalize, thus enabling him to
bridge the gap which separates what is being
defined from the means used to define it.
Refuting the anti-science argument that biotechnology
exploits animals, plants, and the environment in general,
scientists maintain that recombinant DNA is nothing new,
merely an extension of classical breeding techniques.

In

effect, scientists argue that recombinant DNA and
classical breeding techniques are equivalent.

Scientists,

assuming the public believes that traditional breeding
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practices do not exploit and cause no harm to people,
animals, or the environment, contend that genetic
engineering is a refinement of existing technology.
Minimizing the novelty of the technology through
association and definition is an attempt to keep the issue
within the realm of the familiar and to build a base from
which predictions about genetic engineering can be made.
Burke refers to this technique as shrinking the
"circumference" of the debate.
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Reducing the

"circumference" of the discussion is an attempt by
scientists to minimize the opportunities for opponents of
genetic engineering to challenge the predictability of the
technology.
So, scientists defend their discipline by suggesting
that their opponents should be ignored because they are
arguing "hidden agendas" or they are ill-informed, or
both.

Scientists argue, too, that biotechnology is

essential for the well-being of the human race.

And,

finally, scientists contend that there is nothing about
biotechnology that people should fear.

They argue that it

is as safe as the breeding techniques that agriculturists
have employed for centuries, assuming that everyone
believes that those practices were safe and effective.
Justifying Future Scientific Research
Without diminishing the effects of Rifkin's
opposition to biotechnology, I contend that the scientific
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world view is a juggernaut.
perhaps unstoppable.

Its momentum is awesome,

This is not to suggest that because

of science's power and position in society that those who
sustain it should assume absolute privilege.

Although

science is the dominant world view of today's society,
proponents of alternative perspectives continue to voice
their concerns for what they perceive are problems created
by science.

Competing paradigms will continue.

Although Rifkin's attack on biotechnology is a
challenge to science in its approach and application,
advocates on both sides of the issue claim to argue on
behalf of the public.

From that point of view, the

recombinant DNA debate is reminiscent of the early
Twentieth Century Hetch Hetchy controversy.

Christine

Oravec's analysis of the Hetch Hetchy debate illustrates
the utility of understanding the intricacies of debating
pragmatics for the public good versus aesthetics for the
public good.

Pragmatists in the San Francisco area argued

for building a dam in the Yosemite National Park to
provide water for the city.

Preservations countered that

building the dam in the park would ruin the aesthetics of
that part of the park and that the national interest would
be served by not building the dam.374

Oravec contends

that "While preservationists strived to reconcile what
seemed to be the contradiction between 'spiritual' values
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and public action, conservationists argued for the
remediation of more immediate practical difficulties."37S
Rifkin's arguments and those of the scientific
orthodoxy follow similar patterns as those in the Hetch
Hetchy controversy.

Rifkin's world view seeks a spiritual

solution to the problems of advancing technology.

He

advocates the abandoning of scientific inquiry for the
"resacralizing" of the human spirit with nature.

Rifkin

contends that this "empathetic" perspective is in the
public interest because it is the only alternative for
survival of the species.

Science, on the other hand,

argues from the pragmatic perspective.

Seeking solutions

to immediate problems, science maintains that advancing
technology will solve many of the problems that plague
society.
Oravec observes that the rhetorical notions of
"public" are shaped "...not only by the immediate context
of the debate, but also by the legitimizing force of
predominant social and political presumptions."376
Noting that the dam was eventually built, Oravec argues
that the nation's prevailing mood of progressivism
ultimately influenced the outcome of the controversy.
Similarly, today's societal predisposition toward
technological development can help scientists in their
rhetorical struggles with heretics.
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As scientists prepare their rhetorical strategies
they must first realize that some of their assumptions may
no longer be valid.

Scientists should consider the

assumption that the public neither knows nor cares about
their research a rhetorical time bomb ready to detonate.
Equally as explosive is the assumption that the public
trusts scientists "to do what is right," therefore they
enjoy total freedom in their scientific pursuits.
Scientists who view the abandonment of these assumptions
as opportunities to advance the cause of science will set
the example for the paradigm.
Rhetorical strategies that focus the public's
attention on the practical applications of biotechnology
will produce results similar to those in the Hetch Hetchy
controversy.

Scientists who describe stringless celery

and more colorful tomatoes, for example, are more likely
to enjoy success than those who defend the injection of
growth hormones in cows or those who describe the benefits
of bacteria to fix nitrogen in soybean plants.
Perhaps even more beneficial to the scientific
community are the strategies that include discussions of
medical advances.

Opponents of biotechnology, in my

judgment, have avoided aggressively debating the use of
recombinant DNA research in medicine because of the
difficulty of demonstrating that the disadvantages
outweigh the benefits.

When Rifkin describes his
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empathetic world of the future, a central theme is an
emphasis on life.

Arguing against a product designed to

prolong life and relieve suffering— even if it is
genetically engineered— is infinitely more difficult than
arguing against an agricultural product with which the
general population may be only indirectly concerned.
Scientists will find that to argue effectively
against their opponents in the future they must focus more
on audiences outside the scientific community.

While the

need to respond to the opposition necessarily requires a
certain amount of "preaching to the choir"—scientists
talking to scientists—eventually, the scientific
community's strategy must incorporate persuasive efforts
targeted for the larger numbers of people who influence
legislators and policy makers—the non-scientific public.
If scientists are to argue effectively against Rifkin
and other opponents of science, they must elevate their
rhetorical strategies above name calling, reiteration of
scientific dogma, and denigration of the public they are
trying to persuade.

They must evaluate the opponents'

rhetoric and attack its weakest points.

For example, one

of Rifkin's vulnerabilities is his use of what Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca identify as argument of direction.
They explain,
The argument of direction implies...the
existence of a series of stages toward a
certain—usually dreaded—end and, with it, the
difficulty, if not the impossibility, of crying
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halt once one has started on the road leading to
that end.
The form of the argument of direction used by Rifkin
is also commonly referred to as the "slippery slope
fallacy."

According to Vincent Barry and Douglas Soccio,

"The fallacy of slippery slope is an argument that objects
to a position on the erroneous belief that the position,
if taken, will set off a chain of events that ultimately
will lead to undesirable action."378

Rifkin claims that

manipulation of genes in plants and animals will
inevitably lead to genetically engineered humans.

The

fallacy of the argument is that there is no causal link
between plant genetics, animal genetics, and human
genetics.

The process can be stopped at any point.

Logic

suggests that the genetic modification of a plant or
animal does not necessarily lead to an unavoidable "slide”
down the biotechnology slope to eugenics as Rifkin
suggests.

Rifkin's notion that biotechnology is

unavoidably destined for eugenics and a genetically
engineered environment is an excessively harsh indictment
of science that taps into what Rushing and Frentz describe
as "... an evolving dystopian shadow myth that expresses
repressed fears the culture has about its relationship to
technology." 379
Another of Rifkin's vulnerabilities is his lack of
specificity in defining both his empathetic world and his
audiences.

As noted earlier, I contend that his lack of
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specificity is intentional.

Restricting descriptions of

his empathetic world to idealistic generalities denies
Rifkin's opponents the opportunity to criticize the
inevitable weaknesses in the plan.

This strategy allows

Rifkin to focus on the weakness of the scientific
orthodoxy rather than responding to specific criticisms of
his alternative world view.
Similarly, Rifkin never clearly defines his
audiences.

Although identifying a target audience is

among the first priorities of most effective rhetors, in
Rifkin's case it appears to have little, if any, priority.
Defining audiences narrows Rifkin's rhetorical
flexibility; it weakens his "us vs. them" strategy.
Rifkin's rhetorical advantage rests in his ability to
define "us" as anything that is not science.

Dividing the

whole "us" into smaller segments exposes vulnerabilities
in Rifkin's strategy.
A Case for Rhetorical Heretics
Undoubtedly, there are individuals in the scientific
community who believe that Rifkin and advocates like him
not only create unnecessary complications for their
research, but engage in behavior that is mostly
destructive to science and society.

I agree that not all

of Rifkin's activities generate ultimately positive
results.

So far, however, whatever detrimental

consequences that result from the activities of opponents
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of biotechnology do not outweigh the benefits of increased
public enlightenment.
It is reasonable to assume that if Rifkin and other
opponents of biotechnology had not involved themselves in
the recombinant DNA controversy, many of the issues being
debated today might still lay dormant in a shroud of
scientific privilege.

It is likely that many of the

regulations governing recombinant DNA would not have been
enacted.

Other than an initial concern for public

involvement expressed in the Asilomar letter in the early
stages of recombinant DNA development, scientists for the
most part have discussed biotechnology research only after
considerable persuasion or coercion from their opponents.
Although Rifkin represents an extreme point of view,
and some of his concerns may be beyond what some people
consider reasonable, he raises issues that need to be
discussed and questions that need to be answered, not only
by scientists, but the public as well.

Chapter 1 noted

that much of Rifkin's advocacy reflects the ideas of at
least one highly regarded contemporary philosopher, Jurgen
Habermas.

Habermas provides the philosophical grounding

to the notion that the world's population is exceeding the
earth's ability to sustain continued consumption.

Rifkin,

however, is responsible for presenting the issues in a
manner that provokes debate.

The issues may have never

been raised nor the questions asked if Rifkin had not
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become involved.

Increased oversight in recombinant DNA

research by government agencies and corporate bans on food
containing BGH seem to validate at least some of Rifkin's
concerns.
The public needs to be aware of the approaching
ethical dilemmas that are likely to evolve from genetic
engineering.

For example, should limits be placed on the

development of transgenic animals?

Or, should the

boundaries of this research be limited only by the
creativity or technical expertise of the scientists
involved? Should the public have the opportunity to debate
these limits?

Are species sacred?

More troubling,

however, are Rifkin's questions of the ethics of eugenics.
Without suggesting that scientists are conspiring to
genetically engineer a superior race of human beings,
other questions of ethics surface as recombinant DNA is
discussed in terms of human applications.

There seems to

be little debate as to whether scientists should employ
genetic engineering to develop a cure for cancer or the
HIV virus.

Even discussions of using biotechnology to

remedy disorders such as Downs syndrome or epilepsy draw
few critics.

But, as recombinant DNA applications venture

further from the confines of catastrophic diseases and
debilitating genetic disorders, the term "disorder" comes
under closer scrutiny.
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Rifkin asks questions that may seem extreme now, but
are certain to become more difficult to answer as
biotechnology advances.

For example, Rifkin asks if left-

handedness and color blindness may one day be defined as
disorders.

If genetic engineering is used to cure

dwarfism, would it be unreasonable to use the technology
to increase the "normal11 height of people for athletic
purposes?

Would parents choose to dictate hair color,

height, intelligence, etc. of their offspring if the
technology provided the means?
question,

Even more sobering is the

"Who will make these decisions?”

Will it be the

scientists, government agencies, or the individuals
involved?

These kinds of questions regarding genetic

engineering are certain to spark debates about the ethics
of these procedures.

The public needs to be aware that

these issues are likely to be topics of controversy in the
years ahead.
Rifkin advances the argument that genetic engineering
is the ultimate technological tool.

Given biotechnology's

capability to change existing plants and animals and
create new ones, he may be right.

Rifkin's ability to

argue the necessity for public involvement in decisions as
crucial as these is essential to the well being of science
as well as society.
Although the public is less directly affected by
biotechnology now than it will be in the future, it has a
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stake in the ultimate uses of recombinant DNA research.
Whether the debate is about applications that increase
food production, lead to medical cures, or develop novel,
new transgenic animals for carnival side shows, the public
should have a voice in whether these kinds of research
activities are pursued.
It is the necessity for public involvement that
validates Rifkin's activities.

A democratic society needs

deliberative discourse that gives voice to the minority
position on issues such as recombinant DNA.
Unfortunately, sometimes the only way these voices can be
heard in the presence of a dominating paradigm, such as
science, is through strident, persistent, and often
extreme discourse.

Although this discourse serves the

purpose of exposing a controversy to more public scrutiny,
it may simultaneously damage the credibility of the people
whom it represents and the cause it espouses.
Heretical Rhetoric-other Considerations
Kurtz and Lessl observe the irony of heresy—that
although the phenomenon is an attack on the orthodoxy, it
also produces beneficial consequences such as increased
solidarity among the supporters of the orthodoxy.
study revealed a similar, but different, irony.

This
The

evidence suggests that Rifkin's heretical challenge slows
the advancement of recombinant DNA research.

Although the

scientific community views Rifkin's opposition as
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detrimental, science may realize some unexpected benefits
from a more gradual implementation of biotechnology.

A

more deliberate approach to research projects may result
in better project conceptualization, planning and
implementation.

Conceivably, these improvements may

result in more meaningful technology.

A higher level of

consensus building may be another benefit of a more
gradual approach to biotechnology.

Increased

implementation periods for research projects potentially
provide researchers and others an opportunity to engage in
activities that build support for their projects.

In

fact, Lawrence Prelli suggests that the notion of
gradualism is among the topoi that form the basis for the
rhetoric of science.380
Another consideration is ethics.

During the ensuing

debates surrounding the recombinant DNA controversy, the
inevitable questions of ethics arise.

Are Rifkin's

analogies, metaphors, interpretations of scientific data
and appeals to fear ethical?
legal battles ethical?

Are his lobbying efforts and

Perhaps one way to address these

questions is by responding to another question:

"Is the

scientific community's rhetorical response to Rifkin's
challenges ethical?"
The examination of the scientific community's
response to Rifkin in Chapter 5 suggests that scientists
formulate their rhetorical strategy primarily around the

legitimacy and credibility of Rifkin and his arguments
rather than the issue themselves.

However, the

scientists' rhetorical approach to questioning the
validity of Rifkin's arguments seem to suggest a more
fundamental challenge.

Rifkin's heretical stance is an

affront to the assumptions of the scientific establishment
and because it is based in social values, his opposition
is perceived by the scientific community as a threat to
scientific rationality.

Because of the seriousness of the

perceived threat, I contend that the scientific
community's rhetorical approach strives not only to
curtail debate to gain a deliberative advantage, but also
seeks to deny Rifkin and others a forum to voice their
opposition. Walter Fisher contends that moral issues are
often "...submerged by ideological and bureaucratic
arguments that insist on rival moralities and technical
arguments which denudes it of morality altogether, making
the dispute one for 'experts' alone to consider."381
Farrell and Goodnight argue that "...even as technical
reasoning encompasses an increasing array of social
questions, its very logic precludes its practitioners from
full social responsibility."382

If the scientific

community's intent is to deny dissent, then its rhetoric
assumes a dimension of questionable ethics.
Value-based judgements that represent public
attitudes must have a role in the implementation of
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scientific technologies that have the potential of
increasing societal anxieties.

Fisher observes that

"Humans as rhetorical beings are as much valuing as they
are reasoning animals. "3#3 The inclusion of value-based
decisions occur only through public scrutiny and debate of
these technologies and the issues that accompany them.
Recombinant DNA may be characterized as what Bitzer terms
a "global exigency."

Bitzer contends that many of today's

exigencies are global in nature and "...no less than a
universal public is sufficient to authorize their
modification. "38*
Farrell and Goodnight suggest that "If the public is
to be revitalized, then the language, the modes of
decision-making, and procedures for establishing consensus
must be discovered for both experts and generalists
alike."
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If, then, deliberative discourse is the most

direct route to consensus, the question of ethics is more
appropriately directed to those endeavoring to impede
discussion than those attempting to broaden the debate.
This does not suggest that Rifkin's rhetorical strategies
should be elevated above ethical considerations, but the
dilemma of how to confront successfully the questionably
ethical strategies of the massive scientific establishment
raises questions of rhetorical priorities.

Does the

context of the controversy place a higher priority on
access to the debate than ethical considerations?

The
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analysis in this study suggests that Rifkin employed
strategies designed to make the public aware of the
advances of recombinant DNA and to draw the scientific
community into the public arena to discuss the technology.
For the most part, Rifkin appears to have taken only those
steps necessary to accomplish these goals.

While the

scientific community questions the ethics of Rifkin's use
of fear and analogies, his application of these rhetorical
tools appears to be within the bounds of ethical
rhetorical invention, particularly when the goal is to
open debate on the biotechnology issue.
Summary
Rifkin's rhetorical efforts reflect the criteria of
Kurtz' characterization of heresy.

As a rhetorical

approach, heresy elevates the arguments of the "deviant
insider" in an institution to a high level of visibility
and draws the defenders of the orthodoxy out of their
cloisters to respond to the challenge.

Heresy draws to

the surface of social concerns issues that may never be
visible otherwise.

In Chapter 1 it was suggested that

heresy eventually becomes the victim of its own success.
Rifkin's heretical challenges validate that observation.
As the heresy increases visibility and points to the
weaknesses in the orthodoxy, the heretic draws
increasingly concentrated rhetorical retribution from the
orthodoxy, ultimately becoming the victim of his own
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success.

The more prominent the heretical challenge, the

more vigilant the orthodox response.
The heretic whose only goals are to overcome the
establishment and to establish the heretical agenda as the
new orthodoxy is likely to find himself engaged in an
effort destined for failure.

If, however, the heretic's

goal is to modify the existing orthodox doctrines and open
hierarchial decisions to broader discussion, then he may
realize a measure of success.
Although Rifkin espouses the cause of a new world
order that replaces the scientific world view with his
"empathetic" world view, the immediate results of his
heretical challenge may produce the most important
implications for rhetoric.

Rifkin demonstrates that

heresy is an important rhetorical strategy for elevating
the visibility of an issue and drawing the opposition into
the debate.

While heresy offers neither a resolution to

the dichotomy between technical reasoning and value-based
reasoning nor a bridge to consensual discourse, its value
is in its ability to initiate dialogue on issues otherwise
relegated to obscurity.
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